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A DECISION-MAKING MODEL PROPOSAL ON HUMAN RELIABILITY 
ANALYSIS ON-BOARD SHIPS 
SUMMARY  
 
Recently, investigation of the human performance affecting factors has become one 
of the focal subjects of industrial and academic organizations. There are ongoing 
extensive studies about it in industries such as nuclear energy, petrochemical 
industry, health services, medical, defence industry, electronic systems and 
transportation. Despite the fact that marine incidents that happen and hazards occur 
on ships mostly on human factor, it is seen that there is not a sufficiently novel study 
that can meet the needs of maritime industry. In recent years, it is observed that 
international authorities such as IMO (International Maritime Organization), ILO 
(International Labour Organization), IACS (Ship Classification Societies e), etc. 
increased their studies. As statistical studies point out that human error proportion 
reaches 80% level and the problem becomes obstinate, the subject of human safety 
analysis on ships is chosen. Because of that this study is parallel to expectation of a 
solution to this problem of maritime industry decision-makers and their stakeholders.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop an unique human reliability analysis 
approach on-board ship based on a decision-making model proposal in order to 
eliminate and minimize the human error during critical shipboard operations. This 
approach, additionally contributing current human reliability analysis methods in 
academic literature, will be applicable on vessel fleets such as container, chemical 
tanker, petrol tanker, LGP tanker, bulk. With the study under this thesis, it is 
predicted to reach solid targets mentioned below: i) To minimize the error risk by 
assessing human reliability in shipboard operations, ii) To test proposed approach for 
critical shipboard operations such as loading or discharging cargo, bunkering, ballast 
operations, anchoring, shipboard contingency actions, working in enclosed space, 
maritime pollution prevention, iii) To create available solutions for shipboard 
operational concept by developing a valid approach to human error assessment, iv) 
To determine preventive actions (that improves human reliability) against pivotal 
factors that cause errors in shipboard operations, vi) To contribute to ship safety 
management system practices. 
 
In human reliability analysis study of correlation among variables especially with 
incident causalities generic task types (GTT) and error producing conditions (EPC), 
suitable customization to ship platform, weighting of variables related to decision-
making method, consistency in weighting and increasing sensitivity can be 
mentioned as original aspects of the project. In other words, EPC values will be re-
determined by quantifying variables of an existing human reliability analysis method 
(HEART) with synthesis of human factor analyse and classification system (HFACS) 
approach. Also, this thesis proposes a smart solution utilising analytic hierarchy 
xx 
 
process (AHP) technique to weight the importance of each EPC since they are 
weighted from 0 to 1.Because term descriptions of variables of existing studies in 
literature are in general structure and direct weighting is implemented on variables. 
With this study, via offering solutions to related points, implementation of 
management of human error analysis and reduction technique will be consistently 
provided in maritime industry. Specially, even though there are peculiar, developed 
human reliability analysis methods in aviation and railway as well as nuclear 
industries, there is no unique method for maritime industry yet. With the method 
presented by the thesis will both satisfy this requirement and it is expected to be 
utilized in similar sectors such as ports, shipyards, off-shore platforms, etc. To keep 
contact with academic and industrial experts to contribute researchers` careers.  As a 
result, proposed thesis with these aspects, will be providing new perspective to 
human reliability assessment researches and will provide marine-specific HRA in 
transportation industry.  
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GEMİLERDE İNSAN GÜVENİLİRLİĞİ ANALİZİ ÜZERİNE BİR KARAR 
VERME MODELİ ÖNERİSİ 
ÖZET  
 
Denizde emniyet son yıllarda önemi artan bir konu olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Artan 
ticaret hacmi ve gemi filoları denizciliği önemli bir sektör haline getirmesine rağmen 
emniyet standartları hala yersiz kalabilmektedir. Bu kapsamda denizde emniyet ve 
çevrenin korunması için uluslararası otoriteler çalışmalarına devam etmektedir. 
Ayrıca akademik alanda denizde emniyeti geliştirecek ve çevre kirliliğini azaltacak 
yönde önleyici çalışmalar yapılmaktadır. Bu aşamada insan faktörü en önemli sebep 
olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Günümüzde gemi operasyonlarında meydana gelen 
kazalar ve tehlikeli oluşumlarda insan faktörü yüksek oranda ön plana çıkmaktadır. 
Bu oluşumları indirgemek için eğitimler, uygulamalı talimler, sıkı denetimler ve 
yaptırımlar getirilmiş ancak gemide meydana gelen kazalar ve tehlikeli oluşumlar 
tam olarak engellenememiştir. 
 
Günümüzde insan performansını etkileyen faktörlerin incelenmesi endüstriyel ve 
akademik organizasyonların odak konularından biri haline gelmiştir. Hali hazırda 
başta nükleer enerji olmak üzere sağlık hizmetleri, tıp, savunma sanayi, elektronik 
sistemler, petrokimya endüstrisi ve taşımacılık alanında konu ile ilgili kapsamlı 
çalışmalar devam etmektedir. Ancak, denizcilik endüstrisinin ihtiyaçlarına cevap 
verebilecek nitelikte bir çalışmanın olmadığı görülmektedir. Oysa gemilerde 
meydana gelen kazalar ve tehlikeli oluşumlarda insan faktörü yüksek oranda ön 
plana çıkmaktadır. Son yıllarda insan hataları üzerine uluslararası otoritelerin 
(Uluslararası Denizcilik Örgütü, Uluslararası Çalışma Örgütü, Gemi Klaslama 
Kurumları, vb.) çalışmalarını artırdığı görülmektedir. Bahsedilen insan hata 
oranlarının istatistiksel araştırmalarda %80 düzeylerini bulması ve problemin kronik 
bir hal alması nedeni ile gemilerde insan güvenirliliği analizi konusu seçilmiştir. 
Dolayısıyla bu çalışma denizcilik endüstrisi karar mercilerinin ve paydaşlarının bu 
konudaki çözüm beklentileri ile paralellik arz etmektedir.  
 
Bu tezin amacı, gemi platformunda insa hatalarından doğabilecek operasyonel 
problemleri en aza indirgemek için özgün bir insan güvenirliliği analiz ve takip 
sistemini geliştirilmiştir. Akademik literatürde mevcut insan güvenirliliği analizi 
yöntemlerine de katkı yaparak geliştirilecek bu sistem konteyner, kimyasal tanker, 
petrol tankeri, sıvılaştırılmış gaz tankeri, dökme yük gibi gemilerde uygulanabilir 
olması sağlanmıştır. Tez kapsamında yürütülen çalışma ile aşağıda sıralanan somut 
hedeflere ulaşılması öngörülmüştür: i) Gemi operasyonlarında insan güvenirliliğini 
ölçerek hata riskini en aza indirgemek, ii) Önerilen yaklaşımı yükleme veya tahliye, 
yakıt alımı, balast işlemleri, demirleme, gemi acil durum eylemleri, kapalı mahalde 
çalışma, deniz kirliliği önleme gibi kritik gemi operasyonları için test etmek, iii) 
xxii 
 
İnsan hatası ölçümü için geçerli bir yaklaşım geliştirerek gemi operasyonel 
konseptine uygun çözümler üretmek, iv) Gemi operasyonlarında hataya neden olan 
odak faktörlere yönelik önleyici (insan güvenirliliği iyileştirici) faaliyetleri 
belirlemek, vi) Gemi emniyet yönetim sistemi uygulamalarına katkı sağlamak. 
 
Bu tezin araştırma planı, operasyonel seviyedeki değişenlerin analizi ile gemi 
platformunda insan hataları en aza indirgenerek, emniyet unsuru geliştirilebilir 
kuramsal yaklaşımı üzerine kurulmuştur. Bu tezda izlenecek yöntemin ana hatları  
kavramsal araştırma, yöntem geliştirme ve uygulama aşamaları üzerine 
tasarlanmıştır. İnsan güvenirliliği analizinde özellikle kaza nedensellikleri ile genel 
görev türleri (GGT) ve hata üreten koşullar (HÜK) gibi değişkenler arası 
korelasyonun araştırılması, gemi platformuna uygun olarak özelleştirilmesi, karar 
verme yöntemi ile ilgili değişkenlerin ağırlıklandırılması, ağırlıklandırmada tutarlılık 
ve hassasiyetin artırılması projenin özgün yönleri olarak ifade edilebilir. Bu 
kapsamda analytik hiyerarşi süreci yöntemi kullanılarak hata üreten koşulların 
göreceli ağırlıklandırılması sağlanmıştır. Ayrıca, literatürdeki mevcut bir insan 
güvenirliliği analiz modelinin değişkenleri, denizcilik endüstrisi kaza verilerinin 
sentezi ile sayısallaştırarak ilgili hata üreten koşullar değerleri yeniden belirlenmiştir. 
Çünkü literatürdeki mevcut çalışmalarda değişkenlerin koşul tanımları genel 
yapıdadır ve değişkenler üzerine doğrudan ağırlıklandırma yapılmaktadır. Bu tez 
kapsamında denizcilik için özgün hale getirilecek hata üreten koşullar (HÜK) 
yeniden hesaplanırken doğruluğunu ölçmek için farklı gemi tiplerinden farklı kaza 
örnekleri incelenmiştir. Bu incelemeler neticesinde elde edilen deniz kaza sebepleri 
tek tek ilgili sınıflara dağıtılmıştır. Bu dağılım neticesinde her bir kaza nedeni ilişkili 
olduğu HÜK’ ler üzerine önem derecesine gore pay edilmiştir. Bu kapsamda sıralı 
ağırlıklandırma yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Farklı filo guruplarından (ham petrol tankeri, 
kimyasal tanker, konteyner, dökme yük ve general kargo gemi filoları) alınan uzman 
görüşleri neticesi ile sıralı ağırlıklandırma yapılarak HÜK değerleri bulunmuştur. 
Sonraki aşamada normalize edilen değerler ilk değerler ile bağımsız T testi ile 
karşılaştırılmış ve doğrulanmıştır. 
 
Denizcilik için hesaplanan HÜK değerleri uygulama kısmında kullanılmış ve 
sonuçları değerlendirilmiştir. Bu kapsamda kimyasal tanker gemisinde propylen oksit 
yükü tahliyesi analiz edilmiştir. Uygulama gerçek gemi ortamında yapılmış ve gemi 
kaptanının değerlendirmesi ile operasyon sırasında insan güvenirlirlik analizi 
yapılmıştır. Sonuçlar çerçevesinde insan güvenilirliği aralığı tespit edilmiş ve bu 
aralığı aşan değerler için önleyici faaliyet planı geliştirilmiştir.  
 
Bu çalışma ile literatüre ilgili hususlarda çözümler önererek, insan hata 
değerlendirme ve indirgeme yönteminin denizcilik alanında tutarlı bir şekilde 
uygulanması sağlanmıştır. Özellikle havacılık, demiryolu ya da nükleer enerji 
sektöründe kendine has geliştirilmiş insan güvenirliliği analiz yöntemleri olmasına 
karşın denizcilik alanına özgün bir yöntem henüz yoktur. Bu tez ile ortaya konulacak 
yöntem (MAHRA) ilgili açığı gidermekle birlikte; liman, tersane, açık deniz 
platformları, petrol çıkarma kuyuları, yüzer-üretim-depolama-yükleme üniteleri gibi 
benzer alanlarda kullanılması öngörülmektedir. Tez kapsamında yürütülen çalışma 
ile sıralanan somut hedeflere ulaşılması ve ilgili ölçme ve karşılaştırmalar ile 
değerlendirilmesi öngörülmüştür. Bu hedefler; i) Gemi operasyonlarında insan 
güvenirliliğini ölçülmüş ve hata riski en aza indirgenmeye çalışılmıştır, ii) Önerilen 
MAHRA yaklaşımı ile kritik gemi operasyonları için uygulama fırsatı 
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oluşturulmuştur, iii) İnsan hatası ölçümü için geçerli bir yaklaşım geliştirerek gemi 
operasyonel konseptine uygun çözümler üretilmiştir, iv) Gemi operasyonlarında 
hataya neden olan odak faktörlere yönelik önleyici (insan güvenirliliği iyileştirici) 
faaliyetleri belirlenmiştir, v) Gemi emniyet yönetim sistemi uygulamalarına katkı 
sağlanmıştır. 
Sonuç olarak, yukarıda belirtilen önleri ile önerilen çalışma, insan güvenilirlik 
değerlendirmesi araştırmalarına çeşitli yönlerden yeni bakış açıları getirirken, 
denizcilik alanında odak bir konuya çözüm üretecektir. Gemilerde insan hata 
olasılıklarını istenilen düzeylere indirgediğimiz takdirde, uygunsuzların, tehlikeli 
oluşumların hatta kazaların büyük ölçüde önlenebileceği görülmektedir. Bu yönü ile 
düşünüldüğünde, önerilen yöntem ile geliştirilecek olan insan güvenilirliği analiz 
yöntemi, uluslararası denizcilik örgütü ve ilgili denizcilik otoritelerinin stratejik 
hedef olarak ortaya koyduğu, sürdürülebilir deniz taşımacılığı konseptinin, 
gereklerini somut olarak destekleyecek bir adım olarak görülebilir. Yürütülen tezin 
ilk etapta ulusal düzeyde desteklenerek, disiplinlerarası yukarıda sıralanan ilkeler 
doğrultusunda çalışmanın sürdürmesi ile birlikte kısa vadede olgunlaştırılan 
denizcilikte insan güvenilirliğinin bilgi tabanlı ölçümü ve hassasiyet düzeyi 
kavramları, orta ve uzun vadede denizcilik otoritelerine yeni bir emniyet konsepti 
(gemi personeli güvenilirlik indeksi gibi) olarak sunulması ile ülkemizi uluslararası 
düzeyde denizcilik bilgi ve teknolojileri konularında çözüm öneren noktaya 
taşıyacaktır. Bu kapsamda tezin ortaya koyduğu teorik çalışmanın gemi 
platformunda insan güvenirliliğinin sürekli izlemesi için önerilen yaklaşımı kullanıcı 
arayüzü yazılımı ile desteklemesi çalışmanın sonraki etapları olarak planlanmaktadır.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Safety is very essential subject in maritime transportation. It directly affects human 
life, environment and commodity. Maritime safety requires a set of rules and 
activities on-board ships and most of them should have controlled by shore based 
organisation or maritime authorities. Although maritime authorities have adopted 
numerous regulations and codes, safety has not raised to the desired level.  
Maritime industry is composed of numerous elements such as ships, crew, 
ownerships, management and administration authorities, classification and insurance 
society, maritime authorities, etc. which have a different effect on the overall 
performance. One of the most important elements of those is ship crew since various 
technical or maintenance operations on-board ship have been performed by human. 
Moreover, non-automated system shall require direct human inputs for shipboard 
operation or maintenance. It appears that human behaviour is often a root or 
significant contributing cause of system failure. Therefore, human reliability plays a 
crucial role since the statistics show that about eighty percent of marine accident had 
occurred due to human errors (Fotland, 2004).  
Humans represent the largest contribution to system failure with an estimated 
percentage of more than 80% (Kirwan,1987). Nowadays, investigation of the human 
performance affecting factors has become one of the focal subjects of industrial and 
academic organizations. There are ongoing extensive studies about it in industries 
such as nuclear energy, health services, medical, defence industry, electronic systems 
and transportation. Despite the fact that accidents that happen and dangers occur on 
ships mostly on human factor (Wang, 2007), it is seen that there is not a sufficiently 
good practice that can meet the needs of maritime industry. In recent years, it is 
observed that international authorities (International Maritime Organization (IMO), 
International Labour Organization (ILO), Ship Classification Societies etc.) 
increased their studies. As statistical studies point out that mentioned human error 
proportion reaches 80% level and the problem becomes obstinate, the subject of 
human safety analysis on ships is chosen (Fotland, 2004). Because of that, this study 
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is parallel to expectation of a solution to this problem of maritime industry decision-
makers and their stakeholders.  
Maritime safety is very substantial topic because it covers an advance system of 
players. The consequences might affect those players (crew, environment and ships) 
drastically if the system is broken. Therefore, there is strong tendency for maritime 
safety analysis and seeking an advance creative solution for enhancement of safety, 
protection of the environment and loss of human life. In a broad sense, there are 
limited numbers of studies performed upon maritime safety analysis. For example, a 
quantitative risk assessment is conducted upon deficiency databases gathered from 
ship inspection (Heij et al., 2011). Furthermore, another study performed by Mullai 
and Paulsson (2011) was introduced as a new approach namely grounded theory 
model. This research mainly based on maritime accident statistics. A review of the 
formal safety analysis method is performed to review and criticize deficiency of IMO 
status (Psaraftis, 2012). Hence, strengths and weaknesses of them were revealed. 
Similarly, a new approach was proposed by Karahalios et al. (2011) to enable of 
assessment the implementation performance of international maritime regulation. 
Moreover, Yang et al., (2013) criticised the challenges of maritime safety analysis 
and the different approaches used to quantify the risks in maritime transportation 
industry. Furthermore, Akyuz and Celik (2014a) have conducted a study utilising 
hybrid decision-making approach in order to measure effectiveness of safety 
management system (SMS) implementations in the recent time. The main purpose of 
this research is to measure effectiveness of SMS and enhance its implementation on-
board ship. 
Since safety is one of the most significant topics in maritime industry, statistics show 
that human/crew factor is the major contributory factor of marine accidents 
(Mazzuchi et al., 1998). Therefore, human reliability plays crucial role to minimize 
marine accident that may results injury or loss of life, environment pollution and 
cargo damages.  Within this context, this thesis aim is to analyse human reliability 
during shipboard operation. A smart technique for the quantification of human error 
in maritime industry will be developed. In order to achieve that, the thesis organized 
as follows. This section provides introduction concerning maritime safety and human 
reliability analysis (HRA) also highlight of the research aims, impacts and 
contribution to marine industry. The next section deals with literature review upon 
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HRA and its application on maritime industry as well as research alternative HRA 
techniques. The third section proposes a decision-making model for human reliability 
analysis on-board ship. Section four demonstrates the model with shipboard 
operations. The final section gives conclusion, discussion and contribution of the 
proposed model into marine industry.      
1.1 Purpose of Thesis 
In the light of above, the aim of this research is to analyse human reliability on-
board ship based on a decision-making model proposal in order to eliminate and 
minimize the human error during shipboard operations and particularly to reduce the 
occurrence of human error incidence that may arise out due to human (crew) errors. 
Moreover, human reliability factor during shipboard operations will be widely 
discussed and analysed comprehensively in this thesis. A new perspective in marine 
industry will be introduced by minimising human error factor and enhancement of 
human reliability simultaneously. Thus, the proposed model is expected to contribute 
significantly for compensating shortfalls of human reliability enhancement in 
maritime industry.  
This thesis, additionally contributing current HRA methods in academic literature, 
will be tested on vessel fleets such as container, chemical tanker, petrol tanker, bulk 
carrier and their operational feasibility and validity will be verified. Within this 
context, the research is predicted to reach solid targets mentioned below:  
i) Minimize the error risk by assessing human reliability in shipboard operations,  
ii) Test proposed approach for critical shipboard operations such as loading or 
discharging cargo, bunkering, ballast operations, anchoring, shipboard contingency 
actions, working in enclosed space, maritime pollution prevention,  
iii) Create available solutions for shipboard operational concept by developing a 
valid approach to human error assessment,  
iv) Support proposed approach to constant observation of human reliability on-board 
ship  
v) Determine preventive actions (that improves human reliability) against pivotal 
factors that cause errors in shipboard operations,  
vi) Contribute to ship safety management system practices. 
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1.2 Impact of Thesis 
HRA is very substantial topic due to the contributions of humans to the systems 
flexibility and to possible adverse consequences of human errors or oversights when 
the human reliability is important part of the large systems. It describes how reliable 
the operator is to conduct the task successfully or how long the operator will perform 
task without committing error (Yip et al., 1984). This study is expected to give 
original contributions to the ship management companies, ship operators, safety 
engineers and maritime researchers during the analysing of human reliability on-
board ship operations. Moreover, the proposed model remedies the gap between 
system reliability and maritime transportation industry in terms of adopting 
operational data in safety and reliability analysis. The following subjects of the thesis 
can be highlighted as a contribution;  
 The proposed approach can utilize both qualitative and quantitative data in 
maritime safety and human reliability analysis. 
 A novel HRA technique based on decision-making model will be developed 
to improve safety for maritime applications.  
 It would be substantial advantage for literature in establishing a marine 
transportation-specific methodology to evaluate human reliability. 
 The research provides unique parameter for marine industry to improve HRA 
calculation sensitivity.   
 This research contributes evaluation human of reliability on-board ship. 
 The model-based approach can assist ship management companies, safety 
engineers and reliability researchers to give their full attention on the most 
critical human error factor. 
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2.  LITERATURE REVIEW  
Human factor is very essential issue for safety. Especially, human reliability 
assessment has always been a critical issue for risk researchers, safety experts and 
engineers. The reasons of that human reliability assessment method are subjective 
and the data concerning human factor is impreciseness. Human reliability can be 
defined as human performance, which shows how reliable the person/operator can 
perform the action correctly or how long the person/operator can perform without 
failure (Pyy, 2000).  
HRA is quite new disciplinary research which was introduced in three stages. The 
first stage is covering the date between 1970 -1990 where it is known as the first 
generation of human reliability methods. The second stage is between 1990 - 2005 
years where it is introduced as the second generation. Since 2005, the third 
generation of human reliability methods have been introduced.  
The first probabilistic HRA was performed after Second World War for weapon 
system feasibility (Swain, 1990). Thereafter, the method has applied in numerous 
disciplines such as nuclear power plant (Zubair and Zhijian, 2013; Chang et al., 
2013; Groth and Mosleh, 2012; O’Hara et al., 2008; Kim and Jung, 2003), engine 
systems (Chang et al., 2010; Chang et al., 2004; Hong and Pai, 2006; Liang and 
Tong, 2001), electronic systems (Liang and Wang, 1993; Soi and Aggarwal, 1980), 
weapon and defence system (Hausken, 2008; Gary et al., 1988; Swain, 1990), 
manufacturing (Bertolini et al., 2010; Jones et al., 2010; Ke and Shen, 1999), 
transportation (Calhoun et al., 2014; Guo et al., 2012; Kirwan et al., 2008; Baysari, 
2011; Vanderhaegen, 2001), software system (Podofillini and Dang, 2013; EI-
Sebakhy, 2008; Costa et al., 2005), etc.  
Numerous HRA techniques have been developed to determine human reliability. 
Totally, 31 potential HRA related methodology have been proposed so far. Table 2.1 
provides potential HRA methods used in practice. However, among the mentioned 
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methods, THERP, SLIM, ATHEANA, CREAM, HEART, SPAR-H, NARA, CARA, 
RARA and Bayesian Network have been commonly used in literature. 
Table 2.1 : HRA methods used in practice. 
Abbreviated 
name 
Methodology Developed by 
ASEP Accident sequence evaluation programme Swain, 1987 
AIPA Accident initiation and progression analysis Raabe, 1976 
APJ Absolute probability judgement Dalkey and Helmer,  
1963 
ATHEANA A Technique for human error analysis Cooper et al., 1996 
BN Bayesian network Almond, 1992 
CAHR Connectionism assessment of human reliability Sträter, 2000 
CARA Controller action reliability assessment Kirwan and Gibson, 
2008 
CES Cognitive environmental simulation 
Woods and Roth, 
1987 
CESA Commission errors search and assessment Reer and Dang, 2007 
COCOM Contextual control model Hollnagel, 1993 
COGENT Cognitive event tree Swain and Gutterman, 
1983 
COSIMO Cognitive simulation model Cacciabue et al., 1992  
CREAM Cognitive reliability and error analysis method Hollnagel, 1998 
DREAMS Dynamic reliability technique for error assessment in man-
machine system 
Cacciabue et al., 1993 
FACE Framework for analysing commission errors Pyy, 2000 
HCR Human cognitive reliability Hannaman et al.,1984 
HEART Human error assessment and reduction technique Williams, 1992 
HRMS Human reliability management system Reason, 2000 
MAPPS Maintenance personnel performance simulation Knee et al., 1984 
MERMOS Méthode d’Evaluation de la réalisation des missions Bieder et al., 1998 
 
opérateur pour la sûreté 
 NARA Nuclear action reliability assessment Kirwan et al., 2004 
OATS Operator action tree system Wreathall et al., 1982 
OHPRA Operational human performance reliability analysis 
 PC Pair comparisons method Hunns, 1982 
RARA Railway action reliability assessment Gibson et al.,2013 
SHARP Systematic human action reliability procedure Nus Coporation, 1984 
SLIM Success likelihood index methodology Embrey et al.,1984 
SPAR-H Simplified plant analysis risk human reliability 
assessment 
Gertman et al.,2005 
STAHR Socio-Technical assessment of human reliability Phillips et al.,1985 
TESEO Empirical technique for estimating operator errors 
Bello and Colombari, 
1980 
THERP              Technique for human error rate prediction 
 
Swain and 
Gutterman, 1983 
In a broad sense, HRA models take into account as many factors as the designers of 
the method thought desirable. The methods have following certain limitations. 
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 The knowledge of designer and experience of the system, 
 Preciseness and comprehensiveness degree is needed, 
 Structure and organization should be examined,  
In this context, numerous of HRA techniques for estimating HEP value have been 
proposed in recent years. Some of these techniques conducted into practice while 
some are only theoretical. The one of this method developed for the HRA is the 
technique for human error rate prediction (THERP). This technique is considered as 
the first generation method that is still valid. The aim of the model is to assess human 
reliability by dealing with task analysis, failure definition and quantification of HEP 
values. It is developed for nuclear power plant in order to conduct probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) but might be applied in any other disciplines such as off-shore 
where human error risk involvement is comparatively high. Since the method has 
some advantages such as well used in practice or powerful HRA technique, there are 
some limitation in practice. It does not reflect impact of performance shaping factors 
(PSFs) on performance as well as time consuming and intensive for user.  
Furthermore, success likelihood index methodology (SLIM) was proposed by 
Embrey et al. (1984) in order to assess failure in task or action sequences. The 
method has been applied for maintenance or operational cases and mainly based on 
expert’s judgement to assess human performance. The method is a decision-analytic 
approach to HRA which uses expert judgement to quantify PSFs, concerning the 
individuals, environment or task. There are some restrictions of the method. Lacking 
of the quantitative element and relying on mainly expert judgement are the notable 
limitations. 
Another HRA method is a technique for human error analysis (ATHEANA) which 
has been developed in recent years by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The 
ATHEANA is considered as the second generation technique and provides a detailed 
search process for identifying human actions.  It enables user to find EFC by utilising 
and combining experiences and knowledge in safety engineering, PRA and human 
factors. The method utilises a quantification technique for HFS probability relied on 
predict of how likely or typically the system conditions and PSF comparising the 
EPC occur. Even though the method can be applied in various disciplines, there have 
been some limitations. First of all it is impracticable and not cost-effective for users. 
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The guidance is very complicated and mainly depends on expert judgements. 
Moreover, the quantification method is weak as well as the quantitative results are 
invalidated. Also, the method doe not produce HEP since it is one of the most 
significant outcomes of PRA.  
The other HRA technique commonly used in literature is cognitive reliability and 
error analysis method (CREAM) which is considered as second generation technique 
Hollnagel (1998). There are two versions of the CREAM method; the basic and the 
extended. The basic method provides an overall evaluation of the performance 
reliability that might be expected for tasks while the extended version uses the results 
of the basic version to check or investigate actions of task more deeply. The method 
utilised CPC which determine the human error probability control mode. The 
CREAM technique has been derived from Contextual Control Model (COCOM). 
The aim of the COCOM was to provide conceptual and practical basis in order to 
enhance operator performance (Hollnagel, 1993). Therefore, control modes in four 
different characteristics are defined in accordance with the human cognition and 
action content. Some of restricitions with technique have been found such as the data 
needed to complete the analysis. Additionally, more development is required and 
could be linked to cognitive task analysis approach (Kirwan, 1998). The method has 
been mainly applied in NPP, however CPCs are considered as generic. Therefore, it 
is suitable to use in any other disciplines where human factor is crucial. There are a 
couple of studies performed upon marine industry by utilising CREAM. The method 
seems powerful tool for HRA and is still valid. 
Williams (1988) originates another technique named as human error assessment and 
reduction technique (HEART) which is one of the few HRA methods that have been 
empirically validated. The practitioners utilise HEART in order to quantify error 
probability occurring throughout the completion of a particular task by applying 
weighting factors. The method is furtherly developed and applied in numerous 
disciplines. The method basically comprises GTT and EPC in order to assign 
nominal HEP values. Generic values for HEP values depend on generic tasks which 
can be adopted in most cases. HEART has been extensively used in NPP but it is 
cross toll that is applicable to any discipline where human reliability has potential 
importance. The method has been successfully modified and applied in various 
industries including chemical, nuclear plants, aviation, rail and medical. The method 
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is very easy tool to understand and apply in real human reliability problems. 
However, the system parameters should be modified for application in other 
industries such as maritime.   
Standardized plant analysis risk - Human reliability (SPAR-H) method was 
introduced by US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 1994 to model the 
human reliability performance in NPP. This method was modified in 1999 after 
experience gathered in field testing (Gertman et al.,2005).  The aim of this 
methodology is to identify HEP values based on human performance influences. The 
PSFs (mainly based on eight PSFs) are utilised by experts in order to define the 
human factor incluence. The method is user-friendly and easy to apply. Yet, it is 
applicable only for NPP and oil&gas industry cases. The SPAR-H model has some 
disadvantages such as not taking in consideration the PSFs direct effect upon cases. 
The results are widely based on experts’ opinion and provide accurate results up to 
experts’ knowledge.     
Another HRA method was proposed to monitor human reliability performance by 
offering PSA. The method is known as Nuclear Action Reliability Assessment 
(NARA), which is based on a data mining in UK NPP. This technique aims to 
develop a smart toll to quantify the reliability of human interactions in NPP. The 
method is derived from HEART since it is not always fit for NPP task being 
assessed. Therefore, Kirwan et al. (2004) was introduced NARA as a new tool based 
on more recent and relevant data. NARA have some advantages rather than HEART 
including a smooth understanding of core data are used to derive the GTT and EPC 
parameters. On the other hand, parameters used in NARA have merely specify for 
NPP industries.  
Kirwan and Gibson (2008) recognized a similar approach CARA (Controller Action 
Reliability Assessment) as a new human reliability assessment tool. The objective of 
the method is to analyse human error probability relevant to ATC. This method, 
likewise NARA, is based on tailoring the basic principle of HEART. Unique GTT 
and EPC parameters were defined in accordance with aviation industry.  Then, 
HEART methodology uses a simple calculation to integrate both parameters to get 
final HEP. The proposed method is widely used for aviation industry since it has 
specific parameters.         
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Railway Action reliability Assessment (RARA) has recently been proposed for a 
specific approach to human error quantification (Gibson et al., 2012). It is developed 
to encourage the consideration of human reliability performance in railway industry.  
The aim of the method is to improve consideration of human reliability factor and 
provide an easy tool for human error quantification in railway industry. The method 
has been derived from HEART methodology by using information and structural 
framework.  The RARA uses the calculation methodology of HEART. The method 
specifies parameters for the railway industry.  
Bayesian network (Almond, 1992) method has been proposed in recent years as a 
last generation of the HRA (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007). BN method can provide 
qualitatively model the causal relationships between organisational factors and 
human reliability as well as quantitatively measure human operational reliability, 
identifying the most likely root causes or prioritisation of root causes of human error. 
It provides nodes between the variables where dependency existing among them.  
The method based on a compact representation of a multivariate distribution function 
and applied in various disciplines. There are some limitation for the method such as 
difficulties in obtaining conditional probabilities in data bank and mainly based on 
expert judgements. However, the methodology has been widely applied in literature.  
2.1 Literature Review of HRA on Marine Transportation 
After having research application of HRA marine transportation, the results shows up 
that research are quite limited. There have been totally 34 researches existing in 
literature in respect of HRA application since 1995 years. Furthermore, 20 of those 
are fully research paper published in journals, 9 of them are conference proceeding 
papers and rest of them are books/brochures. Figure 2.1 shows graphical distribution 
of researches upon HRA on marine transportation in accordance with the recent 
years.  Apparantly, studies upon human reliability analysis have been increasing 
since 1995. Especially, the topic has clearly gained more importance in recent years 
since human error factor and recovery are key attributes of a reliability assessment 
approach.  
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Figure 2.1 : Researches upon HRA on marine transportation in recent years. 
Meantime, Reliability Engineering & System Safety and Safety Science journals 
appear the prominent publisher with totally 11 research papers. These articles 
analysing human reliability and applies alternative HRA methods focusing various 
emergency conditions such as collision, grounding, etc. Figure 2.2 provides graph for 
distribution of articles published in journals since 1995 years. 
 
Figure 2.2 : Distribution of articles published in journals in recent years. 
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The HRA researches conducted upon marine industry have numerous topics. Most of 
them are utilised existing HRA methodology into various applications. The aim of 
the researches mainly focused on to minimise or prevent human error while critical 
marine operations/processes in advance. Figure 2.3 illustrates the research topics 
applied in journals and proceedings related to marine industry since 1995 years. In 
this context, collision of ships is one of the vital issues for HRA since human factor 
plays a crucial role. The second major topic related to HRA is maritime 
transportation system including container shipment on-board ship. 
 
Figure 2.3 : Research topic related to marine transportation industry. 
In the light of above, Table 2.2 shows the elaborative list including journal and 
conference papers gathered from literature research for HRA in marine transportation 
industry. Amrozowicz et al. (1997) proposed a probabilistic risk analysis method to 
identify tanker ships accident risks. The paper utilised fault trees and event trees and 
integrated them with THERP in order to quantify individual errors. The main goal of 
this research is to perceive the nature of the failures that may result vessel grounding. 
Thus, the paper demonstrated the proposed approach with tanker grounding.      
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Table 2.2 : Elaborative list for HRA in marine transportation industry. 
Author Methodology Topic Publisher (Journal or Conference paper) 
Akyuz and Celik, 2015a HEART-AHP Shipboard operation Safety Science 
Akyuz and Celik, 2015b CREAM LPG cargo operation Journal of Loss Prevention in the Proc. Ind. 
Akyuz and Celik, 2015 HFACS-HEART-AHP Shipboard operation Conference 
Goerlandt and Montewka, 2014 Bayesian network Collision Marine Pollution Bulletin 
Montewka et al., 2014 Bayesian belief network Collision Reliability Engineering and System Safety 
Goerlandt and Kujala, 2014 Quantitative risk analysis Collision Safety Science 
Akthar and Utne, 2014 Bayesian network Grounding Safety Science 
Gaonkar et al., 2013 Fuzzy set Maritime transportation 
system 
Ocean Engineering 
Musharraf et al., 2013 Bayesian network and SLIM Emergency situation Safety Science 
Martins and Maturana, 2013 Bayesian belief network Collision Reliability Engineering and System Safety 
Yang et al., 2013 CREAM Cargo oil pump Ocean Engineering 
Gao et al., 2013 Possibilistic theory Ship crane Conference 
El-laden and Turan,2012 Human entropy boundary conditions Emergency situation Reliability Engineering and System Safety 
Yang and Wang, 2012 CREAM Maritime transportation 
system 
Conference 
Sulaiman et al., 2012 - Navigation  African  Journal of Business Management 
Riahi et al., 2012 Fuzzy logic and AHP Crew performance Conference 
Xi and Guo, 2011 APJE-SLIM Collision Applied Mechanics and Materials 
Turan et al., 2011 Fault tree analysis Diving support vessel Quality and Reliability Engineering Int. 
Gaonkar et al., 2011 Fuzzy set Maritime transportation 
system 
Expert System with Application 
Martins and Maturana, 2010 Formal safety assessment Collision Risk Analysis 
Montewka et al., 2010 Monte Carlo method Collision Reliability Engineering and System Safety 
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 Table 2.2 (continued) : Elaborative list for HRA in marine transportation industry. 
Author Methodology Topic Publisher (Journal or Conference paper) 
Kenji et al., 2010 Cognitive reliability theory Navigation  Conference 
Konstandinidou et al., 2006 Fuzzy CREAM - Reliability Engineering and System Safety 
Trucco et al., 2006 Bayesian network and fault tree 
analysis 
Collision Conference 
Mennis et al., 2006 Markov theory Environment protection Conference 
Chen and Moan, 2004 Quantitative risk analysis Collision Reliability Engineering and System Safety 
Sii et al., 2001 Fuzzy If-Then rules Maritime transportation 
system 
Reliability Engineering and System Safety 
Malone et al., 2000 - Collision Conference 
Amrozowicz et al., 1997 THERP Grounding Conference 
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Likewise, Malone et al. (2000) presented another conference paper in order to 
enhance human reliability performance in port and shipping operations. The aim of 
this paper is to identify human factors engineering and reduce human errors. In order 
to fulfil that, the authors show some empirical data to illustrate the benefits of human 
factors engineering in minimizing the marine accident in port. A collision case at 
Harbour is demonstrated as an application.   
Sii et al. (2001) explained a qualitative safety modelling for risk assessment in 
marine transportation system. The paper utilised fuzzy logic approach based on if-
then rules in order to model numerous design parameters for marine engineering 
systems. An illustrative example in line of fire cases in fuel oil system failure is 
introduced as marine engineering systems. Thus, the proposed approach may help to 
carry out risk assessment in the initial design level. The development of fuzzy 
linguistic parameters and membership functions are identified in the paper. 
Furthermore, a probabilistic risk analysis was presented to demonstrate the collision 
case between shuttle tanker and floating-production-storage and offloading (FPSO) 
unit (Chen and Moan, 2004).  The authors aim is to produce practical solution to 
carry out risk assessment in order to decrease the collusion frequency in offshore 
cargo loading operation. Therefore, quantitative risk analysis method based on 
collision frequency was developed. At the end of the study, the paper recommended 
some preventive actions which may reduce the probability of FPSO to shuttle tanker 
during offshore tandem loading. 
Mennis et al. (2006) proposed a reliability modelling based on Markov theory for 
ship safety assessment. In order to prevent marine environmental pollution, the 
author introduced reliability model of Markov theory. Thus, the model is able to 
simulate reality and predict reasons that may induce accidents. The authors applied 
an illustrative case study to demonstrate the model process into ship safety systems. 
Since Markov theory has rarely used into HRA, the authors applied model into 
human reliability assessment successfully. 
Another collision case was conducted by utilizing Bayesian Belief Network and fault 
tree analysis (Trucco et al., 2006). In this article, the authors present a creative tool 
integrating human and organization factors into risk analysis. The method allowed 
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identification of stochastic correlations between the basic events and Bayesian Belief 
Network model.  
Konstandinidou et al. (2006) have proposed a different approach that combined the 
CREAM into a fuzzy logic in order to determine the human error actions probability. 
This paper offers a pilot model, which is successfully translating CREAM 
methodology into fuzzy logic. The authors use fuzzy logic in order to design CPC 
including nine input variables and one output variable. At the end of research, 
proposed methodology was tested with five different scenario and the results were 
found satisfactory. Fuzzy integrated CREAM approach extended in later years 
successfully in marine industry and aviation.  
The method, called cognitive reliability theory, for estimating of HEP was proposed 
in order to establish a systematized technique for risk assessment (Kenji et al., 2010). 
In this research, authors have examined about more than six thousand marine 
accident in order to develop systematic approach for human factors. Thereafter, all 
marine accidents are classified into cases by the cognitive conditions. The simulator 
experiences are tested participation of experienced navigational officers. 
Montewka et al. (2010) have proposed a new approach for collision probability 
modelling. In this article, authors combine Monte Carlo and generic models in order 
to conduct risk analysis during collision of vessels. The model applied into paper 
based on minimum distance to collision values and calculated with assumption that 
two ships doing manoeuvring in order to prevent collision. The results of study were 
compared with registered data which gathered from maritime traffic. The authors 
found them satisfactory.  
Another approach based on a formal safety assessment theory was applied to perform 
a quantitative analysis of the human failure contribution in the collision and 
grounding of oil tankers (Martins and Maturana, 2010). The authors utilised the 
technique for estimating HEP values. At the end of study, the authors revealed that 
the operator should decide where he will work to reduce the probability of marine 
accidents such as collision or grounding. While the paper did not introduce a new 
concept with respect to HRA, it presented a different perspective into marine 
industry. A model for overcome the data problem proposed by Gaonkar et al. (2011) 
defines the application of fuzzy sets and logic as an alternative option to deal with 
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the data scarce in parameters. The authors reveal the different factors affecting 
marine transportation systems and model them as linguistic variables. Thus, the 
complexity of the maritime transportation system HRA can be achieved.  
Another study upon HRA was performed by using Fault tree analyse tool with time-
dependant dynamic gates (Turan et al., 2011). In order to validate the results of 
paper, the authors has utilised the Birnbaum and Criticality reliability importance 
measures. An application upon diving support vessel was demonstrated as a case 
study. The paper revealed the reliability analysis results of the main and sub-systems 
of vessel as well as their significant components. Then, necessary recommendations 
upon how to improve the overall reliability of the vessel systems were suggested by 
the authors. 
A hybrid technique combining APJE and SLIM methodology was introduced for 
estimating marine human error probability (Xi and Guo, 2011). The paper focused on 
researching marine human errors and how the context effect human behaviuor. In 
this study, human reliability performance upon collision avoidance was investigated 
by utilizing hybrid methodology called APJE-SLIM. The results of study gave 
positive contribution theoretically in order to prevent collision accident at sea.  
A seafarer’s reliability assessment has been conducted by incorporating subjective 
judgements (Riahi et al., 2012). This article introduced a different approach to 
monitor the seafarer performance concerning conditional reliability by integrating 
fuzzy logic and analytical hierarchy process. The proposed methodology allows user 
to evaluate the seafarer performance during his or her seafaring period on-board ship 
in order to enhance maritime safety. 
Sulaiman et al. (2012) performed another study which researched result of human 
error and human reliability derived from use of technology for ship navigation within 
coastal waters. In this approach, the author uses qualitative and quantitative tools 
such as marine accident reports and literature data. Another study was performed by 
Yang and Wang (2012) in order to develop generic method by modifying CREAM 
methodology. In this paper; in order to facilitate the quantification human failure in 
marine industry, the authors combined fuzzy evidential reasoning and Bayesian 
inference logic into CREAM methodology. The hybrid approach allowed user to link 
between nine CPCs and four control modes defined in COCOM technique.  
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A new approach namely called HENT (human entropy) was presented for marine 
and offshore applications (El-Laden and Turan, 2012). The research introduced 
quantitative and qualitative taxonomies of PFSs in order to find generic root causes 
of failures. The author defined nine generic human factors such as crew quality, 
training procedure, welfare, stress and environment conditions, etc. which are 
affecting reliability.  
Gao et al. (2013) studied upon ship’s crane structure reliability utilising possibility 
theory. Since cranes are significant components for shipping industry, reliability 
performance of component were analysed. The authors applied possibility theory 
instead of collecting large amount sample and the impact of human factors. 
Furthermore, Yang et al. (2013) presented another research paper, which used a 
modified CREAM methodology by incorporating the Bayesian reasoning model with 
fuzzy evidential reasoning. In this paper, authors applied evidential reasoning to set 
up fuzzy if-then rule bases and established Bayesian reasoning in order to 
accumulate all the rules for predicting its failure probability. The proposed model 
was shown through the illustrative example of analysing an oil tanker cargo oil pump 
shut down scenario. 
Application of Bayesian belief network model into HRA was introduced to analyse 
human error probability (Martins and Maturana, 2013). The aim of this paper is to 
determine the most likely sequences of potential danger events in order to reduce 
potential risk. The authors demonstrated the proposed model with human factors 
related to the tanker collision case in order to reduce probability of collision. 
Likewise, Musharraf et al. (2013) introduced a quantitative approach for HRA during 
offshore emergency conditions. In this paper, authors combined BN method into 
evidence theory in order to provide dependency between the human factors and 
associated actions. Thereafter, the outcomes of the researches are compared with 
SLIM technique to provide an analytical approach. The proposed approach then 
applied an emergency hazardous operation case in marine industry.  
Both fuzzy set theory and fuzzy logic were used to conduct the estimation procedures 
and provide the reliability value for vessel transportation operation (Gaonkar et al., 
2013). In the paper, the authors applied the method to deal with the insufficient or 
unavailable data in marine industry. The authors utilised the first method to ensure 
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fuzzy arithmetic for vessel reliability prediction while second method is to integrate 
fuzzy interface system with rule base.  
A BN approach for human fatigue has recently been introduced by Akhtar and Utne 
(2014). The method provides an enhancement for BN technique for modelling ship 
accident risk. In this paper, modified HFACS method has been integrated into BN 
approach to ensure qualitative part of the method while various marine accident 
investigations reports have been analysed for quantitative parts. The authors applied 
grounding case for demonstration. Another research paper has been proposed in 
recent months in order to evaluate HRA during ship-to-ship collision cases 
(Goerlandt and Kujala, 2014). The authors have studied the reliability of quantitative 
risk analysis (QRA) for ship collision cases. The paper main objective is to prove 
quantitative risk analysis have some limitations and might not be considered as a 
reliable method to evaluate the risk. 
Montewka et al. (2014) have introduced a research paper recently to assess risk for 
marine transportation system. The article proposed a proactive tool for maritime 
transportation systems. In order to fulfil that BN has been utilised by authors as 
proactive model. The article assesses the probability of events concluding by 
ascertaining collision severity. A collision case study in which RoPax vessel 
involved has chosen as a demonstration. Likewise, the BN has been applied into 
accidental cargo oil outflow in ship collision cases (Goerlandt and Montewka, 2014). 
This paper introduces BN method for reasoning under uncertainty to evaluate the 
collision case study. The authors combined the damage extent model condition into 
impact scenario in order to reveal probabilistic oil flow model. 
Recently, an application upon cargo loading process of LPG tanker have been 
recognised as a unique study (Akyuz and Celik, 2015b). In the paper, the main focus 
of the research is to systematically predict human error potentials for designated 
tasks and to determine the required safety control levels on-board LPG ships. To 
achieve this purpose, CREAM approach is used.  
Likewise, Akyuz and Celik (2015a) have recently presented a novel approach by 
integrating AHP method into HEART approach to evaluate human reliability in 
chemical tanker ship. The paper conducts an empirical human reliability analysis for 
tank cleaning process on-board chemical tanker ship to enhance safety and 
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operational reliability in maritime industry. It provides a methodological 
development on decision making and human factors 
In the light of above, literature research conducted between 1995 -2014 years for 
HRA in marine transportation industry, following significant points are revealed; 
 There are limited studies performed upon HRA on marine transportation 
industry. 
 Apparently, current HRA methods do not provide a consistent approach to 
human error quantification through the marine transportation industry. 
 The HRA studies conducted upon marine transportation up to now have 
utilised existing HRA methodology. 
 There are no specific articles upon HRA shipboard operations since human 
errors are important contributor factor to safety risk in many of the potential 
hazardous on-board ship. 
 Even though there are numbers of HRA techniques covering a range of 
disciplines to assess human error, it has been no specific method to perform 
HRA in the marine transportation industry. 
 In literature, existing HRA studies applicability in marine industry are 
seemingly inadequate and not practical.  
 It would be substantial advantage in establishing a marine transportation-
specific methodology to evaluate human reliability. 
Within this context, it is necessary to develop a new approach for assessment human 
reliability. The aim of this thesis is to fill the gap in literature by proposing a new 
approach in which analyses human reliability on-board ship based o a decision-
making model proposal. Next section introduces new model proposal basically called 
MAHRA (Maritime Human Reliability Analysis). 
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3.  MARITIME HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS (MAHRA) 
This chapter introduces an empirical human reliability analysis for shipboard 
operations on-board ship to enhance safety and operational reliability in maritime 
industry, providing a methodological extension through the integration of the AHP 
(Analytic Hierarchy Process) and HFACS (Human Factor Analysis and 
Classification System) technique into the HEART (Human Errror Assessment and 
Reduction Technique) approach. The hybrid approach is namely called as MAHRA 
(Maritime Human Reliability Analysis). The conceptual framework, research 
methodologies and system design of proposed approach will be provided in this 
chapter. The MAHRA as a hybrid decision making model has been introduced to 
minimize the operational problems/errors that may arise from human errors on-board 
ship. Within this context, the chapter is organised as follows; this section gives brief 
information about the MAHRA approach. The next section introduces theoretical 
background of research methodologies. Then, system design will be provided to 
derive marine-specific EPC and calculate APOA (Assessed Proportion of Affect). 
The fourth section introduces system application where MAHRA approach defines 
step by step.  
3.1 Conceptual Framework 
MAHRA approach contains a couple of methodological process to create robust tool. 
Figure 3.1 depicts the conceptual framework to establish proposal approach. The 
concept consists of three main stages. The first one is data gathering where required 
data including marine accident causes are provided. Since obtaining quantitative 
human error data on the nature of maritime industry is very challenging, the aim of 
this phase is to gather data by analysing marine accident cases. In this sense, marine 
investigation branches such as MAIB, ATSB, NTSB and JTSB are exploited. The 
second stage is EPC derivation part where HFACS and AHP methods are combined 
to generate marine specific performance shaping factors. The last stage is system  
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Figure 3.1 : Conceptual framework.
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application part in order to assess human error. This part contains APOA and HEP 
calculation. 
3.2 Methodological Background 
This thesis conducts an empirical human reliability analysis for critical operations 
on-board ship to enhance safety and operational reliability in marine industry by 
integrating HEART and AHP as well as HFACS technique. The next section 
introduces research methodologies respectively.  
3.2.1 HEART  
HEART (human error assessment and reduction technique) is recognized as a well-
known modelling tool in safety and reliability analysis where critical operation is 
performed. It is currently applicable to wide range of industry. Since the human error 
data is scarce in the literature, it is quite tough to apply stochastic models such as 
Bayesian Network or Markov chain into marine HRA concept in order to predict 
HEP value. Furthermore, the current HRA techniques are limited to reveal all of the 
significant aspects of human performance in marine industry such as insufficient 
data, subjectivity of expert judgement, uncertainty, etc. Therefore, using the 
empirical method such as HEART seems more reasonable and consistent to support 
the consideration of human performance. The technique is quick and flexible 
requiring few researches. It was presented to assess human tasks with defined values 
for HEP calculation (William, 1988). The fundamental is to depend on two 
parameters; the first one is generic task type (GT) and second one is error-producing 
condition (EPC). The GT allows user to find suitable task under HRA and then 
define the generic error probability (GEP) value (also known as nominal human 
unreliability), while EPC defines the PSF of human which influence the probability 
of human error in the related task. This means that EPCs are expected to affect 
human performance negatively and leading to increase HEP associated with generic 
task.  
The impact of GEP and EPC value were derived by numerous researches of human 
factor performances for a long time. These data base includes a variety of HEP 
values derived from numerous industries such as nuclear power plant, petrochemical 
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industry, offshore platforms, service industry, etc. (William, 1988). However, 
MAHRA proposes a novel base approach deriving marine-specific value for EPCs 
since internal and external factors directly increase the probability of human error in 
marine industry distinctively.  
The HEART method is easy to understand and the process starts with selecting a GT 
in order to employed GEP values as first parameter. As the GEP values are based on 
the nature of generic task to be performed and generic, they are regarded as the same 
value as adopted in HEART with given nominal likelihood within probabilistic 
limits. There are totally nine generic tasks associated with nine GEP values, which 
gives the probability of human error, occurred in perfect condition. The analysts have 
specific tasks that they need to quantify during HRA. In order to do that, specific task 
is compared with GT by experts and nominated respectively. Thereafter, EPC is 
selected by experts as a second parameter. These are the external and internal factors 
(operator experience, familiarity with situation, time pressure, fatigue, noise level, 
etc.) that might heavily affect the human performance and increase the probability of 
human error. There are thirty-eight different EPCs assigned in HEART approach and 
seventeen of those have the substantial influence to HEP values (Kirwan et al., 
1996). The selection of relevant EPC is usually based on scenario for the task being 
applied. EPC has a maximum nominal value which to be inserted in equation (3.1).  
𝑯𝑬𝑷 = 𝑮𝑬𝑷𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 × [( 𝑾𝒊 −  𝟏 )  × 𝑨𝑷𝑶𝑨𝟏 +  𝟏 ] × [( 𝑾𝒋 −  𝟏 )  × 𝑨𝑷𝑶𝑨𝟐 +  𝟏 ] ×..    (3.1) 
where Wi and Wj indicate weight for each context task chosen from EPC tables. The 
APOA (assess the proportion of affect) states the proportion of the effect which is 
weighted the each EPC basis of its importance. 
In the light of above, the basic principles of HEART methodology are as follows: 
i) Task analysis 
ii) Define the scenario,   
iii) Nominate generic task type in accordance with scenario,   
iv) Select GEP as per generic task,  
v) Define the relevant EPC/s,  
vi) Assess the proportion of EPC affect,  
vii) Calculate final HEP,  
25 
 
3.2.1.1 HEART application overview 
The HEART method has been successfully applied in numerous disciplines such as 
nuclear energy (Kirwan et al., 2004), petrochemical (Castiglia and Giardina, 2013), 
transportation (Akyuz and Celik, 2015; Gibson et al., 2012; Kirwan and Gibson, 
2008), off-shore (Noroozi et al., 2014; Deacon et al., 2013), service industry etc. 
Particularly, studies upon NPP have become prominent since the the human error 
risk involvement is comparatively high. For instance, Kirwan et al. (2004) are 
presented nuclear energy specific model (NARA) which is based on tailoring the 
basic principle of the HEART. Hence, the technique is successfully applied for NPP 
to be used for quantification of human error. Furthermore, another specific study is 
performed in petrochemical industry by comparing HEART results to CREAM 
(Castiglia and Giardina, 2013). The authors modified the both methodology on the 
basis of the fuzzy set theory and illustrated the techniques by analysing of human 
error in hydrogen refuelling station. 
The use of HEART method in transportation industry is quite limited although 
transportation activities can pose potential hazard to human and environment. 
Nevertheless there have been some studies applied the HEART method such as 
RARA (Gibson et al., 2012 ) and CARA (Kirwan and Gibson, 2008). Bothe methods 
are based on tailoring the basic principle of the HEART and successfully applied. 
Likewise, Akyuz and Celik (2015) have recently proposed a hybrid method 
extension through the integration of the AHP technique into the HEART approach. 
The hybrid approach has applied into cargo tank cleaning operation as a 
demonstration to assess human reliability on-board chemical tanker ship.  
The studies utilised HEART methodology upon off-shore industry are focused on 
risk assessment. Whilst this technique was developed for human error assessment, it 
was successfully applied into risk assessment case. For instance, Noroozi et al. 
(2014) were developed a risk-based methodology by using HEART method. The 
paper applied the method for determining HEP value for pre-and-post maintenance 
procedures of a condensate pump which is used with single buoy mooring units. 
Similar study was conducted by Deacon et al. (2013) to perform risk assessment for 
critical steps in the escape, evacuation and rescue process on off-shore unit. In this 
paper, the authors are used HEART method to determine HEP. 
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3.2.2 AHP methodology 
The AHP is a powerful multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) method. It was first 
introduced by Saaty (1980) in order to provide relative weight of criteria according to 
hierarchical structure. The method depends on the pair-wise comparison matrix 
where alternatives are compared respectively. The technique is widely utilised to 
solve complicated decision problems. The method has been used in numerous 
disciplines to find out the complex decision problems. The AHP methodology 
basically divides the complicated problem into small parts in order to rank 
hierarchically. In this thesis, the AHP method which quantifies the subjective expert 
judgement and confirms the consistency of collected data is used to weight/prioritise 
proportion effect of EPCs as well as weighting EPCs during derivation process. 
As the AHP is powerful tool to enable relevant weight for criteria, the first stage is to 
compose a pair-wise comparison matrix (A) as introduced by Saaty (1986). In order 
to fulfil that Saaty’s 1-9 linguistic relative importance scale, provided in Table 3.1, 
has been utilised.  
Table 3.1 : Saaty’s pair-wise comparison scale. 
Importance Definition 
1 Equal importance 
3 Moderate importance 
5 Strong importance 
7 Very strong importance 
9 Absolute (extreme) importance 
2,4,6,8 Intermediate values 
The matrix A represents criteria pair-wise comparison matrix where each aij (i,j = 
1,2,...,n) has the relative importance of ith elements compared to the jth. This indicates 
that higher value of aij shows stronger preference of criteria ai to aj. In the light of 
comparison linguistic scale, the numbers of 1,3,5,7 and 9 verbal judgements can be 
defined as “equal importance”, “moderate importance”, “strong importance”, “very 
strong importance”, and “extreme (absolute) importance”.  The intermediate values 
between the adjacent scale (such as 2 (weak); 4(moderate plus); 6 (strong plus); and 
8 (very, very strong)) are used for compromise. The matrix A is provided in equation 
(3.2) accordingly.    
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𝑨 = [
𝟏 𝒂𝟏𝟐 ⋯ 𝒂𝟏𝒏
𝒂𝟐𝟏 𝟏 ⋯ 𝒂𝟐𝒏
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝒂𝒏𝟏 𝒂𝒏𝟐 ⋯ 𝟏
]     𝒂𝒊𝒊 = 𝟏, 𝒂𝒋𝒊 = 𝟏 𝒂𝒊𝒋⁄ , 𝒂𝒊𝒋 ≠ 𝟎    (3.2) 
After composing of a pair-wise comparison matrix, normalized value of matrix is 
found by dividing each entry in column to the sum of entries in column. Thereafter, 
the priority weights of criterion are calculated. The average of value in each row 
gives estimate of relative weights of criterion. The normalization of matrix and 
priority weights of criterions (wi) will be found with equation (3.3).  
𝒘𝒊 =
𝟏
𝒏
∑
𝒂𝒊𝒋
∑ 𝒂𝒌𝒋
𝒏
𝒌=𝟏
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏
                          
The next step in the AHP method is to prove consistency of data. The reason of this 
is introduced by Saaty (1986) who proposed a basic equation to control whether the 
comparison pair-wise matrix is consistent or not. The consistency index (CI) can be 
calculated by following formula. 
𝑪𝑰 =
𝝀𝒎𝒂𝒙 −  𝒏
𝒏 − 𝟏
                      
where ; 
n   : the order of the matrix 
𝝀𝒎𝒂𝒙      : the maximum matrix eigenvalue  
𝝀𝒎𝒂𝒙   can be found with equation (3.5) as proposed by Vargas (1982).    
∑ 𝜶𝒊𝒋 
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏
𝒘𝒋 = 𝝀𝒎𝒂𝒙 𝒘𝒊   
A consistency ratio (CR) calculation is then needed to specify reasonable 
consistency. The CR value can be calculated by equation (3.6). The CR value will be 
equal or smaller than 0.10 otherwise the expert judgement will be revised to get 
consistent result.  
𝑪𝑹 = 𝑪𝑰/𝑪𝑹                                                                 (3.6) 
             
    (3.3) 
    (3.5) 
    (3.4) 
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In the equation, RI stands for random index (RI) and introduced by Saaty (1994). It is 
subjected to the number of items that is compared in matrix. The RI value table is 
provided in Table 3.2. In this thesis, AHP method is used to generate marine-specific 
EPC as well as APOA calculation respectively.     
Table 3.2 : Random index value. 
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
RI 0 0 0.58 0.90 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49 
3.2.2.1 AHP application overview 
As the AHP technique enable to solve complex decision problems using qualitative 
and quantitative criteria measurement, it has been adopting in numerous disciplines 
such as logistic (Li and Kuo, 2008), marine industry (Akyuz et al., 2014; Akyuz and 
Celik, 2014a; Kandakoglu et al., 2009), waste management (Onut and Soner, 2008), 
supplier selection (Wang et al., 2009), performance measurement system (Bititci et 
al., 2001), etc. AHP technique has rarely been applied separately. The method has 
usually been used in the literature by integrating other disciplines such as TOPSIS, 
SWOT analysis, Fuzzy logic, Monte Carlo, BSC and etc. due to ease of use.  
In the literature, the AHP technique has been successfully applied in numerous 
application in marine industry. For instance, there has been a recent study performed 
to assess compliance with the Maritime Labour Convention requirement at the 
operational level (Akyuz et al., 2014).  Another hybrid study integrating HFACS into 
AHP has been conducted to analyse the role of human factor in marine accident case 
(Akyuz and Celik, 2014b). Furthermore, a qualitative research has been performed 
by using SWOT analysis in order to provide a strategy for the safe carriage of liquid 
chemical cargoes in chemical tankers (Arslan and Er, 2008). Another research 
attempting to examine the precaution priorities during cargo operation in chemical 
tankers have been studied by Arslan (2009). In this study, AHP method is utilized to 
prioritize the precautions in order to explain risk assessment options in chemical 
tanker fleet. Furthermore, Karahalios et al. (2011) have proposed a system of 
balanced scorecards integrated fuzzy sets and AHP in order to measure the 
regulatory performance of various stakeholders involved into the shipping industry. 
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3.2.3 HFACS 
The HFACS is an analysis methodology tailored Swiss cheese model which was 
introduced by Reason (1990). A basic framework of the Swiss cheese model is 
depicted in Figure 1 for human error causation. 
 
        Latent Failures  
 
                                  Latent Failures 
 
                                                               Latent Failures 
 
                                                                                           Active Failures 
             Failed  
  or absent defences 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 : Swiss cheese model for human error causation (Reason, 1990). 
The method is fundamentally used for aviation industry to investigate and analyse 
role of human factor in accidents (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003). The authors’ aim 
is to propose a basic framework to help reserachers in investigating and analysing 
human error. In this context, the method enables the knowledge and instruments 
required to perform a human error investigation. Numbers of causal categories are 
depicted within four level of human failure. The HAFCS investigates and exemines 
the active and latent factors caused to accidents. The combination provided in 
HFACS method has contributed to raise capability of the framework in accident 
survey practice. The HFACS method contains four schematic levels;  
Organizational 
Influences 
Unsafe 
Supervision 
Precondition for 
Unsafe Acts 
 
Unsafe Acts 
 
ACCIDENT 
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i) Organisational influences: This level of human failures covers the organisation 
which may impact performance at all level. In this level; resource management, 
organisation climate and operational process are included as to address latent failure.   
ii) Unsafe supervision: This level contains the inadequate supervision, planned 
inappropriate operation, failed to correct problem and supervisory violations which 
can pose a potential human failure due to unsafe supervision. 
iii) Pre-conditions for unsafe acts: The level deals with the substandard condition 
and practice of operators such as adverse mental fatigue, poor communication, poor 
environment condition, etc. This level fundamentally covers crew resource 
management, personal readiness, physical/mental limitation, adverse physiological 
states and adverse mental states.  
iv) Unsafe acts: As the last level of human failure, unsafe acts include two hint 
terms; errors and violations.  
The objective evidence in conjunction with each level identifies the active and latent 
failures/causes in the system. The usage of HFACS concept provides practitioners to 
identify the latent or active failures (Reason, 1990). They might be utilised to 
decrease accident causes as derivable. So that, the application  of HFACS can assist 
users to show up the shortfalls during the reducing marine accidents.  In this thesis, 
the HFACS technique is utilised to generate specific EPC as well as validation part 
of MAHRA approach. 
3.2.3.1 HFACS application overview 
Numerous HFACS applications were adopted in recent years due to it is easy usage 
to analyse of accidents. In numerous applications, the HFACS framework was 
modified and re-organised. On the other hand, the modification did not change the 
original idea lies behind the concept. Wiegman and Shappell (2001) made substential 
attempts to extend theory by introducing a comprehensive, user-friendly tool to 
contribute users in effectively investigating and analysing human error in aviation 
industry. However, unique model is needed for different fields such as 
petrochemical, railway or marine industry as the model was presented for aviation 
industry only.  
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The HFACS method has been successfully adopted to numerous diciplines such as 
maintenance (Krulak, 2004), railway traffic (Reinach and Viale, 2006), highway 
traffic (Iden and Shappell, 2006), medicine and surgery (ElBardissi et al., 2007), 
construction industry (Walker, 2007), mining (Patterson and Shappel, 2010), etc. 
Hovewer, adaptation of HFACS application in marine industry is scarce due to data 
mining difficulty. In order to tackle that, Celik and Er (2007) modified the HAFCS 
framework to define the effect of design-based system failures in terms of human 
factor. Likewise, the article studied by Celik and Cebi (2009) was intended to 
decrease occupational accident rates in the Turkish shipyards by utilising HFACS 
framework. 
An adapted version of the HFACS with limited modifications related to machinery 
space was used to figure out organizational factors that are identified during 
maritime accident investigation (Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2010). Then, as a relatively 
new tool, systemic and multifactorial analysis of collision at sea aiming to identify 
different types of accidents has been introduced by Chauvin et al., (2013). A hybrid 
appraoch combining HFACS into cognitive mapping has recently been recognised to 
identify and prevent human errors in marine accidents (Akyuz and Celik, 2014b). 
The author demonstrated the model with real-case shipboard situation.    
3.3 System Design 
In order to design MAHRA approach as a marine-specific human reliability analysis 
technique, EPCs will be re-designed as unique parameter. Additionally, this thesis 
proposes a smart solution during assessed proportion of affect calculation. Thus, the 
modification will improve the consistency of the calculation during HEP assessment. 
In this context, this section presents how to design the system to create novel HRA 
approach for marine industry.  
3.3.1 Derivation of EPC for marine industry   
The traditional HEART method is based on data mining to generate EPC values from 
different industry such as power plant, petrochemical industry, offshore platforms, 
and service industry. Instead of using data mining, this thesis brings a new 
perspective to derive marine-specific EPCs. The study proposes a methodologic 
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approach by integrating HFACS and AHP to quantify the EPCs for MAHRA since 
obtaining historical data with respect to human error on the nature of maritime 
industry is very challenging and mostly unknown due to scarce of data. The EPC 
derivation process consists of seven steps. The flow chart is illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
Step 1. Identifying HFACS-EPC relationships: In this step, HFACS-EPC relation 
matrix is established by distributing EPCs into relevant HFACS sub-levels in the 
light of marine experts’view. In order to fulfil that elobrative survey is performed 
with experts who are working in a prestigious shipping companies. The companies 
are selected as per deadweight tonnage of world merchant fleets which are bulk 
carriers, tanker ships, container ships, chemical tanker ships and general cargo ships. 
The expert profile contains professional managers (DPA or HSEQ) and marine 
superintendents who have seagoing background and professional execution 
experiences. Since there were more than one expert in each shipping company, 
consesnsus of group have been achived. The experts are asked to distribute relevant 
EPCs under HFACS sub-levels which may potential affect on error production. In 
the ligh of above, the each HFACS-EPC relation matrix, which is established by the 
consensus of marine experts with respect to the ship fleet types, is provided in 
Appendix A respectively.  
Step 2. Applying majority rules: The purpose of this step is to select the available 
EPCs with respect to the HFACS sub-levels. After having identified HFACS-EPC 
relationships in the view of marine experts’ consensus for bulk carriers, tanker ships, 
container ships, chemical tanker ships and general cargo ships; majority rules will be 
applied since there are a variety of relationships among the HFACS and EPC. The 
majority rule enables to select alternatives which have more than half of the votes. 
The technique is widely used in decision-making problem.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
Figure 3.3 : EPC derivation and validation flow chart. 
In this thesis, majority rule is used to sort out EPCs which have been selected by the 
marine experts. For instance, there are five different HFACS-EPC relationship 
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matrices created by the consensus of marine experts from the five different shipping 
companies. In the first matrix (Appendix A ); EPC4, EPC11, EPC19, EPC20, 
EPC22, EPC23 and EPC27 are selected by the marine experts who are working in 
chemical tanker shipping company in accordance with resource management. On the 
other hand, marine experts who are working on bulk carrier shipping company 
chooses EPC5, EPC11, EPC16, EPC19, EPC20, EPC22, EPC23 and EPC36 in 
conjunction with resource management (Appendix A). Likewise, marine experts who 
are working on container shipping company selects EPC10, EPC11, EPC16, EPC19, 
EPC20, EPC21, EPC22, EPC23 and EPC29 under resource management (Appendix 
A). For tanker ships, EPC11, EPC16, EPC20, EPC21, EPC23 and EPC26 are 
selected (Appendix A). The last selection is made for general cargo ships and 
EPC11, EPC14, EPC19, EPC22 and EPC31 are selected by consensus of marine 
experts who are working on general cargo shipping company in conjunction with 
resource management (Appendix A). As there are a set of different EPCs are selected 
by marine experts in conjunction with resource management, the majority rule is 
adopted to select prominent ones. Since the technique requires to select alternative 
that have more than half choices, EPC11, EPC16, EPC19, EPC20, EPC22, EPC23 
are become prominent factors. Therefore, they are inserted in final HFACS-EPC 
relation matrix. The rest of EPCs selection is carried out in compliance with majority 
rule.   
Step 3. Establishing relation matrix: After having applied majority rule into the 
entire levels, final relation matrix is constructed by distributing EPCs into relevant 
HFACS sub-levels. Figure 3.4 shows the relation matrix between EPCs and HFACS. 
For instance, human errors which are caused by resource management may generate 
error producing conditions such as “Poor feedback (EPC 11)”, “Impoverished 
information (EPC16)”, “No diversity (EPC19)”, Educational mismatch (EPC20)”, 
“Lack of exercise (EPC22)” and “Unreliable instruments (EPC23)”. Another 
example is to be showed up in skill-based error. Human errors which are classified 
under skil-based error are triggering to generate EPC1, EPC9, EPC10, EPC14, 
EPC23 and EPC38 respectively Accordingly, Figure 3.5 depicts distribution of EPCs 
in conjunction with HFACS. 
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Figure 3.4 : EPC- HFACS relation matrix. 
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Figure 3.5 : EPC derivation flow chart. 
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Step 4. Constructing comparison matrix: This step provides a pair-wise comparison 
matrix in order to prioritise EPCs which are distributed under each HFACS sub-
levels. In this context, equation 3.2 is used. A pair-wise comparison matrices are 
established in accordance with 1-9 linguistic scale of the analytic hierarchy process 
which are showing the intensity of importance each criterion (Table 3.1). The 
judgements on EPCs for each HFACS level were received from the marine experts to 
construct a pair-wise comparison matrix. Since group opinion is considering in 
decision process, the survey results should be reduced to one comparison matrix by 
getting geometric means of judgements. Accordingly, EPCs pair wise comparison 
matrces for each HFACS levels are established respectively. For instance, 
“Performance ambiguity (EPC11)” has slightly moderate importance than 
“Impoverished information (EPC16)” in resource management level. Therefore, 
number 4 is assigned according to the Saaty’s linguistic scale for this comparison. 
Likewise, the reciprocal equation of EPC16 to EPC11 is assigned 1/4 as proposed in 
equation (3.2). To give another example, the EPC19 (No diversity) has moderate 
importance when compared to EPC22 (lack of exercise).  
Within this context, Table 3. shows a pair-wise comparison matrix for resource 
management, Table 3.4 provides a pair-wise comparison matrix for organisational 
climate, Table 3.5 for organisational process, Table 3.6 for inadequate supervision, 
Table 3.7 for planned inappropriare operations, Table 3.8 for failed to correct 
problem, Table 3.9 for supervisory violations, Table 3.10 for physical environment, 
Table 3.11 for technological environment, Table 3.12 for adverse mental states, 
Table 3.13 for adverse physiolagical states, Table 3.14 for physical/mental limitation, 
Table 3.15 for crew resource management, Table 3.16 for personal readiness, Table 
3.17 for decision error, Table 3.18 for skill-based error, Table 3.19 for perceptual 
error, Table 3.20 for routine violations, Table 3.21 for exceptional violations.  
Table 3.3 : A pair-wise comparison matrix for resource management. 
  EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
EPC11 1.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 2.00 
EPC16 0.25 1.00 3.00 4.00 2.00 0.33 
EPC19 0.33 0.33 1.00 2.00 3.00 0.50 
EPC20 0.33 0.25 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.33 
EPC22 0.20 0.50 0.33 2.00 1.00 0.33 
EPC23 0.50 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 
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Table 3.4 : A pair-wise comparison matrix for organisational climate. 
  EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
EPC8 1.00 4.00 2.00 
EPC18 0.25 1.00 0.33 
EPC37 0.50 3.00 1.00 
Table 3.5 : A pair-wise comparison matrix for organisational process. 
  EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
EPC2 1.00 3.00 5.00 4.00 2.00 6.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 
EPC4 0.33 1.00 4.00 3.00 0.50 3.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
EPC7 0.20 0.25 1.00 0.50 0.33 2.00 0.33 0.50 1.00 
EPC11 0.25 0.33 2.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 0.50 2.00 0.33 
EPC12 0.50 2.00 3.00 0.33 1.00 3.00 0.33 2.00 3.00 
EPC17 0.17 0.33 0.50 0.50 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.50 0.33 
EPC21 0.33 0.50 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 
EPC26 0.50 0.33 2.00 0.50 0.50 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 
EPC28 0.33 0.25 1.00 3.00 0.33 3.00 0.33 0.50 1.00 
Table 3.6 : A pair-wise comparison matrix for inadequate supervision. 
  EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
EPC13 1.00 5.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 
EPC17 0.20 1.00 0.33 3.00 0.33 0.50 
EPC20 0.33 3.00 1.00 3.00 0.50 0.50 
EPC22 0.33 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.50 
EPC26 0.25 3.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 
EPC28 0.33 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.50 1.00 
Table 3.7 : A pair-wise comparison matrix for planned inappropriare operations. 
  EPC2 EPC8 EPC14 EPC16 EPC18 
EPC2 1.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 
EPC8 0.33 1.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 
EPC14 0.50 0.33 1.00 0.50 3.00 
EPC16 0.33 0.50 2.00 1.00 4.00 
EPC18 0.20 0.33 0.33 0.25 1.00 
Table 3.8 : A pair-wise comparison matrix for failed to correct problem. 
 
EPC2 EPC7 EPC32 
EPC2 1.00 3.00 2.00 
EPC7 0.33 1.00 0.33 
EPC32 0.50 3.00 1.00 
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Table 3.9 : A pair-wise comparison matrix for supervisory violations. 
 
EPC1 EPC12 EPC14 
EPC1 1.00 0.50 2.00 
EPC12 2.00 1.00 3.00 
EPC14 0.50 0.33 1.00 
Table 3.10 : A pair-wise comparison matrix for physical environment. 
  EPC5 EPC19 EPC33 EPC36 
EPC5 1.00 3.00 0.25 0.33 
EPC19 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.50 
EPC33 4.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 
EPC36 3.00 2.00 0.50 1.00 
Table 3.11 : A pair-wise comparison matrix for technological environment. 
  EPC3 EPC13 EPC14 EPC32 EPC33 
EPC3 1.00 0.33 2.00 2.00 0.33 
EPC13 3.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 0.50 
EPC14 0.50 0.33 1.00 0.50 0.33 
EPC32 0.50 0.50 2.00 1.00 0.33 
EPC33 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 
Table 3.12 : A pair-wise comparison matrix for adverse mental states. 
 
EPC8 EPC9 EPC34 EPC35 
EPC8 1.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 
EPC9 0.33 1.00 3.00 1.00 
EPC34 0.50 0.33 1.00 0.33 
EPC35 0.50 1.00 3.00 1.00 
Table 3.13 : A pair-wise comparison matrix for adverse physiological states. 
  EPC27 EPC29 EPC30 EPC31 EPC35 
EPC27 1.00 2.00 3.00 0.33 0.25 
EPC29 0.50 1.00 3.00 0.50 0.33 
EPC30 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.33 
EPC31 3.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 0.50 
EPC35 4.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 
Table 3.14 : A pair-wise comparison matrix for physical-mental limitation. 
  EPC5 EPC15 EPC27 EPC34 
EPC5 1.00 0.33 2.00 3.00 
EPC15 3.00 1.00 5.00 3.00 
EPC27 0.50 0.20 1.00 2.00 
EPC34 0.33 0.33 0.50 1.00 
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Table 3.15 : A pair-wise comparison matrix for crew resource management. 
  EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
EPC10 1.00 2.00 3.00 0.20 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
EPC13 0.50 1.00 3.00 0.33 3.00 5.00 3.00 4.00 
EPC14 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.20 0.50 3.00 0.33 3.00 
EPC15 5.00 3.00 5.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 6.00 
EPC16 0.50 0.33 2.00 0.33 1.00 3.00 1.00 5.00 
EPC20 0.33 0.20 0.33 0.20 0.33 1.00 0.33 3.00 
EPC25 0.25 0.33 3.00 0.33 1.00 3.00 1.00 5.00 
EPC37 0.20 0.25 0.33 0.17 0.20 0.33 0.20 1.00 
Table 3.16 : A pair-wise comparison matrix for personal readiness. 
  EPC1 EPC11 EPC27 EPC35 
EPC1 1.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 
EPC11 0.33 1.00 4.00 0.50 
EPC27 0.20 0.25 1.00 0.33 
EPC35 0.33 2.00 3.00 1.00 
Table 3.17 : A pair-wise comparison matrix for decision error. 
  EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
EPC4 1.00 5.00 2.00 
EPC24 0.20 1.00 0.25 
EPC32 0.50 4.00 1.00 
Table 3.18 : A pair-wise comparison matrix for skill-based error. 
  EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
EPC1 1.00 3.00 2.00 5.00 2.00 3.00 
EPC9 0.33 1.00 0.50 3.00 0.33 1.00 
EPC10 0.50 2.00 1.00 3.00 0.50 2.00 
EPC14 0.20 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.25 0.33 
EPC23 0.50 3.00 2.00 4.00 1.00 3.00 
EPC38 0.33 1.00 0.50 3.00 0.33 1.00 
Table 3.19 : A pair-wise comparison matrix for perceptual error. 
  EPC5 EPC6 EPC9 EPC12 EPC38 
EPC5 1.00 0.50 0.33 0.25 0.50 
EPC6 2.00 1.00 3.00 0.33 2.00 
EPC9 3.00 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.25 
EPC12 4.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 
EPC38 2.00 0.50 4.00 0.50 1.00 
 
 
41 
 
Table 3.20 : A pair-wise comparison matrix for routine violations. 
  EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
EPC10 1.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 
EPC13 0.50 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 
EPC16 0.33 0.50 1.00 3.00 2.00 
EPC17 0.20 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.50 
EPC21 0.33 0.50 0.50 2.00 1.00 
Table 3.21 : A pair-wise comparison matrix for exceptional violations. 
  EPC1 EPC3 EPC10 EPC11 EPC14 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 EPC36 
EPC1 1.00 3.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 
EPC3 0.33 1.00 0.50 2.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 
EPC10 0.50 2.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 4.00 3.00 5.00 
EPC11 0.25 0.50 0.50 1.00 3.00 2.00 0.50 2.00 0.33 
EPC14 0.20 0.33 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.50 3.00 2.00 3.00 
EPC16 0.25 1.00 0.50 0.50 2.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 
EPC17 0.17 0.33 0.25 2.00 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.50 1.00 
EPC21 0.20 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.50 0.50 2.00 1.00 2.00 
EPC36 0.17 0.25 0.20 3.00 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.50 1.00 
Step 5. Calculating EPC weights: This step provides weighting of the EPC under 
relevant HFACS level by using equation (3.3). Thus, the prioritization of EPCs will 
be provided by quantification the subjective judgement of experts and confirm the 
consistency of data.  
Step 6. Evaluating CR value: In this step, consistency of each comparison matrix is 
checked in order to get reasonable results. The CR values will be calculated in 
accordance with equation (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6). In this context, Table 3.22 shows 
priority weight of each EPCs as well as maximum matrix eigenvalue (𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥. ), CI and 
CR values under corresponding HFACS levels. If the CR values are found equal or 
less than 0.10, the judgements of experts inserted in comparison matrix are 
considered as consistent. As can be seen in the Table, the findings of almost each 
comparison matrix are reasonable and consistent since the results of CR calculations 
are found more than 0.10.  
Step 7. Quantifying EPC: After having weighted of each EPC under corresponding 
HFACS levels by adopting AHP method, each EPC column is accumulated vertically 
to find total EPC effect at the end. Table 3.23 illustrates the result of quantified 
EPCs. In the table, PW stands for priority weight of each EPC which is calculated 
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Table 3.22 : Priority weight, maximum matrix eigenvalue, CI and CR. 
 
EPCs 
Priority 
weight 
λ max CI CR 
R
es
o
u
rc
e 
m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t 
EPC11 0.35 6.512 0.100 0.082 
EPC16 0.16 
   
EPC19 0.12 
   
EPC20 0.06 
   
EPC22 0.07 
   
EPC23 0.23 
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a
n
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a
ti
o
n
a
l 
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a
te
 
EPC8 0.56 3.018 0.009 0.015 
EPC18 0.12 
   
EPC37 0.32 
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n
is
a
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o
n
a
l 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
p
ro
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ss
 
EPC2 0.25 10.267 0.158 0.107 
EPC4 0.16 
   
EPC7 0.05 
   
EPC11 0.10 
   
EPC12 0.13 
   
EPC17 0.03 
   
EPC21 0.13 
   
EPC26 0.08 
   
EPC28 0.07 
   
 
     
In
a
d
eq
u
a
te
 
su
p
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v
is
io
n
 
EPC13 0.38 6.513 0.102 0.082 
EPC17 0.08 
   
EPC20 0.13 
   
EPC22 0.06 
   
EPC26 0.19 
   
EPC28 0.14 
   
  
    
P
la
n
n
ed
 
in
a
p
p
ro
p
ri
a
te
 
o
p
er
a
ti
o
n
s 
EPC2 0.40 5.308 0.077 0.068 
EPC8 0.24 
   
EPC14 0.13 
   
EPC16 0.18 
   
EPC18 0.06 
   
 
     
F
a
il
ed
 t
o
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ec
t 
p
ro
b
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m
 
EPC2 0.52 3.053 0.026 0.046 
EPC7 0.14 
   
EPC32 0.33 
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Table 3.22 (continued) : Priority weight, maximum matrix eigenvalue, CI and CR.  
 
EPCs 
Priority 
weight 
λ max CI CR 
S
u
p
er
v
is
o
ry
 
v
io
la
ti
o
n
 
EPC1 0.30 3.009 0.004 0.007 
EPC12 0.54 
   
EPC14 0.16 
   
 
     
P
h
y
si
ca
l 
en
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t 
EPC5 0.17 4.298 0.099 0.088 
EPC19 0.11 
   
EPC33 0.45 
   
EPC36 0.27 
   
 
     
T
ec
h
n
o
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g
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a
l 
en
v
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o
n
m
e
n
t 
EPC3 0.15 5.194 0.048 0.043 
EPC13 0.26 
   
EPC14 0.09 
   
EPC32 0.12    
EPC33 0.38 
   
A
d
v
er
se
 
m
en
ta
l 
st
a
te
s 
EPC8 0.42 4.236 0.078 0.070 
EPC9 0.22 
   
EPC34 0.12 
   
EPC35 0.24 
   
  
    
A
d
v
er
se
 
p
h
y
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o
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g
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a
l 
st
a
te
s 
EPC27 0.15 5.343 0.085 0.076 
EPC29 0.13 
   
EPC30 0.07 
   
EPC31 0.25 
   
EPC35 0.39 
   
 
     
P
h
y
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ca
l-
m
en
ta
l 
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m
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a
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o
n
 EPC5 0.24 4.178 0.059 0.053 
EPC15 0.52 
   
EPC27 0.14 
   
EPC34 0.10 
   
 
     
C
re
w
 r
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o
u
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e 
m
a
n
a
g
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EPC10 0.18 8.762 0.108 0.077 
EPC13 0.17 
   
EPC14 0.06 
   
EPC15 0.32 
   
EPC16 0.10 
   
EPC20 0.04 
   
EPC25 0.10 
   
 
 
44 
 
Table 3.22 (continued) : Priority weight, maximum matrix eigenvalue, CI and CR.  
 
EPCs 
Priority 
weight 
λ max CI CR 
P
er
so
n
a
l 
re
a
d
in
es
s EPC1 0.51 4.164 0.054 0.048 
EPC11 0.19 
   
EPC27 0.07 
   
EPC35 0.23 
   
      
D
ec
is
io
n
 
er
ro
r EPC4 0.57 3.024 0.012 0.021 
EPC24 0.10 
   
EPC32 0.33 
   
 
     
S
k
il
l-
b
a
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d
 e
rr
o
r EPC1 0.33 6.145 0.029 0.023 
EPC9 0.10 
   
EPC10 0.17 
   
EPC14 0.05 
   
EPC23 0.25 
   
EPC38 0.10 
   
 
     
P
er
ce
p
tu
a
l 
er
ro
r 
EPC5 0.08 5.476 0.119 0.106 
EPC6 0.22 
   
EPC9 0.12 
   
EPC12 0.38 
   
EPC38 0.20 
   
R
o
u
ti
n
e 
v
io
la
ti
o
n
s      
EPC10 0.41 5.088 0.022 0.019 
EPC13 0.24 
   
EPC16 0.17    
EPC17 0.07    
 EPC21 0.12    
 
     
E
x
ce
p
ti
o
n
a
l 
v
io
la
ti
o
n
s 
EPC1 0.30 10.190 0.148 0.101 
EPC3 0.13 
   
EPC10 0.17    
EPC11 0.09    
EPC14 0.07    
EPC16 0.10    
EPC17 0.05    
EPC21 0.05    
EPC36 0.05 
   
calculated in step 6 and figured out in Table 3.22 entirely. Then, the total rough EPC 
effect is found by getting sum of each column vertically. For example, 1.42 is found 
for total EPC effect for EPC1. Accordingly, Table 3.24 shows rough marine-specific 
EPC values for MAHRA concept.  
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Table 3.23 : Quantification of EPCs.  
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Table 3.23 (continued) : Quantification of EPCs.  
 
 
E
P
C
1
 
E
P
C
2
 
E
P
C
3
 
E
P
C
4
 
E
P
C
5
 
E
P
C
6
 
E
P
C
7
 
E
P
C
8
 
E
P
C
9
 
E
P
C
1
0
 
E
P
C
1
1
 
E
P
C
1
2
 
E
P
C
1
3
 
E
P
C
1
4
 
E
P
C
1
5
 
E
P
C
1
6
 
E
P
C
1
7
 
E
P
C
1
8
 
E
P
C
1
9
 
E
P
C
2
0
 
E
P
C
2
1
 
E
P
C
2
2
 
E
P
C
2
3
 
E
P
C
2
4
 
E
P
C
2
5
 
E
P
C
2
6
 
E
P
C
2
7
 
E
P
C
2
8
 
E
P
C
2
9
 
E
P
C
3
0
 
E
P
C
3
1
 
E
P
C
3
2
 
E
P
C
3
3
 
E
P
C
3
4
 
E
P
C
3
5
 
E
P
C
3
6
 
E
P
C
3
7
 
E
P
C
3
8
 
F
a
il
ed
 t
o
 c
o
rr
ec
t 
p
ro
b
le
m
 
P
W 
 
0
.5
2
 
    
0
.1
4
 
                        
0
.3
3
 
      
S
u
p
er
v
is
o
ry
 
v
io
la
ti
o
n
s 
P
W 
0
.3
0
 
          
0
.5
4
 
 
0
.1
6
 
                        
P
h
y
si
ca
l 
en
v
ir
o
n
m
en
t 
P
W 
    
0
.1
7
 
             
0
.1
1
 
             
0
.4
5
 
  
0
.2
7
 
  
T
ec
h
n
o
lo
g
ic
a
l 
en
v
ir
o
n
m
en
t 
P
W 
  
0
.1
5
 
         
0
.2
6
 
0
.0
9
 
                 
0
.1
2
 
0
.3
8
 
     
A
d
v
er
se
 m
en
ta
l 
st
a
te
s 
PW        
0
.4
2
 
0
.2
2
 
                        
0
.1
2
 
0
.2
4
 
   
47 
 
Table 3.23 (continued) : Quantification of EPCs. 
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Table 3.23 (continued) : Quantification of EPCs. 
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Table 3.24 : Rough marine-specific EPC values.  
Code Error producing condition Maximum affect 
EPC1 Unfamiliarity with a situation which is potentially important but which only occurs 
infrequently or which is novel 
1.42 
EPC2 A shortage of time available for error detection and correction 1.17 
EPC3 A low signal-noise ratio 0.28 
EPC4 A means of suppressing or over-riding information of features which is too easily 
accessible. 
0.73 
EPC5 No means of conveying spatial and functional information to operators in a form which 
they can readily assimilate 
0.48 
EPC6 A mismatch between an operator’s model of the world and that imagined by a designer 0.22 
EPC7 No obvious means of reversing an unintended action 0.19 
EPC8 A channel capacity overload, particularly one caused by simultaneous presentation of 
non-redundant information. 
1.21 
EPC9 A need to unlearn a technique and apply one which requires the application of an 
opposing philosophy 
0.44 
EPC10 The need to transfer specific knowledge from task to task without loss 0.92 
EPC11 Ambiguity in the required performance standard 0.72 
EPC12 A mismatch between perceived and real risk 1.05 
EPC13 Poor, ambiguous or ill-matched system feedback 1.05 
EPC14 No clear direct and timely confirmation of an intended action from the portion of th 
system over which control is to be exerted 
0.56 
EPC15 Operator inexperience 0.84 
EPC16 An impoverished quality of information conveyed by person/person interaction 0.71 
EPC17 Little or no independent checking or testing of output 0.23 
EPC18 A conflict between immediate and long-term objectives 0.18 
50 
 
Table 3.24 (continued) : Rough marine-specific EPC values.  
Code Error producing condition Maximum affect 
EPC19 No diversity of information input for veracity checks 0.23 
EPC20 A mismatch between the educational achievement level of an individual and the 
requirements of the task 
0.24 
EPC21 An incentive to use other more dangerous procedures 0.30 
EPC22 Little opportunity to exercise mind and body outside the immediate confines of a job 0.14 
EPC23 Unreliable instrumentation 0.48 
EPC24 A need for absolute judgements which are beyond the capabilities or experience of an 
operator 
0.10 
EPC25 Unclear allocation of function and responsibility 0.10 
EPC26 No obvious way to keep track of progress during an activity 0.28 
EPC27 A danger that finite physical capabilities will be exceeded 0.36 
EPC28 Little or no intrinsic meaning in a task 0.21 
EPC29 High level emotional stress 0.13 
EPC30 Evidence of ill-health among operatives, especially fever 0.07 
EPC31 Low workforce morale 0.25 
EPC32 Inconsistency of meaning of displays and procedures 0.79 
EPC33 A poor or hostile environment 0.83 
EPC34 Prolonged inactivity or highly repetitious cycling of low mental workload 0.22 
EPC35 Disruption of normal work-sleep cycles 0.86 
EPC36 Task pacing caused by the intervention of others  0.32 
EPC37 Additional team members over and above those necessary to perform task normally and 
satisfactorily 
0.35 
EPC38 Age of personnel performing perceptual tasks 0.30 
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3.3.2 Validation of EPC  
The traditional HEART method is based on data mining from different industry such 
as power plant, petrochemical industry, offshore platforms, and service industry to 
validate the EPCs. Instead of using data mining, this thesis utilises real marine 
accident causes for validation. The validation process of marine-specific EPC 
consists of six main steps which is provided in Figure 3.3. Since validation mainly 
utilises marine accident causality, the process begins with analysing of marine 
accident cases.  
Step 1. Analysing marine accident cases: The purpose of this step is to provide real 
data using marine accident causes since the human factor is one of the most 
significant contributory factor of marine incidents. Therefore, totally 100 marine 
accident cases are examined and analysed to find out the causes of the marine 
incident. In order to reach accurate findings, those cases were selected in accordance 
with distribution of world fleet by principal dwt tonnage and percentage of accident 
causality (collisions, groundings, fires/explosions, machinery damage, listing, and 
other significant accidents) during 2014. Accordance to the UNCTAD report (2014), 
the world fleet consists of 42.9% bulk carriers, 28.5% oil tankers, 12.8% container 
ships, gas carrier &chemicals and continuing. Table 3.25 shows the detail of world 
fleet dwt tonnage in 2014.  
Table 3.25 : Frequency of world fleet by principal dwt tonnage in 2014. 
Vessel type        Percentage 
Bulk carrier 42.9 
Oil tanker 28.5 
Container ship 12.8 
Gas carrier+chemical 10.3 
General cargo ship 4.6 
Others (Ferry+passenger, etc.) 0.9 
The EMSA report (2013) reveals that the majority of marine accident consists of 
collisions/contacts with 44%. The rest of causalities are sequentially 25% grounding, 
12% fire&explosion, 8% machinery damage, 3% listing/capsizing, 4% flooding and 
4% others. Table 3.26 illustrates marine accident causality around the Europe in 
accordance with EMSA 2013 report.  
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Table 3.26 : Marine accident causality in 2013. 
Casuality type         Percentage  
Collision/Contact 44 
Grounding 25 
Fire/Explosion 12 
Machinery damage 8 
Listing/Capesizing 3 
Flooding 4 
Others(FFO+cargo handling 
damage+weather damage,etc..) 
4 
 
The numbers of ship types upon marine accident causality with respect to percentage 
of 2013 is shown in table 3.27. 
Table 3.27 : The number of ship frequency upon marine accident causality. 
Vessel type 
Collision/
Contact 
Grounding 
Fire/
Expl
osion 
Machinery 
damage 
Listing/ 
Capsizing 
Flooding Others 
Bulk carrier 19 10 5 3 1 2 2 
Oil tanker 13 8 4 2 1 1 1 
Container ship 6 3 2 1 0 0 1 
Gas carrier+chemical 4 3 1 1 0 1 0 
General cargo ship 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Others 
(ferry+passenger..) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Step 2. Determining marine accident causes: The aim of this step is to determine 
and define marine accident causes in order to distribute towards HFACS level. After 
having analysed 100 different types of marine accident cases including 
collision/contact, groundings, fires/explosions, machinery damage, listing/capsizing, 
flooding and others (FFO, cargo handling damage, weather damage, etc.), relevant 
marine accident causes are identified. In conclusion, 692 marine causes were found 
out in 100 marine accidents around the world. This database involves approximately 
406 different types of human errors from range of different investigation branches 
such as Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), Australian Transportation 
Safety Bureau (ATSB), National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Japan 
Transport Safety Board (JTSB) and Turkish Accident Investigation Board (KAIK). 
Table 3.28 provides an example of marine accident analysis in particular 
collision/contact case and their causes for bulk carrier vessels MV Paula C & MV 
Darya Gayatri (MAIB, 2013). In this table, “Ineffectively using the electronic aids 
during bridge watch” is one of the cause of collision/contact accident caused by 
human error. Likewise, “Inappropriate and not timely intervention on VHF radio” is 
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another example of marine accident cause. The entire list covering marine accident 
causes, type of accidents and vessel names are provided in Appendix B . In the table, 
“Insufficient anchor cable was deployed (C170)” is an example accident cause of 
grounding accident or “Using improper fire extinguisher (C220)” is one of the 
marine accident causes due to fire/explosion incident on-board ship.  
Step 3. Distributing accident causes: This step utilizes the HFACS methodology in 
order to distribute 692 marine accident causes into relevant EPCs. Before distribution 
of marine accident causes, each of them is classified in respect of the HFACS 
framework under four-level hierarchical structure. For instance, “Ineffectively using 
the electronic aids during bridge watch (C1)” is kind of an active failure and 
classified under unsafe acts since it is typical error related with skill-based. 
Therefore, it is classified under unsafe acts-skill based error level.  Similarly, “Poor 
watch keeping standards (C8)” is type of an accident cause (latent failures) and is 
classified under “organisation influences-organisational process” level since it 
involves standards determined by procedures. 
Shappell and Wiegmann (2003) presented a detailed framework indicating how to 
make a proper classification for marine accident causes under HFACS levels. 
Accordingly, Table 3.29 illustrates the classification approach for organisational 
influences (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2003). For example, “Officer on watch (OOW) 
was the sole lookout on the bridge (C4)” is kind of a human error accumulated under 
organisation influences-resource management sub-level since the ship management 
company did not provide that the ship to be safely manned against principles of safe 
manning on-board. Therefore, the reason of C4 is due to negligence of 
staffing/manning. Likewise, “Not to comply with the requirements to keep a look out 
(C27)” is an example of human error accumulated under organisational influences-
organisational climate. The COLREG clearly defines the requirements for lookout 
that every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper lookout to avoid risk of 
collision. Thus, the reason of C27 is not to comply with rules stipulated regulations. 
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Table 3.28 : An example of marine accident analysis in particular collision/contact case and their causes. 
Type of 
accident 
Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
 
Collision/
Contact 
 
MV Paula C & 
MV Darya 
Gayatri 
C1 Ineffectively using the electronic aids during bridge watch 
C2 Inappropriate and not timely intervention on VHF radio 
C3 Inexperienced OOW and insufficient competency to keep a bridge watch in constrain 
waters 
C4 OOW was the sole lookout on bridge 
C5 Not calling Master although clear instruction was given by ship management company 
C6 Unaware of the capabilities and limitations of the electronic systems (AIS, ARPA, 
ECDIS) 
C7 Not giving any sound signals when manoeuvring during the vessels were in close 
proximity 
C8 Poor watchkeeping standards 
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Table 3.29 : Classification approach for organisational influences. 
 
Resource/Acquisition 
Management 
Organisational Climate 
Organisational 
Process 
O
R
G
A
N
IS
A
T
IO
N
A
L
 I
N
F
L
U
E
N
C
E
S
 
Human resources Structure Operations 
 
Selection 
 
Chain of command 
 
Operational tempo 
 
Staffing/manning 
 
Delegation of authority 
 
Time pressure 
 
Training 
 
Communication 
 
Production quotas 
Monetary/budget resources 
 
Formal accountability for 
actions 
 
Incentives 
 
Excessive cost cutting Policies 
 
Measurement/appra
isal 
 
Lack of funding 
 
Hiring and firing 
 
Schedules 
Equipment/facility resources 
 
Promotion 
 
Deficient planning 
 
Poor design 
 
Drugs and alcohol Procedures 
 
Purchasing of unsuitable 
equipment Culture 
 
Standards 
   
Norms and rules 
 
Clearly defined objectv 
   
Values and beliefs 
 
Documentation 
   
Organisational justice 
 
Instructions 
    
Oversight 
     
Risk management 
          Safety programs 
In the light of above, Table 3.30 provides the classification approach for unsafe 
supervision level (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2003). For example, “Safety 
Management System (SMS) non-conformities were not identified during internal 
audit performed by management company (C31)” is a typical example of human 
error due to unsafe supervision-inadequate supervision since the internal audit was 
not properly inspected by the Designated person ashore (DPA). Therefore, C1 is 
classified under inadequate supervision due to failed to track performance.   
Similarly, “Late corrective action was performed (C48)” is classified under unsafe 
supervision-failed to correct problem level since the crew/operator failed to initiate 
corrective action on time.  
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Table 3.30 : Classification approach for unsafe supervision. 
 
Inadequate Supervision   Planned Inappropriate Operations 
U
N
S
A
F
E
 S
U
P
E
R
V
IS
IO
N
  
Failed to provide guidance 
 
Failed to provide correct data 
Failed to provide operational doctorine Failed to provide adequate brief time 
Failed to provide oversight 
 
Improper  manning 
Failed to provide training 
 
Mission not in accordance with  
Failed to track qualifications 
 
rules/regulations 
Failed to track performance 
 
Provide inadequate opportunity for crew rest 
   Failed to Correct Problem 
 
Supervisory Violations 
Failed to correct document in error 
 
Authorized unnecessary hazard 
Failed to identify an at-risk 
 
Failed to enforce rules and regulations 
Failed to initiate corrective action 
 
Authorized unqualified crew for flight 
Failed to report unsafe tendencies     
Furthermore, Table 3.31 shows the classification approach for precondition for 
unsafe acts (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2003). The table defines which conditions each 
sub-level contain in order to do correct classification of human error. For instance, 
“OOW was distracted by other tasks rather than keeping a lookout (C16)” is an 
example of human error classified under precondition for unsafe acts-adverse mental 
state since the error is occurred due to distraction. Likewise, “Master did not receive 
close navigational support from the chief officer (C40)” is another example of human 
error which is classified under precondition for unsafe acts-crew resource 
management. The reason of this classification is that the error is caused due to failing 
of communication/coordination.  
The last classification system for active human failures are covered by unsafe acts. 
Table 3.32 illustrates the how classification approach is performed for unsafe acts 
(Shappell and Wiegmann, 2003). For example, “Unaware of both capabilities and 
limitations of the electronic systems (AIS, ARPA, ECDIS,etc..) (C6)” is kind of a 
human error classified under unsafe acts-skill based error since using of electronic 
systems basically depends on the ability and comprehensive skills of person. To give 
another example, “Not giving any sound signals when manoeuvring during the vessels 
in close proximity (C7)” is a human error classified under decision error type.  
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Table 3.31 : Classification approach for precondition for unsafe acts. 
 
Adverse Mental States    Crew Resource Management 
P
R
E
C
O
N
D
IT
IO
N
 F
O
R
 U
N
S
A
F
E
 A
C
T
S
 
Channelized attention 
 
Failed to back-up 
Complacency 
 
Failed to communicate/coordinate 
Distraction 
 
Failed to conduct adequate brief 
Mental fatigue 
 
Failed to use all available resources 
Get-home-it is 
 
Failure of leadership 
Haste 
 
Misinterpretation of traffic calls 
Loss of situational awareness 
  Misplaced motivation 
 
Personal Readiness 
Task saturation 
 
Excessive physical training 
  
Self-medicating 
Adverse Physiological States 
 
Violation of crew rest requirement 
Impaired physiological state 
 
Violation of bottle to throttle requirement 
Medical illness 
  Physiological incapacitation 
  Physical fatigue 
  
   Physical/Mental Limitation 
  Insufficient reaction time 
  Visual limitation 
  Incompatible intelligence/aptitude 
  Incompatible physical capability     
According to the COLREG, if there is any doubt for risk of collision, each vessel 
shall use all available means appropriate such as giving sound signal, making proper 
manoeuvring or calling on VHF to avoid collision. Therefore, the reason of C7 is 
caused inappropriate manoeuvre performed by OOW and classified under decision 
errors.  
The rest of marine accident causes are classified with same manner and then 
distributed into relevant EPCs for validation process. Accordingly, distribution of 
692 marine accident causes under relevant HFACS levels are provided in Appendix 
B. 
Step 4. Applying rank-weighting rule: In this step, each EPC is ranked in accordance 
with their importance level and weighted respectively under relevant HFACS sub-
level. In the step, the experts provide the rank order for each EPC, which is inserted 
into relevant HFACS sub-level, with respect to the influence.  
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Table 3.32 : Classification approach for unsafe acts. 
 
 Errors     Violations 
U
N
S
A
F
E
 A
C
T
S
 
Skill-based errors 
 
Failed to adhere to brief 
 
Breakdown in visual scan 
 
Failed to use the radar altimeter 
 
Failed to prioritize attention 
 
Flew an unauthorized approach 
 
Inadvertent use of controls 
 
Violated training rules 
 
Omitted step in procedure 
 
Flew an overaggressive manoeuvre 
 
Omitted checklist item 
 
Failed to properly prepare for the flight 
 
Poor technique 
 
Briefed unauthorized flight 
 
Over-controlled the craft 
 
Not current/qualified for the mission 
Decision Errors 
 
Intentionally exceeded the limits of the aircraft 
 
Improper procedure 
 
Continued low-altitude flight in VMC 
 
Misdiagnosed emergency 
 
Unauthorized low-altitude canyon running 
 
Wrong response to emergency 
  
 
Exceeded ability 
  
 
Inappropriate manoeuver 
  
 
Poor decision 
  Perceptual Errors (due to) 
  
 
Misjudged distance/altitude/airs 
  
 
Spatial disorientation 
    Visual illusion     
For instance, “Ineffectively using the electronic aids during bridge watch (C1)” has 
been classified under unsafe acts and distributed into skill-based error. There are six 
different EPC nominated in conjunction with skill-based error; EPC1, EPC9, EPC10, 
EPC14, EPC23 and EPC38. Since the effect of C1 will not be same for each EPC, it 
is necessary to determine each EPC effect related with marine accident cause. 
Therefore, rank-weighting rule is applied to rank the six EPCs with respect to their 
importance weight. In this context, rank reciprocal weights formula, provided in 
equation 3.7, is used (Stillwell et al., 1981).  
𝒘𝒋 = (
𝟏
𝒓𝒋
)/(∑
𝟏
𝒓𝒌
𝒏
𝒌=𝟏
)      
In the equation, rj is the rank of jth attribute and n is the number of attributes at the 
handled problem. If more than one attributes have the same row or rank, their mean 
ranking is used. Marine experts list the most important attribute first and least 
important attribute last. Since there are five different expert judgements which have 
been obtained during elaborative survey, the data is reduced to one by getting 
    (3.7) 
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arithmetic mean of judgements. Appendix B illustrates the ranking and weighting 
result of each EPC in conjunction with marine accident causes. In the Table, first 
column shows the cause code of marine accident, the second column denotes the 
times of repeating causes and third column shows the ranking & weighting of EPCs. 
In the third column, the first row gives the EPCs in conjunction with accident cause, 
the second row provides the ranking order of EPCs and the last rows gives the EPC 
weights for each marine accident cause. To find out the EPC weights, equation (3.7) 
is used. 
Step 5. Performing normalization: After having calculated ranking weight of each 
EPC under marine accident cause, normalization is performed for all EPCs which are 
accumulated corresponding HFACS level in order to adjust of EPC values. Table 
3.33 gives the cumulative results of 692 marine accident causes classified under 
relevant HFACS sub-level and their normalized values. In the table, the first row 
shows the total accumulated EPC weight whilst second row gives their normalized 
value. In order to achieve that, the accumulated EPC weights inserted in first raw is 
divided into total accident causes accumulated under resource management (73). For 
example, the ranking weight of EPC11 is 25.92 among the resource management and 
its normalized value is 0.36 among the all accident causes in resource management.  
Step 6. Calculating validation weights: In this step, normalized each EPC column is 
summed vertically to find out total EPC effect at the end. In Table 3.34, last row  
shows the findings. The outcomes reveals that there are slight differences between 
the derived EPC values and validated EPC values for marine industry. Therefore, it is 
necessary to verify the findings that have been calculated in derivation section. To 
achieve this purposes, independence T test is used. The next step gives explanation 
as well as outcomes of t-test.   
Step 7. Applying independent T-test: In this step, independent T-test is applied to 
verify whether results of derived marine-specific EPCs are matching with results of 
validated EPCs. The independent t-test, was presented in 1908, provides to compare 
average values of two different groups statistically (Box, 1987; Mankiewicz, 2004). 
The t-test compares the difference among two independent sample and the 
expectation that there is no big difference in the outcomes.      
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Table 3.33 : Cumulative results of 692 marine accident causes classified under relevant HFACS and their normalized values. 
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Table 3.33 (continued): Cumulative results of 692 marine accident causes classified under relevant HFACS and their normalized values. 
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Table 3.33 (continued): Cumulative results of 692 marine accident causes classified under relevant HFACS and their normalized values. 
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Table 3.33 (continued): Cumulative results of 692 marine accident causes classified under relevant HFACS and their normalized values. 
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The independent t-test can be calculated with following equations. In the equation 
(3.8), t denotes t-test.  
𝒕 =
?̅?𝟏 − ?̅?𝟐
𝑺𝒑√
𝟏
𝒏𝟏
+
𝟏
𝒏𝟐
      
where 
𝑺𝒑 = √
(𝒏𝟏 − 𝟏)𝒔𝟏
𝟐 + (𝒏𝟐 − 𝟏)𝒔𝟐
𝟐
𝒏𝟏 + 𝒏𝟐 − 𝟐
     
 
𝒅𝒇 = 𝒏𝟏 + 𝒏𝟐 − 𝟐    
where 
?̅?𝟏 denotes means of first sample ?̅?𝟐 denotes means of second sample. Respectively; 
Sp=pooled standard deviation, 
n1= sample size of first sample, 
n2= sample size of second sample, 
s1=standard deviation of first sample, 
s2=standard deviation of second sample, 
df = degree of freedom, 
In accordance with the equations (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10), Table 3.34 illustrates the 
independent t-test results driven by SPSS. In addition, Table 3.35 gives the statistical 
data information with respect to the samples. According to Levene’s test, which is 
used prior a comparison of means,  the variances of the data obtained from AHP and 
analysis of marine accident case are almost equal since significant level is larger than 
test value 0.05. The two-tailed value of p is 0.987, which is greater than 0.05, and it 
means that there is no significant difference between the means of two samples. In 
terms of the experiment, it can be inferred that the outcomes gathered from analysis 
of marine accident case is the same with the outcomes obtained from AHP in 98 % 
confidence interval.  
    (3.8) 
    (3.9) 
    (3.10) 
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Table 3.34 : Independent t-test results. 
Independent Samples Test 
 Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
T-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. T df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
99% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Test 
Equal variances 
assumed 
0.198 0.658 0.016 74 0.987 0.00132 0.08123 -.21344 .21607 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  0.016 73.746 0.987 0.00132 0.08123 -.21346 .21609 
Table 3.35 : Statistical data information with respect to the samples. 
Group Statistics 
 Groups N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Test 
Data from AHP 
38 0.4989 0.36430 0.05910 
Data from analysis of 
marine accident cases 
38 0.4976 0.34351 0.05573 
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Step 8. Interpolation of EPCs: In this step, the validated EPC values are converted 
to acceptable limits by interpolating. The validated rough EPC with the highest value 
is compared with the highest EPC value in conventional HEART method to obtain 
interpolation ratio.  In this context, equation (3.11) is used.  
𝑰𝒓 =
𝒙𝒎𝒂𝒙.
𝒚𝒎𝒂𝒙.
     
where ; 
Ir   : interpolation ratio 
𝒙𝒎𝒂𝒙.     : the maximum EPC value in conventional HEART approach,  
𝒚𝒎𝒂𝒙.     : the maximum validated rough EPC value in MAHRA approach,  
Then, interpolation ratio is determined and applied through values of validated rough 
EPC at the same rate. To accomplish this, each validated rough EPC values is 
multiplied with interpolation ratio (Ir) respectively (equation 3.12). Thus, the effects 
of single EPC can be revealed in acceptable limits.  
𝑬𝑷𝑪𝒅 =  𝑰𝒓 ×  𝑬𝑷𝑪𝜽   
where 𝑬𝑷𝑪𝒅  denotes values of marine-specific EPC for MAHRA approach, 
𝑬𝑷𝑪𝜽   denotes validated rough EPC values which is provided in Table 3.25. 
Accordingly, Table 3.36 shows the marine-specific EPC values for MAHRA 
approach. Since EPC is a simple multiplication factor for GEP value and affects 
human performance negatively, the EPC value which is less than 1.0 has no great 
influence on HEP value. Therefore, EPC30 have no considerable effects upon 
MAHRA concept.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
    (3.11) 
    (3.12) 
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Table 3.36 : Marine-specific EPC values for MAHRA approach. 
Code Error producing condition Maximum affect 
EPC1 Unfamiliarity  17.00 
EPC2 Time shortage 14.01 
EPC3 Low signal-noise ratio 3.31 
EPC4 Features over-ride allowed 8.72 
EPC5 Spatial and functional incompatibility 5.76 
EPC6 Model mismatch 2.64 
EPC7 Irreversibility 2.23 
EPC8 Channel overload 14.45 
EPC9 Technique unlearning 5.29 
EPC10 Knowledge transfer 11.00 
EPC11 Performance ambiguity 8.60 
EPC12 Misperception of risk 12.51 
EPC13 Poor feedback 12.55 
EPC14 Delayed/incomplete feedback 6.72 
EPC15 Operator inexperience 10.03 
EPC16 Impoverished information  8.42 
EPC17 Inadequate checking  2.79 
EPC18 Objectives conflict  2.15 
EPC19 No diversity  2.74 
EPC20 Educational mismatch  2.88 
EPC21 Dangerous incentives  3.62 
EPC22 Lack of exercise 1.64 
EPC23 Unreliable instruments 5.69 
EPC24 Absolute judgements required 1.17 
EPC25 Unclear allocation of function  1.22 
EPC26 Progress tracking lack 3.28 
EPC27 Physical capabilities  4.35 
EPC28 Low meaning 2.56 
EPC29 Emotional stress 1.59 
EPC30 ill-health  0.89 
EPC31 Low morale 3.00 
EPC32 Inconsistency of displays  9.43 
EPC33 Poor environment 9.90 
EPC34 Low mental workload 2.63 
EPC35 Sleep cycles disruption 10.30 
EPC36 Task pacing  3.85 
EPC37 Supernumeraries 4.14 
EPC38 Age 3.61 
3.3.3 Findings   
In the light of table 3.36, EPC1 (Unfamiliarity) has the highest value since most of 
shipboard operations require specific task knowledge and familiarity. Therefore, ship 
crew/seafarers are requested to be familiar with situation and have knowledge of the 
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tasks. EPC8 (channel overload) has the second highest value (14.45) among the 
whole error producing conditions since heavy work load may lead confusion of the 
crew during specific task being performed. The third most important one is EPC2 
(time shortage) while its value (14.01) ranks third place among the entire EPCs. 
Time shortage is one of the most critical factors on-board ships since  it may result in 
pressure on ship crew and lead to make error during critical shipboard operations. 
On the other hand, EPC30 (ill-health) has the lowest value (0.89) since ship crew are 
not allowed to work on critical shipboard operations until he/she is recovered. The 
second lowest ones are EPC24 (absolute judgement required) and EPC25 (unclear 
allocation of function) respectively. Absolute judgement is not required while 
performing a critical operation since shipboard cooperation and advisory is highly 
appreciated. Likewise, unclear allocation of function is prevented by organisations 
adopting safety management system which provides procedure and work allocation 
instruction on-board ship. EPC29 (high-level emotional stress) has the third lowest 
value in the whole assessment. If the high-level emotional stress is observed on ship 
crew, he will be repatriated in the next available port of call and is not allowed to 
attempt undertaking work requiring high reliability in ship environment. 
In this context, provisional list of quantified EPCs developed for MAHRA is 
compared with the other methods which are based on tailoring the basic principle of 
the HEART. Table 3.37 depicts the comparison of maximum EPC effects in 
MAHRA, HEART, NARA, CARA and RARA methods. The outcomes of the 
comparison show that the effects of a single EPC can be seen clearly in MAHRA 
approach. The review of marine-specific EPCs has resulted that numerous EPCs are 
modified (either decreasing or increasing their maximum effect). For instance, the 
maximum effect of EPC2 (time shortage) or EPC33 (poor environment) are 
increased since those are quite important conditions in shipboard environment. On 
the other hand, the maximum effect of EPC3 and EPC6 are decreased sharply as 
those factors do not have significant impact in shipboard environment. In addition, 
the maximum effect of EPC 35 is considerably increased compared with 
conventional HEART as well as other similar methods. The reason of that sleep 
cycle is vital for crew member on-board ship as it directly impacts mental and 
physical conditions. Moreover, crew on-board ship without proper sleep are likely to 
make more mistakes particularly during critical shipboard operations due to fatigue.           
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Table 3.37 : Comparison of EPC in MAHRA, HEART, NARA, CARA and RARA.  
Code Maximum EPC effect 
MAHRA HEART NARA CARA  RARA 
EPC1 17.00 17.00 20.00 20.00 17.00 
EPC2 14.01 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 
EPC3 3.31 10.00 10.00 N/A 10.00 
EPC4 8.72 9.00 9.00 N/A 9.00 
EPC5 5.76 8.00 N/A N/A 8.00 
EPC6 2.64 8.00 N/A N/A 8.00 
EPC7 2.23 8.00 9.00 N/A 8.00 
EPC8 14.45 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 
EPC9 5.29 6.00 24.00 24.00 8.00 
EPC10 11.00 5.50 N/A N/A 5.50 
EPC11 8.60 5.00 N/A N/A 5.00 
EPC12 12.51 4.00 N/A N/A 4.00 
EPC13 12.55 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 
EPC14 6.72 4.00 N/A N/A N/A 
EPC15 10.03 3.00 8.00 N/A 3.00 
EPC16 8.42 3.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 
EPC17 2.79 3.00 10.00 3.00 3.00 
EPC18 2.15 2.50 2.50 N/A 2.50 
EPC19 2.74 2.50 N/A N/A N/A 
EPC20 2.88 2.00 N/A N/A N/A 
EPC21 3.62 2.00 2.00 N/A N/A 
EPC22 1.64 1.80 N/A N/A 1.80 
EPC23 5.69 1.60 N/A 1.60 N/A 
EPC24 1.17 1.60 N/A N/A N/A 
EPC25 1.22 1.60 N/A N/A 1.60 
EPC26 3.28 1.40 2.00 N/A N/A 
EPC27 4.35 1.40 N/A N/A 1.40 
EPC28 2.56 1.40 N/A N/A 1.40 
EPC29 1.59 1.30 2.00 5.00 2.00 
EPC30 0.89 1.20 N/A N/A N/A 
EPC31 3.00 1.20 2.00 2.00 1.20 
EPC32 9.43 1.20 N/A N/A N/A 
EPC33 9.90 1.15 8.00 N/A 8.00 
EPC34 2.63 1.10 N/A N/A 1.10 
EPC35 10.30 1.10 N/A N/A N/A 
EPC36 3.85 1.06 N/A N/A N/A 
EPC37 4.14 1.03 N/A N/A N/A 
EPC38 3.61 1.02 N/A N/A N/A 
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3.3.4 Proportion affect assessment   
The assessed proportion of affect is one for the critical point during HEP calculation. 
The significant point in calculating APOA should be an assessment of the impact of 
EPC upon the reliability of the task. In conventional HEART approach, if there are 
more than one EPCs, the experts assign a proportion of the effect which is weighted 
(prioritised) for each EPC based on its importance. Instead of conducting traditional 
APOA assessment, this thesis proposes to apply smart solution utilising the AHP 
technique to weight the importance of each EPC since they are weighted from 0 to 1. 
So that, the methodological extension improves the consistency of the calculation 
during HEP calculation. In order to apply APOA calculation in MAHRA, equations 
(3.2), (3.3), (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6) will be conducted respectively. The APOA 
calculation will be applied for each sub-task being assessed, if there are more than 
one EPCs are assigned.   
3.4 System Application  
This section explains the system application to establish MAHRA approach. A flow 
diagram of MAHRA concept is illustrated in Figure 3.6. The system includes 
marine-specific EPCs and APOA calculation as innovation. The main steps of the 
MAHRA are briefly explained as follows.   
3.4.1 Task analysis   
The aim of this stage is to define the relevant task in accordance with the scenario 
which is including main and sub-tasks on-board ship. The task or activity is the 
definition of steps which crew must complete during shipboard operation. This is 
performed in line of hierarchical task analysis (HTA) where main tasks are divided 
into sub-tasks (Shepherd, 2001). In accordance with scenario, HTA may include pre-
activities, activities and post-activities. Each sub-tasks/activities can give detail about 
the main tasks. The HEP value for each sub-tasks can be calculated one by one and 
combination of them can give final HEP value with respect to correlation between 
the sub-tasks Thus, human error probability (respectively human reliability) can be 
estimated. 
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Figure 3.6 : Flow diagram of MAHRA.  
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3.4.2 Definition of scenario 
After having completed task analysis, various scenarios representing in a broad sense 
will be defined. These scenarios include numerous conditions such as working 
environment, operator/crew experiences, noise level, stress, operator/crew workforce 
morale, disruption, available time for task, time of day or organisation quality, etc. In 
accordance with scenario developed by the shipboard environment, the marine 
experts will obtain the corresponding EPCs. The relevant scenario will be either 
developed in real shipboard case or simulation. For instance, shipboard working 
environment is one of the substantial condition during the executing of the operation. 
A poor or hostile working environment on-board ship may induce to human error and 
increase HEP during critical shipboard operations. Another critical condition is time 
of day that task is being since numerous crew on-board ship may suffer from the 
disrupted sleep cycle particularly at night shifts. If the tasks such as manoeuvring, 
bunkering, cargo loading or discharging perform at night hours, sleeplessness and 
fatigue will show up as lack of attention. This could cause human error and increase 
HEP as well.       
3.4.3 Selecting generic task type  
This section provides user to select relevant generic task type in accordance with 
sub-tasks. The relevant generic task type is determined in accordance with the eight 
qualitative descriptions of actions through A to M (William, 1988). Then, 
quantitative GEP value is assigned for each sub-step in conjunction with generic task 
type. The experts will nominate the corresponding GTT and GEP values. Table 3.38 
illustrates the generic task and nominal human unreliability (or GEP value) (William, 
1988). In MAHRA approach, similar GEP values are adopted as presented in 
traditional HEART since they are generic and extracted from a variety of sources 
including petrochemical and off-shore. For example, if crew is fairly experienced and 
has satisfactory skill for the sub-task that is being applied, the experts will probably 
select general task type “G” which best matches the specific task being assessed 
(Kirwan and Gibson, 2008). If the crew member does not understand the process 
completely and he has not enough knowledge for the process, the experts will assign 
GTT “C” which is most fitted for specific task. 
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Table 3.38 : Generic task type and nominal human unreliability (William, 1988). 
              
           Generic task type 
Nominal human 
unreliability 
  
(5th -95th Percentile bounds) 
A Totally unfamiliar; performed at speed with 
no real idea of likely consequences. 
 
0.55                                            
(0.35 - 0.97) 
B Shift or restore system to a new or 
original state on a single attempt 
without supervision or procedures. 
0.26                                         
(0.14 – 0.42) 
C Complex task requiring high level 
of comprehension and skill. 
0.16                                            
(0.12 – 0.28) 
D Fairly simple task performed rapidly 
or given scant attention. 
0.09                                        
(0.06 – 0.13) 
E Routine, highly practiced, rapid task 
involving relatively low level of skill. 
0.02                                              
(0.07 – 0.045) 
F Restore or shift a system to original 
or new state following procedures 
with some checking. 
0.003                                    
(0.0008 – 0.007) 
 
G 
 
Completely familiar, well-designed, 
highly practiced, routine task occurring 
several times per day, performed to highest 
possible standards by highly motivated, 
highly trained, and experienced personnel, 
with time to correct potential error, but 
without the benefit of significant job aid. 
 
0.0004                                   
(0.00008 – 0.009 ) 
H Respond correctly to system command even 
when there is an augment or automated 
supervisory system providing accurate 
interpretation of system state. 
0.00002                                
(0.000006 – 0.0009) 
  
 M Miscellaneous task for which no description 
can be found. 
0.03                                        
(0.008 – 0.11) 
3.4.4 Selecting marine-specific EPC/s 
After having determined GEP values as per generic task type, relevant marine-
specific EPC/s are nominated by experts. The EPC is considered to affect human 
performance negatively therefore it may increase the GEP value. The experts will 
utilise table 3.36 during EPC nomination. The EPC/s are assigned for each sub-steps 
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depend on the condition of operator/crew. There would be more than one EPCs for 
each sub-task. For instance, if the crew/operator has little experience for the sub-task 
being performed or there is not enough time for this job, the experts will select 
EPC15 and EPC2 respectively.  
3.4.5 Determining APOA  
This step provides to assess proportion effect of each EPC if there are more than one 
EPCs selected for relevant sub-task. This thesis proposes smart solution to distribute 
weight of each EPC reasonably (Akyuz and Celik, 2015a ).  
3.4.5.1 Composing a pair-wise comparison matrix 
If there are more than one EPCs, a pair-wise comparison matrix is established by 
using relative importance scale. In this context, equation (3.2) will be applied. The 
experts are asked to compare each criteria with respect to Saat’s linguistic scale 
which is provided in Table 3.1. 
3.4.5.2 Calculating criteria weights 
This step provides weight prioritization for each EPC by using equation (3.3). Thus, 
relative importance of EPCs will be weighted accordingly.  
3.4.5.3 Determining CR values 
In order to make sure that pair-wise comparison matrix is consistent and reasonable 
during EPCs relative weight calculation, CR values are calculated in accordance with 
equation (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6). If the CR values are found more than 0.10, the 
judgements inserted by experts are considered as inconsistent. In this case, the 
judgement inserted into the pair-wise comparison matrix shall be revised and re-
calculated once again. If the CR values are equal or less than 0.10, the experts’ 
judgements are considered consistent and reasonable.  
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3.4.6 Calculating HEP value 
This stage enables user to calculate HEP value for each sub-task and main tasks. To 
achieve this purpose, equation (3.1) will be used. The equation simply multiply GEP 
value with EPC value. For instance, if the user selects EPC1 (unfamiliarity) with 
maximum effect of 17.0 and GTT E (Routine, highly practiced, rapid task involving 
relatively low level of skill) with a human error probability of 0.02, the total HEP 
affect will be 0.02 x 17.0 and HEP value is 0.34. This means that the reliability of 
operator/crew for the sub-task has been made 17 times worse. If there are more than 
one EPC selected, the multiplicative rule will be applied (Gibson et al., 2012). In the 
formula, 1 is subtracted from the maximum effect of selected EPC and added again 
at the end of calculation. The aim of this is to make sure that calculated APOA does 
not generate a value smaller than one.      
After having calculated HEP for each sub-task, dependency can be addressed by 
ensuring that integration of human errors combined together in a HTA PSA. Since 
main task is divided into sub-tasks to obtain final HEP, the correlation between the 
sub-tasks will be provided accordingly. Thus, dependency between the main and sub-
tasks HEP values will be provided. Table 3.39 shows the notations for dependency 
rule to find out the final HEP values (Akyuz and Celik, 2015a; He et al., 2008). 
Table 3.39 : Notations for dependency rule (He et al., 2008). 
System description System sub-task dependency Notation for  HEP  
Parallel system High dependency 𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑘 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛{𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑢𝑏−𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑖} 
 
Low or no dependency 𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑘 = ∏(𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑢𝑏−𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑖) 
Serial system High dependency 𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑘 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥{𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑢𝑏−𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑖} 
 
Low or no dependency 𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑘 =∑(𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑢𝑏−𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑖) 
   
In the HTA PSA, the following rules are used to decide whether the system is 
parallel or serial. If the failure of part induces the system becoming inoperable, then 
system is considered as serial. In other words, the entire system will fail in case any 
one of the system parts fails. In the serial system, it is necessary to success of every 
individual part. On the contrary, the system is considered as parallel where entire 
system works as long as not all the system parts fail. 
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In the light of above, if two tasks in the system are serial then in case failure one of 
them induce the system inoperable. If two tasks in the system are parallel then entire 
system works as long as not all of the tasks fail. 
3.4.7 Recovery proposal  
In case final HEP value is found higher than desired level (DiMattia et al., 2005), 
recovery proposal will be recommended in order to reduce probability of human 
error. In this step, appropriate mitigation measures are taken for EPCs which may 
cause to increase HEP values.  
Before taking appropriate mitigation measures, it is checked whether final HEP value 
is acceptable level or not. To accomplish this, DiMattia et al.(2005) risk matrix is 
used. In the matrix, illustrated in Figure 3.7, the probability of human failure is 
combined with the consequence of severity. The colour of each block indicates the 
level of immediate recovery action needed. In the risk matrix, the HEP value is 
categorized into four different level of 1.00E+00 to 1.00E-01, 1.00E-01 to 1.00E-02, 
1.00E-02 to 1.00E-03, and 1.00E-03 to 1.00E-04 (DiMattia et al., 2005; Akyuz and 
Celik, 2015a).  
HEP value 
  
Consequences severity 
Critical High Medium Low Warning 
1.00E+00 to 1.00E-01           
1.00E-01 to 1.00E-02           
1.00E-02 to 1.00E-03           
1.00E-03 to 1.00E-04            
 
 
 
Figure 3.7 : Risk matrix (DiMattia et al., 2005). 
If the final HEP value is placed inside the red boxes, then recovery proposal is 
needed to mitigate human error probability into desired level (lower risk level- 
yellow blocks). In this context, error reduction measures for relevant EPCs are 
proposed to remove the impacts of error producing conditions. 
 
 
*High risk 
*Lower risk 
*Lowest risk 
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3.4.8 Re-calculating final HEP  
After having proposed recovery measures, the EPCs which have the maximum effect 
on HEP can be removed. Thereafter, re-calculation will take a place whether final 
HEP value is reduced to acceptable level or not. Within this context, equation (3.1) is 
applied. In case re-calculated final HEP value is not decreased into desired level 
(lower risk level- yellow blocks), the recovery measure shall be revised and final 
HEP re-calculated once again. 
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4. DEMONSTRATION  
In this part, an illustrative example involving cargo discharging operation on-board 
chemical tanker is presented to demonstrate the MAHRA approach since cargo 
discharging operation has always potential risk in chemical tankers in terms of 
marine environment, human life and property. In this context, the next step defines 
the carriage of chemical cargo in tanker ships. 
4.1 Carriage of Chemical Cargo in Tanker Ship 
Carriages of chemical commodities have been increasing substantially in recent 
years. In order to meet this demand, special types of vessels are designed- chemical 
tankers which are able to carry numerous different cargoes of different characteristics 
and inherent hazards. Some of the chemical cargoes are petrochemicals including 
products of crude oil, natural gas and coal; alcohols and carbohydrates; acids and 
inorganic chemicals and vegetable, animal oil. The chemical cargoes transportation 
is different from any other dry or liquid bulk cargo carriage since a variety of 
different properties and characteristics hazards might be carried.  
The IBC Code is introduced by IMO and describes standards for chemical tankers 
involved in the carriage of chemical products. It comprises more than 600 chemical 
cargoes, addressing pollution category, hazard characteristics and specific 
requirements. Chemical tankers are generally designed with the highest specification 
and they are capable of transporting a variety of chemical products. Moreover, most 
of chemical tankers have fully segregated cargo handling system to enable safe and 
efficient transportation of products. While various dangerous chemical products are 
carried in the world seas, the following special types of chemical tankers are 
designed complying with the IBC Code (Akyuz and Celik, 2015a; IBC Code, 2007).  
IMO Type I: This type of chemical tankers are designed to transport very severe 
environmental and hazards cargoes such as acid, phenol, phosphorous, 
80 
 
chlorosulphonic acid, phosphate, etc. Therefore, these types of tankers are required 
maximum preventive measures since the cargoes are very dangerous (IBC Code, 
2007).    
IMO Type II: This type of chemical tankers are built to carry less severe 
environmental and hazards cargoes than IMO Type I. For example, alcohols, benzyl 
acetate, cyclohexanol, phenol, palm oil, which may cause still substantial damage, 
are transported by this type of tankers. Therefore, significant preventive measures are 
still required.  (IBC Code, 2007). 
IMO Type III: This type of chemical tankers are designed to transport chemical 
cargoes such as hexanol, ethanol, methyl alcohol, propylene, sulphuric acid which 
may cause minor damage to the crew, marine environment and ship. Therefore, 
moderate preventive measures are required. (IBC Code, 2007). 
In the light of above, IMO type I tanker ships are designed for the greatest hazardous 
chemical cargoes. Therefore, the cargo tanks of the IMO type I shall be robust to 
resist the most dangerous cargoes. According to the IBC Code (2007), four types of 
cargo tanks are designed for chemical tankers. These are independent, integral, 
gravity and pressure tanks. The most common cargo tank is used on-board chemical 
tankers is independent type which is able to eliminate stress to ship structure to 
minimise the risk to the ship. The independent type of cargo tanks can be either 
stainless steel or coated steel. The stainless steel tanks are the most resistant for 
aggressive cargoes and acids which are broadly carried by IMO type I chemical 
tankers. The chemical tanker installed with stainless steel provides easier tank 
cleaning. 
4.2 Problem Description 
The chemical tanker is special type of ships designed to carry petrochemical products 
in liquid form. Since the petrochemical products shipping has been increasing in 
marine industry, their carriage requires utmost attention due to the inherently 
hazardous content such as being explosive, poisonous and corrosive as well as toxic 
(IMDG Code, 1996). These hazardous products may have potential damage for crew 
on-board ship, environment and property. Therefore, the carriage of the chemical 
product by chemical tanker ships is quite critical process involving serious tasks for 
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responsible crew on-board ship (Akyuz and Celik, 2015a). Moreover, particular 
attention is  given by crew on-board ship during critical shipboard operations such as 
cargo loading or discharging, gas inerting, tank cleaning, purging. Since most of 
cargoes carried by chemical tanker ship represent utmost hazards (may be 
flammable, corrosive or toxic) for marine environment, human life and properties, 
chemical tanker fleets require qualified crew who understand the characteristics of 
the chemicals and be aware of the potential hazards involved. The expectation from 
the crew is to perform system-required task without any misperception or violations 
which might cause an operational failure. So that, chemical tanker organisations 
should proactively control and  prevent the possible catastrophe using advance 
techniques. In this context, crew/human reliability on-board ship has been a serious 
concern in marine industry in particular during the critical shipboard operations such 
as cargo loading or discharging (Akyuz and Celik, 2015b).   
Cargo discharging operation in chemical tankers can pose potential harm to human 
life and marine environment if the cargo being discharged is extremely flammable or 
toxic. A catastrophic problem can arise at the operational level of the chemical 
tankers. During the discharging operation, it is necessary to comply with the 
requirements of the SOLAS and MARPOL conventions to prevent loss of life and 
environment pollution. Particular attention shall be paid in order to prevent 
contamination of next cargo, ignition or toxic. Therefore, it is imperative that all 
precautionary steps are taken to avoid any leakage and to limit all source of ignition. 
At this stage, human reliability and awareness play a critical role in sustainable 
maritime transportation with the highest level of safety and loss prevention 
sensitiveness. Thus, crew reliability shall be analyse to mitigate potential operational 
human failure while performing cargo discharging operations on-board chemical 
tanker ships (ICS, 2014). 
4.3 Cargo Discharging Operation in Chemical Tanker Ship 
Carriage of chemical products can be divided into three stage; cargo loading, 
transportation and cargo discharging. Since one of the main objectives of this thesis 
is to systematically predict human error for designated task and to ascertain the 
required safety control levels on-board chemical tanker ships, the cargo discharging 
operation is selected as illustrative case study. As the chemical tankers are designed 
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with completely independent cargo systems, each cargo tank has an independent 
pumping and venting system. Discharging operation should be therefore pre-planned 
and if the different cargo parcels are discharged, then it will be performed according 
to the plan. Furthermore, all cargo pumps valves and equipment are tested prior to 
discharging operation. The discharging operation is performed by vessel own cargo 
pumps. The process can be divided into three section; pre-action, action and post-
action. To demonstrated the MAHRA approach, cargo discharging process in 
chemical tanker ship is applied into a real-time case study on-board ship. The cargo 
is propylene oxide (Annex II, cat.Y) which is carried with IMO type-II chemical 
tankers. The propylene oxide is one of the hazardous cargoes that is being 
transported on the high seas. If it contacts with combustible materials or water, this 
may cause fire or explosion. It can pose potential harm to the human body. During 
storage at cargo tanks, it is not stowed near the combustible materials as well as 
reacting with heat (IBC Code, 2007). The comprehensive information about the 
cargo is provided in Appendix A. In this context, Table 4.1 shows the discharging 
process of propylene oxide in chemical tanker ships.  
  Table 4.1 : Discharging process of propylene oxide cargo.  
Step  Operational process 
P
R
E
-A
C
T
IO
N
 
1. Prepare  deck for discharging operation  
 
1.1 Make sure that proper cargo discharging plan is ready 
 
1.2 Ensure that terminal re-confirm the discharging plan 
 
1.3 Calculate cargo quantitiy to be discharged 
 
1.4 Get confirmation for discharging quantity and discharging procedure from the    
      terminal 
 
1.5 Make sure that ship/shore safety check is completed 
 
1.6 Connect the bonding cable 
 
1.7 Ensure all crew on-deck has personnel protective equipment 
 
1.8 Check if emergency shower and eye washer  is ready  
 
1.9 Arrange sponge, rags and saw dust , ect (SMPEP) on deck in case of pollution 
 
1.10 Make sure that necessary samples have been taken from  cargo tanks 
 
1.11 Separate unused cargo lines and cargo hoses 
 
1.12 Make sure that all drain plugs are in position 
 
1.13 Check if the cargo temperature is available 
 
1.14 Re-calculate ship stability as per harbour condition in terms of SF/BM 
 
1.15 Make sure that no source of ignition around the manifold area 
2. Prepare engine room for discharging operation 
 
2.1 Ensure that power packs are ready 
 
2.2 Check if the cargo tank cofferdam blown with nitrogen properly 
 
2.3 Make sure that generators are ready  
83 
 
Table 4.1 (continued) : Discharging process of propylene oxide cargo. 
 Step    Operational process 
 
2.4 Make sure that no steam to be injected into the tanks unless otherwise instructed 
 
2.5 Maintain discharge heat for efficient cargo pumping 
3. Check out valves and alarms 
 
3.1 Make sure that all warning signs are displayed  
 
3.2 Check if the status of open/shut valves are displayed at cargo control room as  
      well as on deck 
 
3.3 Set P/V valves in manual /automatic open position in accordance with IBC Code 
 
3.4 Make sure that all cargo lines, hoses and valves are re-checked by duty officer  
 
3.5 Ensure HL / HHL alarm is run 
4. Prepare manifold area 
 
4.1 Make sure that all cargo lines are clean  
 
4.2 Check if all cargo lines and hoses are connected properly and ready for use 
 
4.3 Ensure unused manifold fully blinded 
 
4.4 Make sure that all plugs are removed and drain cocks shut. 
 
4.5 Make sure that manifold is connected to the marine loading arm properly  
 
4.6 Test the  manifold connection with air and soap water 
 
4.7 Re-check maximum discharge rate and get confirmation from terminal 
 
4.8 Make sure that internal stripping of tanks is discharged against high back  
      pressure 
 
4.9 Check if vapour return hoses and valves are ready 
A
C
T
IO
N
 
5. Commence cargo discharging process 
 
5.1 Open manifold valve 
 
5.2 Start cargo discharging pumps with slow rate 
 
5.3 Inform terminal to commencement of discharging 
 
5.4 Check level gauges and UTI tapes 
 
5.5 Set the pressure gauge on the manifold 
 
5.6 Make sure that necessary samples have been taken from manifold drain 
6. Check stability of ship 
 
6.1 Check vessel stability condition frequently in particular SF/BM  
 
6.2 Arrange ballast condition of vessel 
 
6.3 Calculate discharged cargo quantity frequently 
7. Monitor cargo discharging process 
 
7.1 Make sure that duty officer is in cargo control room and monitoring the operation  
 
7.2 Provide good communication between CCR, manifold area and terminal 
 
7.3 Monitor cargo discharging sequence  
 
7.4 Monitor manifold pressure and cargo flow rate 
 
7.5 Make sure that stripping of cargo tanks are commenced 
P
O
S
T
-A
C
T
IO
N
 
8. Complete cargo discharging process 
 
8.1 Get confirmation from the terminal for completion of discharging 
 
8.2 Stop cargo pumps and inform engine room 
 
8.3 Calculate final cargo quantity to be discharged 
 
8.4 Obtain the tank dry certificate 
 
8.5 Make sure that line blowing is conducted properly 
 
8.6 Check if all cargo valves are shut off 
 
8.7 Disconnect marine loading arm from the ship manifold 
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As it is seen on the table, task analysis of propylene oxide cargo discharging process 
has mainly eight steps; i)prepare deck for discharging operation, ii)prepare engine 
room for discharging operation, iii)check out valves and alarms, iv)prepare manifold 
area, v) commence cargo discharging process, vi)check stability of ship, vii)monitor 
cargo discharging process, viii)complete cargo discharging process and fifty-five 
sub-steps. 
Prior discharging operation, deck preparation will take a place. This step includes 
sub-steps 1.1 to 1.15. The second step is preparing engine room. It includes sub-step 
2.1 to 2.5. Thereafter, valves and alarms are checked in accordance with sub-steps 
3.1 to 3.5. Manifold area preparation includes sub-steps 4.1 to 4.9 respectively. Then, 
the next step is commencement of cargo discharging process which consists of six 
sub-steps from 5.1 to 5.6. Checking ship stability involves three sub-steps from 6.1 to 
6.3. The next step is monitoring cargo discharging process which is having five sub-
steps as well. It is 7.1 to 7.5. The last step is completion of cargo discharging process 
covering sub-steps 8.1 to 8.7.  
4.4 Analysis of Respondents 
In order to demonstrate the approach, a real-shipboard cargo discharging operation 
has been selected in reputed and reliable chemical shipping company. The ship 
capacity is about 10,450 dwt. It is chemical/oil tanker ships sailing on the high seas. 
The comprehensive survey/assessment has been performed with Master of vessel, 
who has been working as an ocean going master for a long years in chemical tanker 
ships, during discharge of propylene oxide cargo at Port of Zhangjiagang, China. 
Appendix A shows the comprehensive survey/assessment result carried out by 
Master of vessel. Totally, 3,500 mts cargo was discharged. At the time of discharging 
operation, Master of vessel are asked to select the most appropriate generic task type 
for each sub-step as well as relevant EPC/s.  
4.5 Definition of Scenario 
In order to apply proposed model, the real-shipboard cargo discharging operation has 
performed for discharging of propylene oxide cargo. The availability of time, crew 
mental state or stress, working environment, crew collaborations, fatigue, noise level 
and ability of crew, time of day during operation, task familiarity,etc. are evaluated 
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by the Master of vessel at the time of cargo discharging process. Discharge operation 
commenced at day time (15:00 lt) and completed early morning of following day 
(04:00 lt). The weather was calm and sea was smooth. Wind speed was around 8 
knots/hr. Tide is +5 meters at high tide, +0,5 m at low tide. Chief officer, second 
officer, third officer, bosun, pumper and able seamen participated discharging 
operation at different sub-tasks. They were rested enough before commence 
operation. The Master decided the most available generic task type as well as EPC/s 
for each sub-step in the light of environmental condition.  
In order to demonstrate the MAHRA approach, step 5 (commence cargo discharging 
process) is selected as a sample of process since there are totally eight main step and 
fifty-five sub-steps. 
4.6 Selecting Generic Task 
Generic task is defined with the Master of vessel. The crew is fairly experienced and 
has satisfactory skill during commencement of cargo discharging process. The crew 
(pumper), who is in charge of opening manifold valve, is totally familiar to perform 
this task. In addition, he/she is highly practiced. Likewise, duty officer (2/O) in CCR 
has enough experience to start cargo discharging pumps with slow rate since it is 
routine task at the beginning of discharging operation. The communication between 
the ship and terminal in order to exchange information about commencement of 
discharging operation is very routine task for duty officer (3/O). Therefore, officer in 
charge can respond it correctly. Checking level gauges and UTI tapes are also routine 
task and nominated crew (A/B) has enough knowledge to perform it. Furthermore, 
adjusting the pressure gauge on the manifold is carried out by A/B who is completely 
familiar to perform this task. Likewise, taking samples from manifold drain is carried 
out by chief officer and surveyors. Chief officer has enough experience and 
knowledge for this task. In accordance with above assessment, the Master selected 
the generic task for commencement cargo discharging process as illustrated in Table 
4.2.   
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4.7 Selecting Marine-specific EPCs 
The marine-specific EPC/s were nominated by Master. Since EPC affects the human 
performance negatively and leads to increase GEP value, relevant marine-specific 
EPC is chosen from the list of 38 possible statements. Table 4.2 shows the selected 
EPC/s for step 5 (commence cargo discharging process).  
Table 4.2 : Generic tasks and marine-specific EPC/s for step 5. 
Sub-step    Selected 
generic task 
GEP 
value 
Nominated EPC 
5. Commence cargo discharging process    
    5.1 Open manifold valve G 4.00E-04 EPC2, EPC23 
    5.2 Start cargo discharging pumps with slow rate E 2.00E-02 EPC17, EPC22,  
EPC23 
    5.3 Inform terminal to commencement of  
          discharging 
H 2.00E-05 EPC8, EPC11, 
EPC13 EPC14 
    5.4 Check level gauges and UTI tapes E 2.00E-02 EPC22 
    5.5 Set the pressure gauge on the manifold G 4.00E-04 EPC2, EPC17, 
EPC33 
    5.6 Make sure that necessary samples have been   
          taken from manifold drain 
G 4.00E-04 EPC2, EPC15 
4.8 Determining APOA 
In order to assess proportion of affect for each marine-specific EPC, the AHP 
technique is used to execute sensitive calculation. As it is seen in table 4.1, except 
sub-step 5.4 the rest of sub-steps have more than one marine-specific EPC. 
Therefore, sensitive weighting calculation is required to calculate HEP value. Within 
this context, the next part provides comparison matrices for each sub-steps from 5.1 
to 5.6 sequentially.        
4.9 Composing a Pair-wise Comparison Matrix 
A pair-wise comparison matrix is established in accordance with equation (3.2) using 
a relative importance scale. The Master of vessel is asked to assess importance level 
of each marine-specific EPC as per Saaty’s relative importance scale. Accordingly, 
Table 4.3 provides the comparison matrix of nominated marine-specific EPCs for 
sub-step 5.1 (open manifold valve). Table 4.4 shows the comparison matrix of 
nominated marine-specific EPCs for sub-step 5.2 (start cargo discharging pumps 
with slow rate). Table 4.5 gives the comparison matrix of nominated marine-specific 
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EPCs for sub-step 5.3 (inform terminal to commencement of discharging). Table 4.6 
gives the comparison matrix of nominated marine-specific EPCs for sub-step 5.5 (set 
the pressure gauge on the manifold). Finally, Table 4.7 gives the comparison matrix 
of nominated marine-specific EPCs for sub-step 5.6 (make sure that necessary 
samples have been taken from manifold drain). 
Table 4.3 : Comparison matrix of selected marine–specific EPCs for step 5.1. 
 
EPC2 EPC23 
EPC2 1 5 
EPC23  1/5 1 
Table 4.4 : Comparison matrix of selected marine–specific EPCs for step 5.2. 
 
EPC17 EPC22 EPC23 
EPC17 1  1/2 3     
EPC22 2 1 3 
EPC23  1/3  1/3 1 
Table 4.5 : Comparison matrix of selected marine–specific EPCs for step 5.3. 
 
EPC8 EPC11 EPC13 EPC14 
EPC8 1 4 2 1/2 
EPC11 1/4 1 1/2 1/3 
EPC13 1/2 2 1 1/2 
EPC14 2 3 2 1 
Table 4.6 : Comparison matrix of selected marine–specific EPCs for step 5.5. 
 
EPC2 EPC17 EPC33 
EPC2 1  1/2 3     
EPC17 2 1 4     
EPC33  1/3  1/4 1 
Table 4.7 : Comparison matrix of selected marine–specific EPCs for step 5.6. 
 
EPC2 EPC15 
EPC2 1 3 
EPC15  1/3 1 
4.10 Calculating Criteria Weights 
The priority weights of each marine-specific EPC can be calculated in accordance 
with equation (3.3). Thus, consistency in APOA calculation is obtained. In this 
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context, Table 4.8 shows the marine-specific EPC prioritization weights for 
commence cargo discharging process (step 5) accordingly.  
4.11 Determining CR Values 
The CR value can be found by using equations (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6). Whilst the CR 
value is less than 0.10, the judgements inserted in pair-wise comparison matrix by 
Master are considered as reasonable and consistent. Table 4.8 gives the CR values 
along with prioritization weights of EPCs. 
Table 4.8 : EPC prioritization weights and CR values. 
Sub-step EPC Priority weight CR value 
5.1 EPC2 0.817 0.001 
 EPC23 0.183  
5.2 EPC17 0.334 0.046 
 EPC22 0.525  
 EPC23 0.142  
5.3 EPC8 0.311 0.035 
 EPC11 0.100  
 EPC13 0.182  
 EPC14 0.406  
5.4 EPC22 1.000  
5.5 EPC2 0.320 0.015 
 EPC17 0.557  
 EPC33 0.123  
5.6 EPC2 0.750 0.001 
 EPC15 0.250  
4.12 Calculating HEP 
HEP value can be calculated by using equation (3.1) for discharging process of 
propylene oxide cargo in chemical tanker ships. In this context, Table 4.9 shows 
HEP calculation for step 5 (commence cargo discharging process). In the light of 
above illustration, the HEP calculation is conducted for discharging process of 
propylene oxide cargo in chemical tanker ship. Table 4.10 shows the results. 
Moreover, Appendix B illustrates the comprehensive results of whole discharging 
process involving GEP values, maximum affects of EPCs, APAO calculations as 
well as HEP values. 
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Table 4.9 : HEP calculation for step 5 (commence cargo discharging process). 
Step 5 (commence cargo discharging process) GEP value EPC     EPC  
 max. affect 
      EPC      
       APOA 
HEP value 
      5.1 Open manifold valve 4.00E-04 *Time shortage 14.01 0.817 8.64E-03 
   *Unreliable instruments 5.69 0.183  
       
      5.2 Start cargo discharging pumps with slow rate 2.00E-02 *Inadequate checking  2.79 0.334 7.11E-02 
   *Lack of exercise 1.64 0.525  
   *Unreliable instruments 5.69 0.142  
       
      5.3 Inform terminal to commencement of discharging           2.00E-05 *Channel overload 14.45 0.311 1.88E-03 
   *Performance ambiguity 8.60 0.100  
   *Poor feedback 12.55 0.182  
   *Delayed/incomplete feedback 6.72 0.406  
       
      5.4 Check level gauges and UTI tapes 2.00E-02 *Lack of exercise 1.64 1.000 3.28E-02 
       
      5.5 Set the pressure gauge on the manifold 4.00E-04 *Time shortage 14.01 0.320 8.64E-03 
    *Inadequate checking  2.79 0.557  
    *Poor environment 9.90 0.123  
       
      5.6 Make sure that necessary samples have been  taken from  
           manifold drain 
4.00E-04 *Time shortage 14.01 0.750 1.40E-02 
  *Operator inexperience 10.03 0.250  
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Table 4.10 : HEP calculation for discharging process of propylene oxide cargo. 
Step Sub-step EPC HEP value 
1. 1.1 EPC2, EPC38 7.24E-03 
 
1.2 EPC8, EPC14, EPC18 3.18E-04 
 
1.3 EPC2, EPC11, EPC35 2.32E-02 
 
1.4 EPC5, EPC13,EPC15, EPC22 7.12E-03 
 
1.5 EPC2, EPC11, EPC17 7.77E-02 
 
1.6 EPC12, EPC13, EPC33 1.72E-03 
 
1.7 EPC2, EPC17, EPC26 2.88E-04 
 
1.8 EPC1, EPC10, EPC17 1.96E-02 
 
1.9 EPC2, EPC11,EPC17 1.15E-02 
 
1.10 EPC17, EPC33 1.89E-04 
 
1.11 EPC2, EPC14, EPC15 1.64E-01 
 
1.12 EPC17, EPC33 1.51E-04 
 
1.13 EPC2, EPC14, EPC17 1.04E-02 
 
1.14 EPC2, EPC12, EPC23 1.24E-03 
 
1.15 EPC17 5.58E-02 
2. 2.1 EPC1, EPC13, EPC16 1.84E-03 
 
2.2 EPC15, EPC17 2.21E-02 
 
2.3 EPC2, EPC14 5.71E-04 
 
2.4 EPC12, EPC15 1.32E-02 
 
2.5 EPC11, EPC15 8.89E-03 
3. 3.1 EPC2, EPC18, EPC32 4.90E-04 
 
3.2 EPC2, EPC17 3.63E-02 
 
3.3 EPC17 5.58E-02 
 
3.4 EPC17, EPC27,EPC33, EPC36 4.56E-03 
 
3.5 EPC17, EPC34 6.62E-05 
4. 4.1 EPC13, EPC27 4.41E-02 
 
4.2 EPC17 5.58E-02 
 
4.3 EPC1, EPC15,EPC22 6.88E-03 
 
4.4 EPC17, EPC22 6.90E-03 
 
4.5 EPC27, EPC38 2.38E-03 
 
4.6 EPC2 4.20E-02 
 
4.7 EPC8, EPC14, EPC36 9.35E-03 
 
4.8 EPC15, EPC17 2.29E-02 
 
4.9 EPC2 5.60E-03 
5. 5.1 EPC2, EPC23 8.64E-03 
 
5.2 EPC17, EPC22, EPC23 7.11E-02 
 
5.3 EPC8, EPC11,EPC13 EPC14 1.88E-03 
 
5.4 EPC22 3.28E-02 
 
5.5 EPC2, EPC17, EPC33 8.64E-03 
 
5.6 EPC2, EPC15 1.40E-02 
6. 6.1 EPC22, EPC29 1.53E-01 
 
6.2 EPC12, EPC22, EPC32 7.67E-03 
 
6.3 EPC17, EPC38 8.71E-05 
7. 7.1 EPC2, EPC32 1.37E-02 
 
7.2 EPC14, EPC27, EPC36 2.33E-04 
 
7.3 EPC2, EPC10 8.67E-04 
 
7.4 EPC23, EPC33 6.28E-03 
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Table 4.10 (continued) : HEP calculation for discharging process of propylene cargo. 
Step Sub-step EPC HEP value 
 
7.5 EPC15, EPC25, EPC38 1.39E-04 
8. 8.1 EPC10, EPC13, EPC17 1.45E-02 
 
8.2 EPC8, EPC14 5.50E-04 
 
8.3 EPC2, EPC15, EPC22 3.59E-03 
 
8.4 EPC17 1.12E-03 
 
8.5 EPC11, EPC14, EPC32 6.64E-04 
 
8.6 EPC17 5.58E-02 
 
8.7 EPC1, EPC2, EPC27, EPC38 1.69E-03 
As the cargo discharging process of propylene oxide in chemical tanker consists of 
eight main steps and fifty-five sub-steps in HTA, the final HEP values should be 
determined in order to assess human reliability. In this context, correlation between 
the main steps and sub-steps in accordance with PSA HTA are addressed. Namely, 
fifteen sub-steps shall be completed properly to succss step 1 (prepare deck for 
discharging operation) successfully. This refers a serial system where the step 1 will 
fail if any of fifteen sub-step fails to complete. Therefore, the overall HEP value is 
found 3.80E-01 since fifteen sub-steps have a low dependency. Likewise, step 2 
(prepare engine room for discharging operation) will fail in case any of five sub-steps 
fail (serial system-low dependency). Therefore, the HEP value is 4.66E-02 for step 2. 
Accordingly, the overall HEP value is found 1.00E-04 for step 3 (check out valves 
and alarms) as there is a high dependency (parallel system) between five sub-steps. 
Respectively, the overall HEP value is found as 5.60E-02 (serial system- high 
dependency) for step 4; 7.11E-02 (serial system-high dependency) for step 5; 1.00E-
04 (parallel system-high dependency) for step 6; 2.13E-02 (serial system-low 
dependency) for step 7 and 7.79E-02 (serial system-low dependency) for step 8.  
In order to calculate final HEP value for propylene oxide cargo discharging operation 
on-board ship, eight main steps should be completed without any error. In this 
context, if any of these steps fail, cargo discharging operation will not be carried out. 
Therefore, the final HEP value is found 3.80E-01 since there is high dependency 
between them. 
4.13 Recovery Proposal 
The relation between the failure and reliability can be defined with R(t) = 1- F(t) 
formula basically. In accordance with the sensitive calculation carried out, the human 
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reliability value of cargo discharging operation for propylene oxide has been found 
as 6.20E-01 which is very low. Therefore, recovery action is needed to enhance 
performance reliability (Akyuz and Celik, 2015a). 
Table 4.11 provides the detail of recovery proposal in order to mitigate the highest 
HEP values in accordance with DiMattia et al.(2005) risk matrix where the 
probability of failure combined with the consequence severity. In the matrix, the 
colour of each block shows the level of immediate recovery action that is needed. In 
the matrix, the HEP value is categorized into four different level of 1.00E+00 to 
1.00E-01, 1.00E-01 to 1.00E-02, 1.00E-02 to 1.00E-03, and 1.00E-03 to 1.00E-04 
(DiMattia et al., 2005). In this context, whilst cargo discharging operation of 
propylene oxide in chemical tanker is considerably critical aspect for maritime safety 
and environment protection, severities of consequence are considered as high level 
by Master of vessel. The calculated final HEP value (3.80E-01) is to be categorized 
into high risk (red blocks) since the value is placed the range of 1.00E+00 to 1.00E-
01. In order to enhance reliability of operation, the final HEP value shall be reduced 
either into lower (yellow blocks) or lowest (green blocks) risk levels. Therefore, the 
recovery action is represented to reduce HEP value into desired level (lower or 
lowest risk levels) by mitigating the EPCs (Akyuz and Celik, 2015a). 
4.14 Re-calculating HEP Value 
According to the above recovery actions, the highest EPC values which cause to 
reduce human reliability can be avoided. In this sense, equation (1) is used again. 
Table 4.12 shows the results of re-calculated HEP values for discharging operation of 
propylene oxide cargo after mitigation measures. The re-calculated HEP values are 
found after remedial actions. The finding shows that the re-calculated HEP values are 
8.47E-02 for step 1, 4.66E-02 for step 2, 1.00E-04 for step 3, 4.20E-02 for step 4, 
3.28E-02 for step 5, 1.00E-04 for step 6, 2.13E-02 for step 7 and 2.21E-02 for step 8 
respectively.  
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Table 4.11 : Recovery proposal.  
Sub-step EPC Recovery action 
1.5 EPC2 *Nominate experienced officer to carry out task timely 
  
*Prepare functional and efficient check-list to avoid waste of time 
 
EPC11 *Allocate of role and responsibility of officers clearly 
  
*Increase awareness about the importance of check list application 
 
EPC17 *Inspect each ship/shore check list before commencement of operation 
  
*Increase frequency of internal audit carried out by shore-based management company 
1.11 EPC2 *Provide sufficient number of crew to perform task timely 
  
*Instruct duty crew to attend work place in advance  
 
EPC14 *Provide effective communication between the duty crew and officer for feedback 
  
*Instruct duty crew to inform officer properly right after the  task completed 
 
EPC15 *Support inexperienced crew by experienced one and apply practical training accordingly   
  
*Provide practical training concerning how to do this task 
1.15 EPC17 *Increase frequency of safety patrol around the manifold area  
  
*Instruct duty officer to monitor the deck, in particular manifold are, at regular intervals 
3.3 EPC17 *Increase frequency of monitoring of P/V valve positioning 
  
*Enable available check list not to skip process  
4.2 EPC17 *Instruct duty officer to conduct re-inspection for connection of all cargo lines and hoses 
  
*Provide safety checklist which includes monitoring and re-checking of the situation 
5.2 EPC17 *Monitor pressure gauge on the manifold continuously whether discharging pumps run with slow rate 
  
*Keep continuous communication between CCR, manifold area and terminal 
 
EPC22 *Perform training programme for duty crew before they embark the ship  
  
*Apply theoretical and practical training on-board ship how to operate discharging pumps  
 
EPC23 *Make sure that pressure gauge are reliable and maintained regularly  
  
*Check if discharging pumps indicators are in order 
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Table 4.11 (continued) : Recovery proposal.  
Sub-step EPC Recovery action 
6.1 EPC22 *Perform training programme for officers before they embark the ship  
  
*Provide illustrated guidance for officer showing how to follow the process 
 
EPC29 *Enable appropriate social activities for crew on-board ship as much as possible 
  
*Enhance motivational situation of crew by providing high-standard of seafarer life 
8.6 EPC17 *Provide safety checklist which includes monitoring and re-checking position of cargo valves 
  
*Request re-confirmation from he engine control room whether cargo valves are shut off 
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Since the system has high dependency, the final re-calculated HEP value is found 
8.47E-02. Thus, the human error probability is reduced to lower risk (yellow blocks) 
and categorized in the range of 1.00E-01 to 1.00E-02 in accordance with the risk 
matrix. 
Table 4.12 : Re-calculated HEP values.  
Step Sub-step EPC HEP value 
1. 1.1 EPC2, EPC38 7.24E-03 
 
1.2 EPC8, EPC14,EPC18 3.18E-04 
 
1.3 EPC2, EPC11, EPC35 2.32E-02 
 
1.4 EPC5,EPC13,EPC15,EPC22 7.12E-03 
 
1.5 N/A 8.70E-04 
 
1.6 EPC12,EPC13,EPC33 1.72E-03 
 
1.7 EPC2,EPC17,EPC26 2.88E-04 
 
1.8 EPC1,EPC10,EPC17 1.96E-02 
 
1.9 EPC2,EPC11,EPC17 1.15E-02 
 
1.10 EPC17,EPC33 1.89E-04 
 
1.11 N/A 8.57E-04 
 
1.12 EPC17,EPC33 1.51E-04 
 
1.13 EPC2,EPC14,EPC17 1.04E-02 
 
1.14 EPC2,EPC12,EPC23 1.24E-03 
 
1.15 N/A 0.00E-00 
2. 2.1 EPC1,EPC13,EPC16 1.84E-03 
 
2.2 EPC15,EPC17 2.21E-02 
 
2.3 EPC2,EPC14 5.71E-04 
 
2.4 EPC12,EPC15 1.32E-02 
 
2.5 EPC11,EPC15 8.89E-03 
3. 3.1 EPC2,EPC18,EPC32 4.90E-04 
 
3.2 EPC2,EPC17 3.63E-02 
 
3.3 N/A 0.00E-00 
 
3.4 EPC17,EPC27,EPC33,EPC36 4.56E-03 
 
3.5 EPC17,EPC34 6.62E-05 
4. 4.1 EPC13,EPC27 4.41E-02 
 
4.2 N/A 0.00E-00 
 
4.3 EPC1,EPC15,EPC22 6.88E-03 
 
4.4 EPC17,EPC22 6.90E-03 
 
4.5 EPC27,EPC38 2.38E-03 
 
4.6 EPC2 4.20E-02 
 
4.7 EPC8,EPC14,EPC36 9.35E-03 
 
4.8 EPC15,EPC17 2.29E-02 
 
4.9 EPC2 5.60E-03 
5. 5.1 EPC2,EPC23 8.64E-03 
 
5.2 N/A 5.43E-03 
 
5.3 EPC8,EPC11,EPC13 1.88E-03 
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Table 4.12 (continued) : Re-calculated HEP values.  
Step Sub-step EPC HEP value 
 
5.4 EPC22 3.28E-02 
 
5.5 EPC2,EPC17,EPC33 8.64E-03 
 
5.6 EPC2,EPC15 1.40E-02 
6. 6.1 N/A 2.09E-02 
 
6.2 EPC12,EPC22,EPC32 7.67E-03 
 
6.3 EPC17,EPC38 8.71E-05 
7. 7.1 EPC2,EPC32 1.37E-02 
 
7.2 EPC14,EPC27,EPC36 2.33E-04 
 
7.3 EPC2,EPC10 8.67E-04 
 
7.4 EPC23,EPC33 6.28E-03 
 
7.5 EPC15,EPC25,EPC38 1.39E-04 
8. 8.1 EPC10,EPC13,EPC17 1.45E-02 
 
8.2 EPC8,EPC14 5.50E-04 
4.15 Extended Discussion 
In the light of HEP values, findings show that crew error probability is very high 
(3.8E-01) and categorized into high risk level during propylene oxide cargo 
discharging operation in chemical tankers. Apparently, the reason of the high human 
error probability (i.e. lowest human reliability) is mainly caused by sub-tasks which 
have the highest HEP value. Particularly, sub-step 1.11 (separate unused cargo lines 
and cargo hoses) has the highest HEP value as the task requires utmost deck 
organisation and planning. It means that sub-step 1.11 has more impact on the entire 
process. Moreover, sub-step 6.1 (check vessel stability condition frequently in 
particular SF/BM) is the second highest HEP value during discharging process since 
it ranks second place among the all sub-steps. During cargo discharging process, it is 
very important to check vessel stability and stress frequently (in general hourly) 
since the stress limits of vessel are never exceeded. The third highest HEP value is 
sub-step 1.5 (make sure that ship/shore safety check is completed). The ship/shore 
safety check list involves various critical procedure to enable safer cargo handling 
operation. Therefore, it should be completed without any failure. The other highest 
HEP values are sub-steps 1.15 (make sure that no source of ignition around the 
manifold area), 3.3 (set P/V valves in manual /automatic open position in accordance 
with IBC Code), 4.2 (check if all cargo lines and hoses are connected properly and 
ready for use) and 8.6 (check if all cargo valves are shut off) respectively.  
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In the view of main steps, it appears that step 1 (Prepare deck for discharging 
operation) contains the highest HEP value. Chemical cargo discharging operation 
involves numerous critical safety factors which have to be taken into consideration. 
Therefore, it is quite important to take necessary measures prior to discharging 
operation, with particular attention being paid by crew during the cargo is severely 
hazardous for human life and marine environment. In order to minimize human 
errors, necessary remedial actions shall be taken for the EPCs which have the highest 
affect upon HEP value. The findings also indicates that each main step has 
dependency with each other. Therefore, each main step shall be completed without 
any failure. In this context, if any of these steps fail, cargo discharging operation will 
not be completed properly. 
After having taken necessary remedial actions, the final HEP value is reduced to 
8.47E-02 and categorised into lower risk level during propylene oxide cargo 
discharging operation. As mentioned before, reliability can be defined as probability 
of a part of equipment or service operating without failure. Basically, equation R(t) = 
1- F(t) represents the relation between reliability and error. In this context, the 
finding shows that performance reliability of crew (operator) typically follows 
planned procedures and it is acceptable level. The demonstration results clearly show 
that critical tasks within an operation can be completed with higher reliability if 
operator (crew) complies with remedial actions. Therefore, the performance 
reliability result is satisfactory and it leads an improvement in the overall levels of 
safety in cargo discharging operation.  
In the context of reliability interval, the human error probability value is fluctuating 
from 1.64E-01 to 6.62E-05. The means of HEP value is found 2.03E-02. In the light 
of outcomes, fifteen HEP values are higher than mean of human unreliability. This 
reveals that most of sub-tasks are performed within acceptable limits.      
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5.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
5.1 Conclusive Remarks 
Human factor has been becoming the prominent cause of marine incidents in the 
recent years. Therefore, human element is one of the most significant concerns in 
marine industry. In last decades, safety and risk practitioners attempted to extend the 
use of proactive methods in the analysis of human failures to enhance safety and 
prevent environment at sea. In this context, there are a variety of safety and risk-
based studies presented by safety researhers as proactive tools. However, maritime 
safety has not raised to the desired level. In order to remedy that, this thesis provides 
a novel approach, namely called MAHRA, to analyse human reliability on-board 
ship. The proposed approach is robust marine-specific tool whose aim is to mitigate 
the human error during critical shipboard operations. The thesis also discusses and 
analyses human error probability particularly critical shipboard operation in chemical 
tanker ships since they have a potential risk for human and environment due to 
hazardous cargo content. Therefore, crew on-board chemical tanker ship should be 
fully aware of potential hazards. At this point, crew reliability plays substantial role 
on-board ship. 
The thesis proposes an empirical human reliability analysis which has marine-
specific parameters for critical operations on-board ship to enhance safety and 
operational reliability in marine industry by integrating HEART and AHP as well as 
HFACS technique. The study quantifies and validates the EPC parameter since 
obtaining historical data with respect to human error on the nature of maritime 
industry is very challenging and mostly unknown due to scarce of data. In this 
context, HFACS methodology is used to derive and validate marine-specific EPC. 
The AHP method is utilised during derivation process as well as APOA calculation. 
HEART approach is used to calculate HEP value. Thus, MAHRA approach improves 
the overall accuracy on which the consistency of proportion affect in HEP 
100 
 
calculation is increased. In addition, dependency is provided as practice of the 
reliability estimation with the serial or parallel systems to calculate final HEP.  
The modification along with the suggested approach is demonstrated with cargo 
discharging operation which is involving relatively high level of risk when compared 
to other shipboard operations. In this sense, a real-shipboard cargo discharging 
operation is presented as demonstration. At the end of HRA assessment, the initial 
HEP value is found 3.8E-01 which is considerably high. It means that human 
reliability is very low. After having taken necessary preventive measures for relevant 
EPC which may cause to increase HEP values, the final HEP value is reduced 8.47E-
02 which is acceptable since it is categorized in lower risk area. In the light of above, 
the thesis reached the following solid targets; 
 Minimizing the error risk by assessing human reliability in shipboard operations, 
 Applying proposed approach into critical shipboard operations, 
  Creating available solutions for shipboard operational concept by developing a 
valid approach to human error assessment,  
 Recommending preventive measures against pivotal factors that cause errors in 
shipboard operations, 
 Contribute to ship safety management system practices, 
5.2 Contributions to Academic Literature  
In the view of methodological background of the MAHRA, the research has serious 
contributions to academic literature. The following items can be highlighted as 
contribution to academic literature.  
 A new robust tool presentation, namely called MAHRA, is provided 
 Marine-specific EPC values are generated 
 Comprehensive marine incidents investigation and causes identification are 
provided  
 AHP integration into HEART approach, which is a relatively new hybrid decision-
making method, is introduced 
 HFACS integration into HEART method, which is a hybrid decision-making 
model 
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 A wide range of literature review along with the human reliability assessment in 
marine industry is completed. This provides a valuable source to the safety and risk  
researchers 
  Quantitative and qualitative data in maritime safety is provided, 
5.3 Contributions to Marine Industry  
Since most of accident on-board ship is due to human error, it is vital for ship 
management company to reduce human failure on-board ship. Otherwise, operational 
or technical failure of crew can pose potential harm to ship, commodity, human life 
and environment. Therefore, shore-based shipping companies are eager to take 
benefits of academic researches that may introduce proactive methods reducing 
human error on-board ship. At this point, the need for a marine-specific HRA 
technique, capable of systematically predict human error potentials for designated 
tasks and determine the required safety control levels on-board ship, is required. In 
order to remedy this issue, the proposed MAHRA approach is introduced as a 
contribution to marine industry. The followings contributions are made with respect 
to the thesis into maritime sector. 
 A novel HRA technique based on decision-making model is developed to enhance 
safety at sea  
 The proposed approach contributes to evaluate human reliability on-board ship 
 It contribute to ship safety management system practices 
 The proposed approach compensates shortfalls of human reliability enhancement in 
maritime industry 
 The proposed approach can assist ship management companies, safety engineers 
and reliability researchers to give their full attention on the most critical human 
error factor whilst giving them the top priority 
 It allows monitoring as well as controlling human performance on-board ships  
 Enhancement in ship operational safety procedures  
 A comprehensive and robust tool can assist shore-based shipping company as well 
as shipboard organisation to estimate and predict human error likelihood in critical 
operations 
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5.4 Research Limitations 
Some of limitations can be understood and planned for before the research process 
starts, while others become apparent during or after the thesis research process. 
During research of this thesis, it was difficult to get sufficient support from the 
marine experts since they were very busy. Particularly, the experts had no enough 
time to establish relation matrix as well as rank-weighting rules at the time of EPC 
derivation process. Hopefully, necessary judgements were gathered timely and 
transformed into useful information. Another important limitation of this thesis is 
that the method mainly based on expert judgements data which are relatively 
subjective data even though marine experts have adequate seafarer experiences. On 
the other hand, obtaining technical or operational data on the nature of marine 
domain is very challenging and mostly unknown. Therefore, it seems quite 
reasonable that the method based on expert judgements.  
One of the fundamental limitation with quantitative HRA methods is scarce of data. 
Therefore, empirical method is an alternative solution to deal with scarcity of data, in 
particular marine industry. The MAHRA approach, marine-specific method, provides 
satisfactory result since it based on real-marine accident causes. 
The main aim of this research is to mitigate human error in ship operation level. 
Thus, enhancement of maritime safety, prevention loss of life as well as environment 
pollution prevention is achieved. The research encourages the shore-based maritime 
managers as well as safety practitioners in the maritime domain. However, it should 
be user-friendly for shipboard organisation and shore-based executives. Therefore, it 
is necessary to design a smart knowledge-based software for practical use. This 
thesis provides to establish a theoretical background for MAHRA approach. The next 
important step will be design a knowledge-based programming in the system in order 
to transform operational task scenarios in database into meaningful information. A 
H-RAMS (Human Reliability Analysis and Monitoring System Proposal in 
Shipboard Operations) software will provide users a proactive user-friendly solution 
prior commencement of any critical shipboard operations. Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 
show demo versions of H-RAMS software.  In this concept, the followings further 
research proposal are made with respect to the thesis. 
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 Design knowledge-based technological solution (H-RAMS software ) to operate 
MAHRA approach  
 Develop marine-specific GTT and GEP values 
 Apply proposed approach into different case application 
 Test proposed approach on vessel fleets such as container, crude carrier, LGP and 
LNG tanker, bulk carrier, general cargo ships.  
  Extend proposed approach into  similar sectors such as  off-shoring, shipyard,  
port and terminal operations, etc. 
 Design ship crew reliability index  concept  
 
 
Figure 4.1 : H-RAMS software demo sample.  
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Figure 4.2 : H-RAMS software demo sample.  
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Figure A.1 : HFACS-EPC relation matrix established by the consensus of marine experts for chemical tankers. 
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Figure A.2 : HFACS-EPC relation matrix established by the consensus of marine experts for bulk carriers. 
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Figure A.3 : HFACS-EPC relation matrix established by the consensus of marine experts for container ships. 
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Figure A.4 : HFACS-EPC relation matrix established by the consensus of marine experts for tanker ships. 
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Figure A.5 : HFACS-EPC relation matrix established by the consensus of marine experts for general cargo ships.
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Figure A.6 : Cargo information sheet. 
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Figure A.6 (continued) : Cargo information sheet. 
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Figure A.7 : Comprehensive survey/assessment result carried out by Master of vessel. 
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Figure A.7 (continued) : Comprehensive survey/assessment result carried out by Master of vessel 
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Figure A.7 (continued) : Comprehensive survey/assessment result carried out by Master of vessel. 
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APPENDIX B: Tables 
Table B.1: Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code    Marine accident causes 
Collision/ 
Contact 
MV Paula C 
& MV Darya 
Gayatri 
(MAIB) 
C1 Ineffectively using the electronic aids during watch 
C2 Inappropriate and not timely intervention on VHF radio 
 C3 Inexperienced OOW and insufficient competency to keep a bridge watch in constrain waters 
 C4 OOW was the sole lookout on bridge 
 C5 Not calling Master although clear instruction was given by ship management company 
 C6 Unaware of both the capabilities and limitations of the electronic systems (AIS, ARPA, ECDIS,etc..) 
 C7 Not giving any sound signals when manoeuvring during the vessels were in close proximity 
 C8 Poor watchkeeping standards 
 MV Seagate & 
MV Timor 
Stream 
(MAIB) 
C9 OOW on both vessels failed to keep a proper lookout 
 C10 Lack of taking appropriate action stiuplated by COLREG to avoid collision  
 C11 Not to assess the risk of collision  sufficiently 
 C12 Failed to comply with some of the most fundamental elements of the COLREG 
 C13 Failed to comply with the written navigational procedures issued by ship management company  
 C14 The OOW did not assess the situation correctly initially 
 C15 Watch alarm ( Deadman alarm) was not set by the Master 
 C16 OOW was distracted by other tasks rather than keeping a lookout 
 C17 Lack of maintaining high standards of watchkeeping at all times 
 MV Antonis 
(MAIB) 
C18 Poor fendering and lightering by port authority 
 C19 Lack of protection for the exposed bridge aft 
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code    Marine accident causes 
 
 
C20 No formal risk assessment was conducted 
 C21 Limited time for manoeuvring  
 C22 Lack of safety meeting between port authority and vessel 
 MV Alam Pintar 
(MAIB) 
C23 The bridge was manned by an inexperienced officer and an unqualified deck cadet.  
 C24 Ineffective alterations of course to avoid collision 
 C25 Ill considered decision taken to resume shooting pots 
 C26 Inexperienced bridge team  
 C27 Not to comply with the requirement to keep a look out  
 C28 Inappropriate actions of many vessels in the area of the distress 
 C29 VHf radio volume was reduced and became inaudible 
 C30 Fishing vessel not fitted with AIS 
 C31 SMS non-conformities were not identified during internal audit by management company 
 C32 Ship management company did not have a system of formal appraisal for the Master 
 MV Global 
Mariner (MAIB) 
C33 No voyage data recorder fitted to the vessel 
 C34 The positions of the vessels were not fixed on the chart 
 C35 Improper documents were used  
 C36 Inadequate anchor watch was being maintained 
 C37 Improperly rigged anchor ball against the aft side of the jackstay  
 C38 No attempt was made to use the available binoculars to monitor other vessel's manoeuvring 
 C39 Time limitation induced to take effective avoiding action  
 C40 Master did not receive close navigational support from the chief officer 
 C41 Master or chief officer did not receive specific bridge teamwork training before 
 C42 Increased levels of stress during the immediacy of risk of collision 
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code    Marine accident causes 
 MV 
Xuchanghai 
(MAIB) 
C43 Vessel’s speed was insufficient to maintain steerage in the prevailing conditions 
 C44 Master and OOW did not have an adequate knowledge of the English for safe operation 
 C45 Lack of information excahnging between the pilot and master 
 C46 Initially steerage was lost when speed reduced 
 C47 The master was unable to confirm his tow was made fast  
 C48 Late corrective action was performed 
 C49 Improper pilot card available on bridge containing the information 
 MV Kinsale 
(MAIB) 
C50 The bridge team was unaware of the approach of other vessel 
 C51 A proper lookout astern was not being kept 
 C52 Operational radar had a shadow sector astern 
 C53 A sole watchkeeper on bridge 
 C54 Inappropriate contruction/mast visually impeded the officer's line of sight 
 MV Nordheim 
(MAIB) 
C55 Execution of the manoeuvre was not best carried out in accordence with COLREG 
 C56 The master did not make proper voyage plan  
 C57 Negligence of vicinity control 
 C58 Incorrect assumption made by Master 
 C59 The chart was not marked with no-go areas 
 C60 Relaying only electronic information than the chart 
 C61 Look out had not reported properly 
 MV Nikkei 
Tiger (JTSB) 
C62 Incorrect assumption on the basis of scanty radar information 
 C63 OOW did not assess the situation of approaching and determine the necessity of actions to avoid collision 
 C64 Improper bridge watchkeeping procedure manuel to avoid collision in ample time 
 C65 Improper adjustment were made by OOW 
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code    Marine accident causes 
 
 
C66 OOW hesitated to use whistles or engines 
 C67 Insufficient boards poster showing the vessel  manoeuvring characteristic 
 MV Western 
Winner (MAIB) 
C68 Failure to comply with COLREG properly 
 C69 Not to proceed with safe speed  
 C70 Not to have made proper use of radar given the conditions of restricted visibility 
 C71 Master unfamiliar with the situation 
 C72 Ship not to have prepared passage plan 
 C73 Physical and mental stress  
 C74 Main fire pumps had not been started  
 C75 The vessel did not participate the VTS  
 C76 Inadequate rest of seafarers before incident 
 MV Zulfikar 
(MAIB) 
C77 Incorrect assumption on the basis of scanty radar information 
 C78 Improper radar watch to obtain early warning of the risk of collision 
 C79 The bridge was not properly manned when the vessel navigating in thick fog 
 C80 Unreliabile equipment used ( EPIRB did not transmit the signal) 
 C81 Negligence of environmental control 
 C82 Certifacate of competency did not comply with the requirement  
 C83 Failure to use the urgency PAN PAN prefix 
 C84 Failure to proceed at a safe speed. 
 C85 Failure to navigate with particular caution near the termination of the traffic lane 
 C86 Failure to have the engines ready for immediate manoeuvre 
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 Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code    Marine accident causes 
  C87 Series of assumptions based on limited information instead of following a systematic approach  
 C88 Watchkeeper was not keeping a proper lookout 
 C89 An absence of early and appropriate action to avoid the collision 
 C90 The other ship was not equipped with a radar reflector  
 C91 Faigue  
 C92 Low signal sound from AIS 
 MV Grandi 
Rodosi (ATSB) 
C93 Insufficient time for starting air to stop the ahead running engine 
 C94 The ship’s main engine did not run astern ontime due to organisation failure 
 C95 Lack of bridge resource management principles  
 C96 Engineer’s mistake was not identified by anyone on the ship’s bridge  
 C97 No audible alarm to indicate when it was running the ‘wrong way' 
 C98 No implenetation or procedures was given by ship management company in case of wrong way 
 C99 The master/pilot exchange did not cover the essential details required under the port regulation 
 C100 Ship management compnay did not develop contingency plans for specific manouvering 
 C101 Ineffective bridge resource management principles  followed on board  
 MV Silver Yang 
(ATSB) 
C102 OOW was involved non-work related conversation during the period of time leading up to the collision 
 C103 Insufficient course alteration made by OOW 
 C104 Not to do all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances  
 C105 Active radar reflector was turned off by the Master of ship 
 C106 Performance detetiorated due to fatigue and a minor seasickness 
  C107  OOW could not effectively use the IMO’s Standard Marine Communication Phrases (SMCP)  
  C108 Ineffectively implemetation of UNCLOS law onboard ship 
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code    Marine accident causes 
 
 
MV F&K 
(ATSB) 
C109 AIS transmissions may not be reliably onboard ship 
 C110 Maintain improper lookout 
 C111 Master took no action to avoid the collision  
 C112 Inappropriate means to determine whether a risk of collision existed 
 C113 Radar was not turned on by OOW 
 C114 There were no other electronic collision avoidance or warning aids on board 
 
 
MV Ormiston 
(ATSB) 
C115 The wheelhouse and afterdeck working lights were on 
 C116 Obscuring much of the view out to either side of the fishing vessel 
 C117 Adverse weather condition 
 C118 Bridge team made assumptions about the developing situation 
 C119 Inappropriate action to avoid the collision 
 C120 Bridge team members had not effectively implemented bridge resource management principles 
 C121 Lost situational awareness 
 C122 Lack of effective radio communication between the vessel 
 C123 Failure to keep went checked 
 
MV Silky 
Ocean (ATSB) 
C124 Failure to keep an effective lookout 
 C125 Inadequate passage plan prepared by OOW 
 C126 Failure to keep an effective lookout 
 C127 OOW did not appropriately consider the information provided by the navigational charts and publication 
 C128 Inappropriately using all means available, in particular the radar 
  C129 Inadequately managed the crew’s work/rest periods 
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code    Marine accident causes 
 
 
C131 Superficially training planning 
 C132 No effective lookout being maintained 
 MV Mary Ann 
Hudosn& Mv 
Star (NTSB) 
C133 Ineffective handling of rudder command 
 C134 Ineffective use of the two tugboats to manoeuvr 
 C135 Not comply with the COLREG 
 C136 Strees on crew due to commercial pressure  
 C137 Lack of coordination with port authorities 
 C138 Improper physical environment 
 C139 Lack of operatinal knowledge upon ECDIS 
Grounding MV Beaumont 
(MAIB) 
C140 OOW was asleep due to fatigue 
 C141 No lookout on the bridge 
 C142 Master did not exercise his overriding authority for the safety of the vessel 
 C143 Navigational aids were not used effectively by OOW 
 C144 BNWAS was seldom used  
 C145 Inefficient  implemtation of SMS by shore-based management company 
 MV Amber 
(MAIB) 
C146 Bridge equipment tests are not carried out before departure as per SOLAS 
 C147 Watchkeeping officers are not completely familiar with all navigational equipment on board 
 C148 Master/pilot information excahnges were not completed properly 
 C149 Poor communications among the bridge team member 
 C150 Failure at the briefing stage to assign appropriate roles and responsibilities within the bridge team 
  C151 Failing to report defects as required by the COLREG 
  C152  Loss of situational awareness within the bridge team 
  C153 OOW do not keep a proper visual lookout 
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 Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code    Marine accident causes 
 MV CSL 
Thames (MAIB) 
C154 Not to comply with passage plan  
 C155  OOW did not detect activation of the anti-grounding warning zone visual alarm 
 C156 OOW was not monitoring the ECDIS properly 
 C157 Audible ant-grounding alarm did not funtion 
 C158 Lack of understanding of the equipment’s safety features and/or their value 
 C159 OOW lacked experince 
 C160 Bridge team did not use the available grounding checklist 
 C161 Bridge team did not record the times of follow-up actions 
 C162 No risk assessment was undertaken 
 MV CFL 
Performer 
(MAIB) 
C163 Navarea system warnings were not received 
 C164 Route plan was not cross-checked by the Master 
 C165 The officers had not been trained in the use of ECDIS 
 C166 No procedures on the system’s use were included in the vessel’s SMS 
 C167  Undue reliance on the ECDIS 
 C168 Vessel did not have proper emergency response procedures  
 MV Harvest 
Caroline 
(MAIB) 
C169 Safety management of the vessel was not meeting the objectives of the ISM Code 
 C170 Insufficient anchor cable was deployed 
 C171 Dragging of the anchor was not detected because the OOW due to fatigue 
 C172 Insufficent Master judgement and attitude to risk due to comsumption of alcohol 
 C173 The DPA did not possess the necessary experience and knowledge  
 C174 Insufficent instructions for anchoring in its safety management manuel 
 C175 Lack of fitted a watch alarm on the bridge 
 C176 Lack of internal audit  
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
 MV Thunder 
(MAIB) 
C177 Appropriate chart was not available on board. 
 C178 Fundamental misunderstanding of the principles of anchoring 
 C179 Lack of amendement upon the sailing direction 
 C180 OOW did not call the master on time 
 C181 The master failed to report the grounding to either a national or local authority 
 C182 Insufficent emeregency response plan prepared by ship management company 
 MV Lerrix 
(MAIB) 
C183 Master was asleep due to fatigue 
 C184 Improper lookouts  
 C185 Watch alarm (BNWAS) were off 
 C186 Not comply with ILO and STCW crew rest hours 
 C187 Inappropriate use of personal electronic navigation equipment carried by crew 
 C188 Poor work performance 
 MV Dumun 
(ATSB) 
C189 The bridge team had no way of knowing the position of the rudder 
 C190 The ship’s rudder angle indicator transmitter and tiller link-arm were not fitted 
 C191 Incorrect installation at shipyard 
 C192  Inappropriate comprehensive safety management system implemented 
 C193 Communication error between the Master and pilot 
 C194 Lack of good seamnaship practice durinc manouvering 
 MV Shen Neng 
1 (ATSB) 
C195 OOW did not alter the ship’s course at the designated course alteration position 
 C196 Ineffective monitoring of the ship's position due to fatigue 
 C197 No effective fatigue management system in place 
 C198 Insufficient guidance in relation to the proper use of passage plans 
 C199 Amendments upon passage plan were not entered into the ship’s GPS unit 
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 Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
 
 
C200 Improper look out carried out by OOW 
 C201 Hours of work recorded by the chief mate did not accurately reflect the actual working hours 
 MV Iron King            
( ATSB) 
C202 Steering system hydraulic pressure was limited by a leaking actuator relief valve 
 C203 SMS did not include procedures during emeregency steering failure 
 C204 Inappropriate crew training carried out by ship management copmpany before embarking ship 
 C205 Insufficent risk management strategy 
 C206 Lack of awarness of emergency procedures  
 C207 Superficially internal audit carried out by DPA 
 MV Atlantic Eagle 
(ATSB) 
C208 The ship’s position was not established by any member of the bridge team 
 C209 Poor situational awareness 
 C210 Ambiguous and inconsistent instruction against the passage plan 
 C211 Improper monitoring the ship's progress  
 C212 Effectively made the bridge watch inadequate 
 C213 SMS procedures for record keeping were not effectively implemented on board the ship 
Fire/Explosion MV Yeoman Bontrup 
(MAIB) 
C214  Failure to follow company instruction with regards to hot work repair  
 C215  Lack of suitable smoke detector inserted on-board ship 
 C216  Relevant compartment was not equipped with a fixed fire-fighting system 
 C217  Stocking some chemicals in the steering gear room 
 C218 Lack of risk assessment conducted by shore-based management company 
 C219  Lack of emergency fire drill training on-board ship 
 MVRosebank (MAIB) C220 Using improper fire extinguisher  
 C221 Not follow up the situation after extinguished the first fire 
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
 
 
C222 Lack of communication between the bridge and fire figting team  
 C223  Negligence of environmental control before fire 
 C224  Communication problem among the crew due to poor English   
 C225 Not follow up the instruction during emergency situation  
 MV Saldanha 
(ATSB) 
C226 Crew were not aware of any similar previous flashbacks involving Volcano VJ type burners 
 C227 Duty engineer was not aware of all of the hazards associated with operating and maintaining the burner 
 C228 Master and crew were not aware of  the appropriate first aid treatment required for 
 C229 Lack of post accident notice to ship 
 C230 Inadequate safety meeting 
 C231 Lack of approval in bolier equipment modification 
 MV Jin Hui 
(ATSB) 
C232 The fumigation contractor did not adequately consider the risks associated with burying 
 C233 Master was not supplied with sufficient information for cargo inherent 
 C234 Ineffective supervise the application of the alumninium phosphide fumigant 
 C235 Insufficiant fire extinguih technique performed by crew 
 C236 Lack of understanding cargo guidance  
 MV Baltimar 
Boreas ( ATSB) 
C237 Failure of a flexible fuel hose due to negligence 
 C238 The maintenance of the generator flexible fuel hoses was inadequate 
 C239 Inappropriate temporary repairs had been made  
 C240 Improper equipment used (hoses longer than specified) 
 C241 Poor hoses were not found during surveys, audits or inspections 
 C242 SMS provides no guidance for the maintenance or routine replacement of the flexible fuel hoses  
 C243 Flexible fuel hoses was not in accordance with SOLAS requirement 
 C244 Necessary fire extinguisher located incorrect place 
140 
 
Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
 
 
C245 The crew were not aware of the guidance and entered the engine room after CO2 release 
 C246 The closing arrangement did not comply with the requirement of SOLAS 
Machinery damage MV Blue Note 
(MAIB) 
C247 Insufficiently re-tightened the bolts  in accordance with the manufacturer’s maintenance schedule 
C248 Improperly engaged in the hatch-lid sockets 
 C249 Improper equipment used ( length of the ends of the lifting hooks) 
 C250 Lack of crew training with respect to crane functions 
 C251 Incompetent crew operating the crane 
 C252 Maintenance instructions had not been followed properly by crew  
 C253 Necessary lifting test inspection for crane was not carried out  
 C254 Poor record keeping induced to track the history of the crane 
 C255 Lack of risk assessment conducted by shore-based management company 
 MV Love Letter 
(MAIB) 
C256 Absence of suitable markings 
 C257 Insufficient maintenance planning 
 C258 Inadequate assessment of risk 
 C259 Limited monitoring of operations 
 C260 Incorrect modification  
 MV HC Rubina  
( ATSB) 
C261 Improper planned maintenance system carried out  
 C262 Manufacturer's requirements for the shaft alternator flexible coupling were not follow up 
 C263 Ineffective systems for the defective control system for the CPPreported to the relevant authority 
 C264 The pilot and master did not identify an increase in risk 
 C265 The bridge team did not confirm that the predetermined passage plan 
 C266 Communication error between the Master and pilot 
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
Listing/Capsizing MV Flying 
Phantom 
(MAIB) 
C267 No defined limits for tug towing operations in restricted visibility 
C268 Bridge ergonomics of vessel were not suited to conducting blind pilotage operations 
 C269 No checklist prepared for pre-towing operation  
 C270 No effective system for assessing the risk of fog 
 C271 Ineffective SMS with regard to operation in restricted visibility 
 C272 Previous accident were not followed up properly 
 C273 A number of inconsistencies and conflicts within ship's SMS documentation 
 C274 ISO 9001 (quality)audits were not effective at highlighting any gaps in safety procedure 
Flooding MV Sonia 
(MAIB) 
C275 Fitting of internal plugs were not successfully completed 
 C276 Late announcement of flooding to port authority by Master 
 C277 There was no evidence of any protective coating applied either inside or outside the stub pipe 
 C278 Severe corrosion into valve flange were not ascertained properly during last dry dock 
 C279 Owners failed to response emergency due to commercial considerations 
 C280  There was confusion as to what repair work was likely to be required by vessel 
 
C281 
Insurance underwriters and other  sources was made more difficult due to no “out of hours” telephone 
numbers  
 MV Great 
Majesty 
(ATSB) 
C282 When the ballast pump was disassembled for repair, the suction pipe was not blanked off properly 
 C283  The suction valves were not isolated correctly by crew 
 C284 No work permit was completed for the pump maintenance  
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
 
 
C285 No appropriate poster were placed on the ballast valve remote control panel 
 C286 The ballast operations procedure did not provide a sufficient level of guidance for crew 
 C287 The work permit system had not been effectively implemented on board the ship 
 C288 The communications between officers on board ship were not effective 
 C289 Chief engineer did not pay neccessary attention for ballast pump repairing 
Others(FFO&cargo 
handling damage, 
weather damage, 
etc.) 
MV Dutch 
Navigator 
(MAIB) 
C290 The Master and owner were not aware of the regulations covering the dangerous good transportation 
C291 Overstowage of the tank container was not in compliance with the requirement of IMDG code 
C292 Container stack massess were in excess of the recommendations of vessel' cargo sec manuel 
C293 Excessive racking load 
C294 Poorly executed and monitored repairs performed onboard ship 
 C295 The absence of a report from the Master that dangerous goods were involved with the cargo shift 
 C296 Insufficant risk assessment made by ship management company 
 MV Wah Shan 
( MAIB) 
C297 The aft mooring team did not use the equipment that was available to them effectively 
 C298 Duty officer demonstrated very poor leadership 
 C299 Duty officer did not understand or assess the risks involved effectively 
 C300 The aft mooring team of ship did not work effectively as a team 
 C301 The instructions set out in ship’s SMS were not followed effectively 
 C302 The arrangement of the equipment of ship did not provide an obvious safe method of using a winch 
 C303 Lack of emergency response plan 
 C304 Lack of crew training with respect to correct mooring and towing operations 
Collision/Contact MT Saetta and 
MV Conger 
(MAIB) 
C305 During main engine failure to stop, no procedure in place for the crew to follow 
C306 Communication error between the ships 
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
 
 
C308  Over-reliance upon checklists 
 C309 The hours of work and rest were not monitored properly by superintendents 
 C310 Wide-ranging and time-consuming responsibilities given to officers 
 C311 No occupational standards defined for superintendents or masters 
 C312 Inadequate contingecny plan for STS tranfer  
 MT Vallermosa 
(MAIB) 
C313 Unnecessary anxiety induced to distraction of pilot and master 
 C314 Late notice given by Master 
 C315 Weak bridge team maneagement 
 C316 Principles of BTM would not be applied during the pilotage 
 C317 Master totally reliance and trust on the Pilot's ability to con the vessel 
 C318 The weak link in the safety chain 
 C319 Lack of complete understanding of HMRC’s requirements 
 MT Sichem 
Melbourne 
(MAIB) 
C320 The master and pilot pre-departure exchange of information was inadequate 
 C321 Diagrams or sketches were not used in the master pilot exchange.  
 C322 Communication error between the bridge team and pilot 
 C323 Planned manoeuvring based on assumption  
 C324 Bow thruster was used indiscriminately by the master without instruction 
 C325 Lack of review the terminal's risk assessment  
 C326 Insuffiiciant training for ship handling was provided by ship management company to Master  
 MT Audacity 
(MAIB) 
C327 Inefficient brifing conducted betweent eh pilot and bridge team 
 C328 Unreliabile radar equipment used 
 C329 Inadequate risk analysis made by ship 
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
 
 
C330 Lack of trafik information provided to ship by VTS 
 C331 Lack of taking appropriate action situplated by COLREG to avoid collision  
 C332 ARPA was not used effectively on either vessel to assess risk of collision 
 C333 No-one held the con on the bridge of ship 
 C334 The bridge was insufficiently manned in the circumstances and condition 
 C335 The communication between all parties involved was unclear  
 MT Amenity 
(MAIB) 
C336 Master made a quick decision based on scanty information 
 C337 Master of vessel had no other officer present on the bridge to assist him 
 C338 Master of ship did not use his lookout to best effect 
 C339 Master’s PEC training and examination did not include a formally assessed act of pilotage 
 C340 Master’s poor practical pilotage abilities 
 C341 Improper bridge team procedure implemented  
  
MT Gudermes 
(MAIB) 
C342  OOW did not have an adequate knowledge of the English for safe operation 
 C343 Guard zones were not set on any of the three radar displays available 
 C344 OOW did not hear the warning broadcast from VHF 
 C345 Ship did not report the collision to authorities 
 C346 Ship track lane was not in accordance with COLREG regulations 
 C347 Collision regulation was a lesser consideration than commercial interests by ship 
 C348 Assessment of the CPA of other vessel was inaccurate 
 C349 An effective lookout was not maintained 
 C350 Fatigue and inexperienced caused the OOW to fail to switch from autopilot ot manual 
 C351 OOW did not call the master on time 
 
145 
 
Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
 MT Barents Sea 
(ATSB) 
C352 Lack of taking appropriate action stipulated by COLREG to avoid collision  
 C353 Unreliable radar equipment used 
 C354 Lookout did not maintain properly 
 C355 OOW did not hear the warning broadcast from VHF 
 C356 Safety management of the vessel was not meeting the objectives of the ISM Code 
 MT Olympic 
Symphony 
(ATSB) 
C357 The ‘helm off midships alarm’ was not approved by the manufacturers  
 C358 The communication by the bridge team to the pilot was deficient 
 C359 The master did not try the other steering system or change to the non-followup mode. 
 C360 Insufficent procedures available to the bridge team to be taken following the failure 
 C361 The ship’s bridge team was not familiar with the steering systems  
 C362 Insufficient consideration was given to the risks and possible consequences 
 C363 Insufficient information exchanges made between bridge team and pilot 
 MT Unisina 
(ATSB) 
C364 Proper lookout was not maintained on the bridge  
 C365 Proper appraisal of the situation was not carried out by OOW 
 C366 Reduced alertness on the part of the OOW due to fatigue 
 C367 The absence of any guidelines to owners and operators on rest period requirement 
 C368 Inappropriate display of signal lights 
 C369 Lack of giving report to relevant authorities 
 MT Sampet 
Hope (ATSB) 
C370 Insufficient risk assessment in particularly wind strenght 
 C371 Ambiguity on positions plotted on the chart 
 C372 Lack of decision to move the ship another anchorage position 
 C373 The anchors of ship were not arranged properly  
 C374 The anchor was not designed to hold or stop ship  
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
 MT Naticina 
(NTSB) 
C375 Master did not report mechanical problems during transit passage 
 C376 Decision error during manoeuvring  
 C377 Inappropriate bridge watchkeeping hand over between officers 
 C378 Insufficient training upon collision 
 C379 Insufficient internal audit performed by ship management company 
 C380 Not to comply with COLREG regulation 
 MT Song Lin 
Wan (JTSB) 
C381 Proper lookout was not maintained on the bridge  
 C382 Lack of BTM training for officers and Masters 
 C383 Poor VHF communication 
 C384 Inadequate assumption upon risk of collision 
 C385 Inadequate collision avoidance manoeuvring  
 MV Seeb 
(MSIU) 
C386 Communication was not established by either vessel 
 C387 Ship did not monitor the developing situation  
 C388 OOW overshot the alteration point 
 C389 Master did not have accurate situation awareness 
 C390 Ineffective radar usage  
Grounding MT Patriot   
( NTSB) 
C391 Management company in place a shoreside multidisciplinary team specifically responsible for assisting 
C392 Master did not understand the operational limitations of this size of vessel 
 C393 Inexperienced officer deployed in specific trading zone 
 C394 Master did not make good and timely decision due to fatigue 
 C395 Ineffective management of the movements of its vessel 
 C396 Inadequate shore side support for critical shipboard decisions affecting vessel safety 
 C397 Insufficent contingency plan preparedness  
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
 MT British 
Enterprise 
(MAIB) 
C398 Seabad topography was inaccuretaly charted 
 C399 The echo sounder alarm was not active  
 C400 The master did not inform the port state as soon as the vessel ran aground 
 C401 No information concerning the nature of the seabed was gathered 
 C402 No reports of its existence had been received by ship management company 
 C403 A formal task risk assessment was not carried out by the vessel 
 C404 Master was not aware of the importance of the chart source data 
 MT Stolt Tern  
( MAIB) 
C405 The ship’s turn to starboard could not be checked properly by OOW 
 C406 Master reduced to ship speed without asking Pilot 
 C407  Inadequate communication and bridge teamwork 
 C408 The master ignored the pilot’s advice to put the engine astern 
 C409 The lack of tide tables on bridge 
 C410 The lack of experience of bridge team and pilot 
 C411 The ship manager’s safety management system did not identify the deficiencies 
 C412 Ineffective risk assessment conducted by ship management company 
 MT Willy 
(MAIB) 
C413 Insufficient cable given the prevailing weather  condition by Master 
 C414 Anchor dragging position was not being accurately determined by OOW 
 C415 The swinging circle was not calculated or plotted correctly 
 C416 GPS guard zone was set at distance almost three times the radious of swinging circle 
 C417 OOW did not call the master timely 
 C418 The engine was not started and made available in sufficiant time  
 C419 Inadequate emergency response plan  
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
 MT Atlantic 
Blue ( ATSB) 
C420 Inadequate manouvering performed by bridge team  
 C421 The passage plan did not define any off-track limits 
 C422 The bridge team did not discuss limits, define roles and responsibilities  
 C423 The position fixing and track monitoring methods used by the bridge team were not consistently accurate 
 C424 Ineffective and inappropriate use of the radar and GPS 
 C425 Bridge resource management was ineffective 
 C426 Inadequate communication between members of the bridge team 
 C427 Safety management system procedures did not require specific off-track limit 
 C428 The bridge equipment did not provide a failure indication 
 MT 
Breakthrough 
(ATSB) 
C429 The ship’s engineers did not make preparations for using the intermediate fuel oil 
 C430 Intermediate fuel oil had not been tested by marine engineers 
 C431 Ship's senior officers did not adequately manage the risks  
 C432 Passage plan was based on incomplete information 
 C433 Ship owner did not provide the necessary support to vessel 
 C434 The ship’s safety management system was inadequate. 
 C435 Officers did not have sufficient relevant knowledge and experience to safely undertake ship voyage 
 C436 Ineffective inspections of the ship or audits conducted  
  
MT Desh 
Rakshak 
(ATSB) 
C437 Inadequately considered the ship’s speed through the water 
 C438 The ship’s under keel clearance was less than had been anticipated 
 C439 Ineffective procedures and guidelines provided by port authority 
 C440 Inadequate application of bridge resource management principles 
 C441 Lack of time available 
 C442 The bridge team did not effectively use the echo sounder to monitor the depth  
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
 MT Conus 
(ATSB) 
C443 The pilot did not plan the undocking 
 C444 The bridge team did not take full account of the wind and current strength  
 C445 Insufficient decision making upon increasing ship speed 
 C446 Inappropriate action taken during course alteration 
 C447 No accurate assessment could be made of the tidal stream 
 C448 Ineffective radar monitoring performed by OOW 
Fire/Explosion M/V Hilli  
( MAIB ) 
C449 Crew misunderstand regarding with the circulation of the water/acid mixture  
 C450 Negligence of checking the ventilation installation   
 C451 Improper equipment usage during boiler cleaning operation 
 C452 Proper ventilation did not provide by crew 
 C453 No consideration was given to testing the steam drum atmosphere  
 C454 Lack of risk assessment conducted by responsible officer 
 C455 Lack of detail crew responsibilities inserted in company SMS in accordance with ISM Code 
 M/T Qian Chi 
(ATSB) 
C456 Incorrectly assembled equipment after maintenance 
 C457 The design error in equipment 
 C458 Maintenance manual did not provide sufficient guidance 
 C459 Incorrect first aid applied to the injured crew 
 C460 Improper checklist provided by ship management company 
 C461 Not to use personnel protective equipment 
  
MT Tasman 
(ATSB) 
C462 The source of ignition of the fire could not be determined with certainty by crew 
 C463 Fuel oil temperature was not sufficiently screened against spray from the engine hot box by operator 
 C464 Fuel leakage alarm was ineffective 
 C465 Screws was not sufficiently tightened during previous assembly of the pipework 
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
 
 
C466 The crew was using the incorrect torque 
 C467 The response to the fire by the ship’s staff was prompt and ineffective 
 C468 The design of the hot box was incorrect 
 MT Helix  
( ATSB) 
C469 Insufficient preload (torque) upon assembly 
 C470 The failure of the supporting bracket was caused by inadequate design 
 C471 Fire was not extinguished properly  
 C472 Emergency procedures for calling the fireman were ineffective  
 C473 The failure of the bolts securing conducted by crew  
Machinery Damage MT Stellar 
Voyager 
 ( MAIB) 
C474 The windlass appears to have exploded due to overpressure 
 C475 Equipment’s design limitations being exceeded 
 C476 Crew were not aware of the limitations of anchor windlass systems 
 C477 Crew were not aware of risk when the windlass work under excessive load 
 C478 Technical data provided by manufacturer was insufficient 
 C479 Information provided on guidance was inadequate for operation 
 C480 Duty crew did not follow the master’s instructions for heaving up the anchor 
 C481 Duty crew had poor practice upon anchor handling 
 MT Mobil Petrel 
(MAIB) 
C482 Ballast discharging operation performed under closed venting conditions 
 C483 The ballast valve was closed incorrectly   
 C484 Crew made no attempt to repair or replace defective valve 
 C485 The officers did not take appropriate precautions 
 C486 Unsafe practices in the operation of the IG system become acceptable to the ship's officers 
 C487 Ineffective practice upon ballast operation 
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
Listing/Capsizing MT Aquila  
( MAIB) 
C488 Insufficient risk assessment 
 C489 OOW was not aware of the critic stability condition of vessel 
 C490 Lack of traning performed on-board ship 
 C491 Commercial pressure  
 C492 Chain of command error 
 C493 Improper physical environment 
Flooding MT Seiyo 
(JTSB) 
C494 Air vent pipes did not work properly becuse no countermeasures had been taken by crew 
 C495 The operation of ballast lines were changed without getting permission from class society 
 C496 Deficiency of operation management plan 
 C497 Poor record keeping  
 C498 Negligence of environmental control 
Others(FFO&cargo 
handling damage, 
weather damage, 
etc.) 
MT Young 
Lady (MAIB) 
C499 Master decision making error  
C500 Insufficient shackles of cable was let go seabad 
C501 Inadequate contingency plan  
C502 Failure to follow up on the events detected by VTS radar,  
C503 The absence of a formal requirement for the early reporting of the incident to authorities 
 C504 The absence of an effective action response plan 
 C505 The absence of agreed procedures between pipeline operators and terminal 
Collision/Contact MV CMA 
CGM Florida 
& MV Chou 
Shan (MAIB) 
C506  OOW lacked situational awareness and precautionary though 
 C507 Inappropriate use of VHF radio channel for collision avoidance 
 C508  Communication problem among the crew due to poor English   
 C509 Misunderstanding the content of master standing orders 
 C510 Master’s standing orders lacked specific metrics and provided ambiguous instruction 
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
 
 
C513 High power-distance hierarchy affected the OOW 
 C514 Most emergency drills conducted on ship did not provide for a practical simulation 
 MV ACX 
Hibiscus & MV 
Hyundai 
Discovery 
(MAIB) 
C515 Incorrect manouvering performed by OOW 
 C516 Bridge teams did not comply fully with the applicable COLREGS for restricted visibility  
 C517 Chief officer’s performance was  adversely affected by fatigue 
 C518 The standard of watchkeeping on the vessel at the time of the accident was very poor 
 C519 Master’s lack of oversight of the passage plan 
 C520  Fundamental weakness in that administration’s application of the IMO Casualty  
 C521 Master did not take appropriate action to avoid collision  
 MV Bai Chay 
Bridge ( JTSB ) 
C522 OOW was not keeping a proper look out 
 C523 OOW did not listen communication in VHF radio 
 C524 OOW did not properly monitor the maneuvers of other ship 
 C525 Incorrect manouvering performed by OOW 
 C526 Incorrect assumption on the basis of scanty radar information 
 MV Ocean 
Odyssey & MV 
P&O Nedlloyd 
Taranaki ( 
ATSB) 
C527 OOW was falling a sleep due to fatigue 
 C528 Inappropriate physical environment on the bridge 
 C529 Unsuccessfully to alert the other vessel by sounding the ship's whistles 
 C530 No attempt was made to use the available VHF channel for communication 
 C531 Lack of risk assessment strategies 
 C532 Master made a quick decision based on scanty information 
 C534  The lack of communications between the bridge and engine room teams 
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
 
 
C535 Bridge team not keeping the engine room team informed of progress 
 C536  The lack of Bridge Resource Management principles on board 
 C537 The ship did not inform the authorities about the engine response 
 C538  The absence of a safety assessment  
 C539 Inappropriate contingency planning on board ship 
 MV Lykes 
Voyager & MV 
Washington 
Senator (MAIB) 
C540 Inexperienced third officer on the bridge 
 C541 Fatigue due to cargo delay 
 C542 Late VHF communication attempt made by Master 
 C543 Misunderstanding between the master and third officer regarding who had the con 
 C544 Useless AIS information  
 C545 Inefficient bridge team management training provided byy ship management company 
 C546 Not to keep a good listening watch on VHF radio channel 16 
Grounding MV New Delhi 
Express ( NTSB) 
C547 Ineffective bridge team management 
 C548 Ineffective use of resources on bridge 
 C549 Responsibilities between bridge team and pilot did not distribut properly 
 C550 Ineffective communication between the bridge team and pilot 
 C551 Careless passage plan prepared  
 MV Coastal Isle 
( MAIB) 
C552 No one on the bridge to correct the vessel’s heading properly 
 C553 No watch alarms on the bridge have been switched on 
 C554 Absence of the bridge watchkeepers 
 C555 Not to comply with maritime authorities 
 C556 OOW did not inform the Master timely 
 C557 The VDR was kept switched off by the crew 
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
 MV MSC 
Basel 
(MAIB) 
C559 Steering was not tested in accordance with SOLAS requirements before departure 
 C560 Preliminary inspections and tests of steering gear system did not performed properly 
 C561 Intermittent steering fault has not been rectified properly before 
 C562 Relevant checklist regarding prior to departure did not complete by officers 
 C563 Communication between engine room and bridge team was very poor 
 C564 Inadequate internal audit performed by ship management company 
Machinery Damage MV Maersk 
Doha 
(MAIB) 
C565 Loss of feed water in the auxiliary boiler led to failure of temparature increase 
 C566 Soot deposits accumulated in the EGE were not cleaned properly 
 C567 Keep to main engine running  
 C568 Lack of risk assessment in engine control room 
 C569 Delays in reporting the problem to the bridge  
 C570 Lack of advice given to the master  
 C571  Unsuitable techniques were used to attack the fire by crew 
 C572 Ineffective maintenance planning 
 C573 Fuel quick closure valves not functioning correctly 
 C574 Quality and Safety Management System did not contain sufficient detail about emergency operation 
procedures 
 C575 Difficulties with language and poor communication  
 
C577 Winch brake was not fully applied 
C578 Hawse pipe covers had not been fitted to position 
C579 No heavy weather precautions were taken by Master 
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
 
 
C581 Flammable clothing was left in the vicinity of the acetylene gas bottles 
 C582 No gas leak tests were carried out by the manufacturer 
 C583 Hot work permission was not followed by crew 
 C584 The “in use” bottles were co-located with the storage bottles 
 C585 Poor communications between the technical management and the ship  
 C586 Safety watchman was not equipped with a portable VHF radio 
 C587 The VDR information was not saved. 
Collision/Contact MV Key Bora 
(MAIB) 
C588 OOW did not develop sufficient astern thrust in time to stop the shipvessel 
 C589 Poor CPP astern response was introduced at the time the system 
 C590 Ineffecitve fault findings were performed by crew 
 C591 Duty engineer did not test the propulsion system prior to manouvering 
 C592 The master’s lack of familiarity with the backup control system 
 C593 Poor measure effectiveness of the safety management systems on board the ship 
 C594 Lack of periodic drill to practice the correct response 
 MV Apollo 
(KAIK) 
C595 The master had not received 6 consecutive hours of rest during the 24 hour period 
 C596 No reliable source of vessel information provided to pilots 
 C597 Ship SMS did not include responsibility distribution properly 
 C598 Lack of traning performed on-board ship 
 C599 Inadequate bridge procedures manuel on bridge 
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
 MV Spring 
Bok and MV 
gas Artic 
(MAIB) 
C600  OOW was not keeping a proper lookout  
 C601 Scanty radar monitoring provided only 
 C602 No restricted visibility poster provided on bridge against ship's SMS 
 C603 Master became distracted by various personnel for non-operational reasons 
 C604 Master was fatigued due to cumulative effects of his work hours 
 C605 Insufficient bridge team management  
 MV Namhae 
Gas (ATSB) 
C606 OOW did not immediately report the collision to the ship’s Master 
 C607 Master did not make a proper  appraisal of the risk of collision 
 C608 Lack of radar reflector fitted to ship 
 C609 Chart corrections were not performed properly in line of notice to mariners 
 C610 BNWAS was seldom used  
Grounding MV Navigator 
Scorpio 
(MAIB ) 
C611 The ship was underway without a complete berth-to-berth passage plan 
 C612 Passage plan was not throughly checked by the Master 
 C613 Master did not take effective action to mitigate the danger 
 C614 Sole bridge watchkeeper was assigned 
 C615 OOW was distracted by undertaking chart corrections and passage plan 
 C616 OOW did not follow the master's instruction to fix position at 5 min interval 
 C617 Bridge manning was insufficient for the restricted passage 
 C618 The course alteration was ineffective to avoid collision 
 C619 Incorrect information was inserted to the chart 
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
 MV Ovit (MAIB) C621 Passage plan prepared by inexperienced and unsupervised officer 
 C622 The passage plan was not properly checked by  Master 
 C623 The OOW did not check the ship’s intended track when taking over the watch 
 C624 OOW situational awareness was poor 
 C625 The officers were unable to safely navigate using the vessel’s ECDIS 
 C626 Route was not properly checked by OOW 
 C627 Master and deck officers did not implement the ship manager’s policies for safe navigation and 
bridge watchkepg 
 C628 Master provided insufficient leadership 
 C629 No specific training in the alerting system was given 
 MV Attilio Levoli 
( MAIB) 
C630 Poor team work 
 C631  No pre-sailing briefing was given to bridge team 
 C632 Contrary to company instructions, the echo sounder alarm was set to zero 
 C633 The vessel did not report the grounding to the coastguard 
 C634 There is a lack of navigational buoys 
 C635 The passage plan did not follow company instructions 
 C636 A parallel indexing technique was not in use 
 C637 The bridge team did not comply with the specific requirements of the company SMS 
 C638 The responsibility of bridge team was not defined clearly by ship management company 
 C639 The vessel was not fitted with an electronic chart system 
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
Fire/Explosion M/T Esso 
Mersey 
(MAIB ) 
C640 Inadequate quality control standarts caused absence of the two locking grub screws   
 C641 Lack of required standart of the Classification Society 
 C642 Purchasing substandard equipment for pump 
 C643 Lack of communication between the ship and spare parts supplier 
 C644 Failure of the intermediate bush resulting from vibration 
 C645 Not to fulfill requirements of planned maintenance system on-board ship 
Machinery Damage MV Hawkong 
(MAIB) 
C646 Inadequate emergency response plan  
 C647 Training programme did not adequately take into consideration shift patterns 
 C648 Shortcomings in the communication and exchange of information between ship and terminal 
 C649 No system of sharing alarms existed in ship 
 C650 Inadequately monitor the arrangements made to ensure safety at the terminal during loading operation 
 MV Kenos 
Athena 
(KMST) 
C651 Inadequate inspection performed by superintendets for cargo tank inner walls  
 C652 Incorrect maintainenca method applied to cargo tanks' inner walls against corrosion 
 C653 Lack of crew training  
 C654 Bilge PPI alarm was not active  
 C655 Regular safety patrol were not carried out by duty engineer 
 C656 Deficiency in ship's safety management system 
Collision/Contact MV Forum 
Samoa II 
(ATSB) 
C657 The OOW was not keeping a proper lookout 
 C658 OOW was distracted by his radio conversation with friend 
 C659 Unjustified assumption was made by OOW  
 C660 OOW did not check the ARPA or take compass bearing properly 
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
 
 
C661 Inadequate handover performed bu duty officers 
 C662 OOW did not call the Master  
 MV Scot Isles & 
MV Wadi Halfa 
(MAIB) 
C663 No night orders left by the master to alert the watchkeeper about risk of collision 
 C664 ARPA was not used to acquire and plot targets 
 C665 Positions were not plotted on the chart 
 C666 The AIS was not monitored properly 
 C667 The bridge watch alarm was not activated 
 C668 Available navigational equipment was not used effectively  
 C669 SMS non-conformities were not identified during internal audit by management company 
 C670 General alarm was not included in the SMS post collision checklist  
 C671 Checklist carried out on vessel were not sufficient to identify the major damage to the hull    
Grounding MV Bohai 
Challenge 
(JTSB) 
C672 Checklists was not completedly completed by OOW before leaving port 
 C673 No weather information and navigational aids were received properly by Master 
 C674 Utmost attention should not be paid to bad weather  
 C675 A comprehensive anchoring plan and navigation plan did not develop 
 C676 Carelessness navigational information including port of call, pilot, radio signal, etc. were received 
 C677 Inadequate implement ongoing risk assessment procedures 
 C678 Anchor lights were not switched on in accordance with COLREG 
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Table B.1 (continued) : Marine accident causes, type of accidents and vessel names. 
Type of accident Vessel name Cause code Marine accident causes 
Fire/Explosion MV Celtic 
Carrier (MAIB) 
C679  Failure to comply with any of the safety rules renders by company 
 C680  Improper use of equipment 
 C681  İll-prepared for the emergency situation 
 C682 Chain of command error 
 C683  Sub-standard fire-fighting techniques applied by crew 
 C684  Lack of emergency fire drill training on-board ship 
 C685  Negligence of SMS by shore-based management company 
 C686  Inadequate audits performed by shore-based management company 
Listing/Capsizing MV Maritime 
Lady (MAIB) 
C687 Master's poor judgement and decision-making error 
 C688 Master was alone on the bride tehrefore did not have the sources to operate 
 C689 Vessel’s bridge team was diluted during a crucial part of the river 
 C690  Unreasonable workload undertaken as the vessle manouvered into the river 
 C691 Master had not properly used the manpower available 
 C692 There were fundamental VHF procedural errors made by the master 
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Table B.2 : Distribution of 692 marine accident causes into HFACS. 
Cause HFACS level Times 
 
Cause HFACS level Times 
C1 Skill-based error 2 
 
C48 Failed to correct problem 1 
C2 Skill-based error 2 
 
C49 Resource management 1 
C3 Crew resource man 8 
 
C50 Skill-based error 1 
C4 Resource management 4 
 
C52 Inadequate supervision 1 
C5 Routine violation 2 
 
C54 Resource management 1 
C6 Skill-based error 1 
 
C56 Organisational process 5 
C7 Decision error 1 
 
C57 Physical environment 4 
C8 Organisational process 4 
 
C58 Perceptual error 4 
C9 Skill-based error 18 
 
C59 Failed to correct problem 1 
C10 Routine violation 12 
 
C60 Routine violation 1 
C11 Organisational process 2 
 
C61 Skill-based error 9 
C12 Planned inappropriate op 6 
 
C62 Decision error 3 
C13 Routine violation 1 
 
C64 Organisational process 1 
C14 Decision error 2 
 
C65 Skill-based error 1 
C15 Routine violation 8 
 
C66 Decision error 1 
C16 Adverse mental state 4 
 
C67 Organisational process 1 
C18 Organisational climate 1 
 
C69 Routine violation 2 
C19 Organisational process 1 
 
C70 Routine violation 6 
C20 Organisational process 7 
 
C71 Skill-based error 2 
C21 Organisational process 4 
 
C73 Physical/mental limitation 1 
C22 Crew resource man 2 
 
C74 Skill-based error 1 
C25 Decision error 1 
 
C75 Exceptional violation 1 
C27 Organisational climate 1 
 
C76 Planned inappropriate op 2 
C28 Decision error 1 
 
C79 Planned inappropriate op 2 
C29 Exceptional violation 2 
 
C80 Resource management 4 
C30 Resource management 6 
 
C82 Organisational process 1 
C31 Inadequate supervision 2 
 
C83 Exceptional violation 1 
C32 Organisational climate 1 
 
C85 Failed to correct problem 1 
C34 Skill-based error 2 
 
C86 Decision error 2 
C35 Organisational process 1 
 
C87 Perceptual error 1 
C37 Decision error 1 
 
C91 Adverse physiological state 12 
C38 Decision error 1 
 
C92 Technological environment 1 
C40 Crew resource man 3 
 
C94 Organisational climate 1 
C41 Resource management 3 
 
C95 Resource management 5 
C42 Adverse mental state 1 
 
C96 Inadequate supervision 1 
C43 Skill-based error 1 
 
C97 Technological environment 2 
C44 Crew resource man 6 
 
C98 Organisational process 1 
C45 Crew resource man 6 
 
C100 Organisational process 1 
C46 Decision error 1 
 
C102 Routine violation 1 
C47 Adverse mental state 1 
 
C103 Decision error 1 
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Table B.2 (continued) : Distribution of 692 marine accident into HFACS. 
Cause HFACS level Times 
 
Cause HFACS level Times 
C104 Crew resource man 1 
 
C182 Organisational process 1 
C105 Exceptional violation 2 
 
C186 Personal readiness 2 
C107 Crew resource man 1 
 
C187 Resource management 2 
C108 Planned inappropriate op 1 
 
C188 Organisational process 2 
C114 Resource management 1 
 
C189 Skill-based error 1 
C115 Failed to correct problem 1 
 
C191 Resource management 1 
C116 Physcial environment 1 
 
C192 Organisational process 3 
C117 Physcial environment 1 
 
C194 Decision error 4 
C118 Organisational climate 1 
 
C195 Decision error 1 
C121 Adverse mental state 3 
 
C197 Organisational process 1 
C122 Crew resource man 3 
 
C199 Skill-based error 1 
C123 Skill-based error 1 
 
C201 Routine violation 1 
C127 Decision error 1 
 
C202 Skill-based error 1 
C129 Personal readiness 1 
 
C203 Organisational process 1 
C130 Organisational process 3 
 
C204 Inadequate supervision 5 
C131 Inadequate supervision 1 
 
C205 Organisational process 1 
C133 Skill-based error 1 
 
C206 Organisational process 1 
C134 Skill-based error 1 
 
C207 Inadequate supervision 2 
C136 Resource management 2 
 
C208 Organisational climate 1 
C137 Organisational climate 1 
 
C209 Adverse mental state 3 
C138 Physical environment 3 
 
C210 Crew resource man 1 
C139 Skill-based error 1 
 
C214 Exceptional violation 7 
C142 Failed to correct problem 1 
 
C215 Resource management 1 
C144 Organisational climate 1 
 
C216 Planned inappropriate op 1 
C145 Organisational process 3 
 
C217 Physical environment 2 
C146 Routine violation 2 
 
C219 Inadequate supervision 7 
C147 Skill-based error 3 
 
C220 Failed to correct problem 2 
C149 Organisational climate 12 
 
C221 Inadequate supervision 1 
C150 Inadequate supervision 3 
 
C226 Crew resource man 1 
C154 Exceptional violation 1 
 
C227 Decision error 1 
C155 Failed to correct problem 1 
 
C228 Organisational process 2 
C156 Routine violation 4 
 
C229 Crew resource man 1 
C158 Skill-based error 1 
 
C231 Organisational process 1 
C160 Skill-based error 2 
 
C232 Failed to correct problem 1 
C161 Organisational climate 1 
 
C233 Inadequate supervision 1 
C163 Resource management 1 
 
C234 Inadequate supervision 1 
C164 Inadequate supervision 4 
 
C235 Skill-based error 2 
C165 Resource management 1 
 
C236 Perceptual error 1 
C166 Organisational process 1 
 
C237 Physical environment 2 
C167 Routine violation 1 
 
C238 Skill-based error 1 
C168 Organisational process 5 
 
C239 Skill-based error 1 
C169 Inadequate supervision 2 
 
C240 Resource management 5 
C170 Decision error 3 
 
C241 Inadequate supervision 1 
C172 Decision error 2 
 
C242 Organisational climate 1 
C173 Crew resource man 1 
 
C243 Resource management 5 
C174 Organisational process 1 
 
C245 Organisational process 1 
C176 Inadequate supervision 3 
 
C246 Resource management 2 
C177 Routine violation 1 
 
C247 Failed to correct problem 4 
C178 Resource management 1 
 
C248 Skill-based error 1 
C179 Routine violation 1 
 
C251 Crew resource man 1 
C180 Decision error 3 
 
C253 Planned inappropriate op 1 
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Table B.2 (continued) : Distribution of 692 marine accident into HFACS. 
Cause HFACS level Times 
 
Cause HFACS level Times 
C256 Inadequate supervision 1 
 
C321 Exceptional violation 1 
C257 Organisational process 3 
 
C323 Organisational process 1 
C258 Planned inappropriate op 9 
 
C324 Exceptional violation 1 
C259 Technological environment 1 
 
C325 Organisational process 1 
C260 Decision error 1 
 
C330 Planned inappropriate op 1 
C261 Organisational process 1 
 
C332 Skill-based error 2 
C264 Skill-based error 1 
 
C333 Organisational climate 1 
C265 Organisational climate 1 
 
C336 Decision error 3 
C267 Physical environment 1 
 
C337 Resource management 1 
C268 Resource management 1 
 
C340 Skill-based error 1 
C269 Skill-based error 1 
 
C343 Failed to correct problem 1 
C270 Planned inappropriate op 1 
 
C344 Technological environment 2 
C272 Crew resource man 1 
 
C347 Resource management 1 
C273 Organisational process 2 
 
C348 Skill-based error 1 
C274 Organisational process 1 
 
C359 Failed to correct problem 1 
C276 Decision error 1 
 
C360 Organisational process 1 
C277 Failed to correct problem 1 
 
C365 Routine violation 2 
C278 Inadequate supervision 1 
 
C367 Personal readiness 1 
C279 Resource management 1 
 
C368 Technological environment 1 
C280 Organisational climate 1 
 
C371 Decision error 1 
C281 Routine violation 1 
 
C372 Decision error 1 
C282 Skill-based error 1 
 
C373 Failed to correct problem 1 
C283 Routine violation 1 
 
C374 Resource management 1 
C284 Planned inappropriate op 2 
 
C376 Decision error 2 
C285 Organisational process 2 
 
C377 Crew resource man 2 
C286 Inadequate supervision 3 
 
C384 Perceptual error 1 
C289 Routine violation 1 
 
C387 Skill-based error 1 
C290 Organisational climate 1 
 
C388 Decision error 1 
C292 Skill-based error 1 
 
C391 Organisational climate 1 
C293 Skill-based error 1 
 
C395 Organisational climate 1 
C294 Inadequate supervision 1 
 
C398 Planned inappropriate op 1 
C297 Exceptional violation 1 
 
C400 Failed to correct problem 2 
C298 Crew resource man 2 
 
C401 Inadequate supervision 2 
C299 Perceptual error 2 
 
C404 Perceptual error 1 
C300 Organisational climate 1 
 
C405 Decision error 1 
C302 Resource management 1 
 
C406 Exceptional violation 1 
C305 Failed to correct problem 1 
 
C408 Exceptional violation 1 
C306 Organisational climate 3 
 
C409 Organisational process 1 
C307 Organisational process 1 
 
C410 Physical/mental limitation 2 
C308 Skill-based error 1 
 
C411 Organisational process 1 
C310 Decision error 1 
 
C414 Skill-based error 1 
C311 Organisational process 1 
 
C415 Skill-based error 1 
C312 Organisational process 4 
 
C416 Decision error 1 
C313 Adverse mental state 1 
 
C421 Organisational process 1 
C314 Decision error 1 
 
C422 Organisational climate 2 
C315 Resource management 5 
 
C423 Failed to correct problem 1 
C316 Exceptional violation 2 
 
C427 Organisational process 1 
C317 Decision error 1 
 
C428 Planned inappropriate op 1 
C318 Organisational climate 1 
 
C429 Exceptional violation 1 
C319 Perceptual error 1 
 
C430 Inadequate supervision 2 
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Cause HFACS level Times 
 
Cause HFACS level Times 
C431 Organisational process 1 
 
C533 Skill-based error 1 
C436 Supervisory violations 3 
 
C535 Crew resource man 1 
C437 Decision error 1 
 
C538 Organisational process 1 
C438 Perceptual error 1 
 
C543 Perceptual error 1 
C439 Organisational process 1 
 
C544 Resource management 1 
C442 Planned inappropriate op 2 
 
C548 Resource management 1 
C443 Organisational process 1 
 
C551 Routine violation 1 
C444 Routine violation 1 
 
C552 Decision error 1 
C445 Decision error 1 
 
C554 Organisational process 1 
C447 Decision error 1 
 
C555 Exceptional violation 1 
C449 Perceptual error 1 
 
C556 Failed to correct problem 1 
C452 Skill-based error 1 
 
C557 Exceptional violation 1 
C453 Technological environment 1 
 
C558 Inadequate supervision 1 
C456 Skill-based error 1 
 
C561 Resource management 1 
C457 Resource management 3 
 
C562 Skill-based error 2 
C460 Organisational process 1 
 
C565 Technological environment 1 
C461 Routine violation 1 
 
C566 Inadequate supervision 1 
C462 Failed to correct problem 1 
 
C567 Decision error 1 
C463 Skill-based error 1 
 
C569 Crew resource man 2 
C465 Exceptional violation 1 
 
C570 Resource management 1 
C467 Crew resource man 1 
 
C573 Inadequate supervision 1 
C469 Skill-based error 1 
 
C574 Organisational process 1 
C471 Failed to correct problem 1 
 
C577 Skill-based error 1 
C472 Organisational process 2 
 
C578 Resource management 1 
C473 Skill-based error 1 
 
C582 Routine violation 1 
C474 Physical environment 1 
 
C584 Supervisory violations 2 
C475 Resource management 1 
 
C585 Organisational climate 2 
C476 Crew resource man 1 
 
C586 Crew resource man 1 
C478 Resource management 1 
 
C587 Exceptional violation 1 
C481 Inadequate supervision 1 
 
C588 Decision error 1 
C482 Physcial environment 1 
 
C589 Skill-based error 1 
C483 Skill-based error 1 
 
C590 Adverse mental state 1 
C484 Routine violation 1 
 
C593 Organisational process 1 
C485 Decision error 2 
 
C594 Inadequate supervision 1 
C486 Skill-based error 1 
 
C596 Exceptional violation 1 
C487 Inadequate supervision 1 
 
C599 Resource management 1 
C492 Organisational climate 2 
 
C609 Inadequate supervision 1 
C494 Crew resource man 1 
 
C610 Resource management 1 
C495 Exceptional violation 1 
 
C611 Organisational process 1 
C496 Organisational climate 1 
 
C613 Failed to correct problem 1 
C504 Organisational process 1 
 
C619 Skill-based error 1 
C505 Crew resource man 1 
 
C620 Organisational process 1 
C509 Perceptual error 1 
 
C623 Skill-based error 1 
C510 Organisational process 1 
 
C625 Physical/mental limitation 1 
C511 Failed to correct problem 1 
 
C626 Decision error 1 
C513 Crew resource man 1 
 
C627 Routine violation 1 
C514 Inadequate supervision 1 
 
C631 Crew resource man 1 
C520 Organisational climate 1 
 
C634 Organisational climate 1 
C523 Routine violation 2 
 
C635 Exceptional violation 1 
C529 Physical environment 1 
 
C636 Skill-based error 1 
C530 Exceptional violation 1 
 
C637 Routine violation 2 
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Table B.2 (continued) : Distribution of 692 marine accident into HFACS. 
Cause HFACS level Times 
 
Cause HFACS level Times 
C640 Resource management 1 
 
C660 Skill-based error 1 
C641 Planned inappropriate op 1 
 
C663 Adverse mental state 1 
C642 Resource management 1 
 
C670 Organisational process 1 
C644 Physcial environment 1 
 
C671 Skill-based error 1 
C645 Organisational process 1 
 
C674 Perceptual error 1 
C647 Inadequate supervision 1 
 
C675 Organisational process 1 
C649 Resource management 1 
 
C683 Crew resource man 1 
C650 Skill-based error 1 
 
C689 Adverse mental state 1 
C652 Skill-based error 1 
 
C690 Planned inappropriate op 1 
C655 Routine violation 1 
 
C691 Resource management 1 
C659 Decision error 1 
 
C692 Decision error 1 
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Table B.3 : Ranking and weighting result of each EPC in accident cause. 
Cause Times  EPC, ranking, and weigting 
C1 2 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
 
 3 5 1 6 2 4 
   
 
 0.136 0.082 0.408 0.068 0.204 0.102 
   
C2 2 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
 
 4 5 1 6 3 2 
   
 
 0.102 0.082 0.408 0.068 0.136 0.204 
   
C3 8 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
 
 3 8 5 1 4 7 2 6 
 
 
 0.123 0.046 0.074 0.368 0.092 0.053 0.184 0.061 
 
C4 4 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
 
 1 2 4 5 6 3 
   
 
 0.408 0.204 0.102 0.082 0.068 0.136 
   
C5 2 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
 
 1 4 3 5 2 
    
 
 0.438 0.109 0.146 0.088 0.219 
    
C6 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
 
 3 5 4 6 1 2 
   
 
 0.136 0.082 0.102 0.068 0.408 0.204 
   
C7 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
 
 2 3 1 
      
 
 0.273 0.182 0.545 
      
C8 4 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
 
 2 1 8 4 3 7 5 6 9 
 
 0.177 0.353 0.044 0.088 0.118 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.039 
C9 18 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
 
 3 6 2 5 1 4 
   
 
 0.136 0.068 0.204 0.082 0.408 0.102 
   
C10 12 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
 
 1 4 3 5 2 
    
 
 0.438 0.109 0.146 0.088 0.219 
    
C11 2 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
 
 1 2 8 4 3 7 5 6 9 
 
 0.353 0.177 0.044 0.088 0.118 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.039 
C12 6 EPC2 EPC8 EPC14 EPC16 EPC18 
    
 
 1 3 4 2 5 
    
 
 0.438 0.146 0.109 0.219 0.088 
    
C13 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
 
 1 2 3 5 4 
    
 
 0.438 0.219 0.146 0.088 0.109 
    
C14 2 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
 
 1 3 2 
      
 
 0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C15 8 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
 
 2 1 3 5 4 
    
 
 0.219 0.438 0.146 0.088 0.109 
    
C16 4 EPC8 EPC9 EPC34 EPC35 
     
 
 3 1 4 2 
     
 
 0.160 0.480 0.120 0.240 
     
C18 1 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
 
 1 3 2 
      
 
 0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C19 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
 
 1 2 8 3 4 7 6 5 9 
 
 0.353 0.177 0.044 0.118 0.088 0.05 0.059 0.071 0.039 
C20 7 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
 
 1 2 9 4 3 7 5 6 8 
 
 0.353 0.177 0.039 0.088 0.118 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.044 
C21 4 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 8 4 2 7 5 6 9 
  
0.353 0.044 0.044 0.088 0.177 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.039 
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Table B.3 (continued) : Ranking and weighting result of each EPC in accident cause. 
Cause Times  EPC, ranking, and weigting 
 
 
 0.353 0.177 0.039 0.088 0.118 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.044 
C21 4 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 8 4 2 7 5 6 9 
  
0.353 0.044 0.044 0.088 0.177 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.039 
C22 2 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
4 8 5 2 3 7 1 6 
 
  
0.092 0.046 0.082 0.204 0.123 0.053 0.368 0.061 
 
C25 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C27 1 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C28 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C29 2 EPC1 EPC3 EPC10 EPC11 EPC14 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 EPC36 
  
1 3 2 8 5 4 9 7 6 
  
0.353 0.118 0.177 0.044 0.071 0.088 0.039 0.05 0.059 
C30 6 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
2 3 5 4 6 1 
   
  
0.204 0.136 0.082 0.102 0.068 0.408 
   
C31 2 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
3 6 5 4 2 1 
   
  
0.136 0.068 0.082 0.102 0.204 0.408 
   
C32 1 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
2 3 1 
      
  
0.273 0.182 0.545 
      
C34 2 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
2 5 4 6 1 3 
   
  
0.204 0.082 0.102 0.068 0.408 0.136 
   
C35 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 2 9 4 3 7 5 6 8 
  
0.353 0.177 0.039 0.088 0.118 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.044 
C37 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C38 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C40 3 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
3 8 5 1 4 7 2 6 
 
  
0.123 0.046 0.074 0.368 0.092 0.053 0.184 0.061 
 
C41 3 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
2 3 5 4 6 1 
   
  
0.204 0.136 0.082 0.102 0.068 0.408 
   
C42 1 EPC8 EPC9 EPC34 EPC35 
     
  
1 3 4 2 
     
  
0.48 0.16 0.12 0.24 
     
C43 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
4 6 1 5 3 2 
   
  
0.102 0.068 0.408 0.082 0.136 0.204 
   
C44 6 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
2 3 5 1 4 7 8 6 
 
  
0.184 0.123 0.074 0.368 0.092 0.053 0.046 0.061 
 
C45 6 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
3 2 5 1 4 8 7 6 
 
  
0.123 0.184 0.074 0.368 0.092 0.046 0.053 0.061 
 
C46 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
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 Table B.3 (continued) : Ranking and weighting result of each EPC in accident cause. 
Cause Times  EPC, ranking, and weigting 
 
C47 1 EPC8 EPC9 EPC34 EPC35 
     
  
3 1 4 2 
     
  
0.160 0.480 0.120 0.240 
     
C48 1 EPC2 EPC7 EPC32 
      
  
2 3 1 
      
  
0.273 0.182 0.545 
      
C49 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
2 3 5 4 6 1 
   
  
0.204 0.136 0.082 0.102 0.068 0.408 
   
C50 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
3 6 1 5 2 4 
   
  
0.136 0.068 0.408 0.082 0.204 0.102 
   
C52 1 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
4 6 2 5 3 1 
   
  
0.102 0.068 0.204 0.082 0.136 0.408 
   
C54 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
2 3 4 5 6 1 
   
  
0.204 0.136 0.102 0.082 0.068 0.408 
   
C56 5 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 2 8 3 4 7 6 5 9 
  
0.353 0.177 0.044 0.118 0.088 0.05 0.059 0.071 0.039 
C57 4 EPC5 EPC19 EPC33 EPC36 
     
  
3 4 1 2 
     
  
0.160 0.120 0.480 0.240 
     
C58 4 EPC5 EPC6 EPC9 EPC12 EPC38 
    
  
5 2 3 1 4 
    
  
0.088 0.219 0.146 0.438 0.109 
    
C59 1 EPC2 EPC7 EPC32 
      
  
2 3 1 
      
  
0.273 0.182 0.545 
      
C60 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
  
2 1 3 5 4 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.146 0.088 0.109 
    
C61 9 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
3 6 1 5 2 4 
   
  
0.136 0.068 0.408 0.082 0.204 0.102 
   
C62 3 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C64 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 8 4 2 7 6 5 9 
  
0.353 0.353 0.044 0.088 0.177 0.05 0.059 0.071 0.039 
C65 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 5 4 6 2 3 
   
  
0.408 0.082 0.102 0.068 0.204 0.136 
   
C66 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C67 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 2 9 3 4 7 5 6 8 
  
0.353 0.177 0.039 0.118 0.088 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.044 
C69 2 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
  
2 1 3 4 5 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.146 0.109 0.088 
    
C70 6 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
  
2 1 3 5 4 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.146 0.088 0.109 
    
C71 2 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
2 6 1 5 3 4 
   
  
0.204 0.068 0.408 0.082 0.136 0.102 
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Table B.3 (continued) : Ranking and weighting result of each EPC in accident cause. 
Cause Times  EPC, ranking, and weigting 
 
C73 1 EPC5 EPC15 EPC27 EPC34 
     
  
2 1 3 4 
     
  
0.240 0.480 0.160 0.120 
     
C74 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 5 2 6 3 4 
   
  
0.408 0.082 0.204 0.068 0.136 0.102 
    
C75 1 EPC1 EPC3 EPC10 EPC11 EPC14 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 EPC36 
  
1 3 2 9 5 4 8 6 7 
  
0.353 0.118 0.177 0.039 0.071 0.088 0.044 0.059 0.05 
C76 2 EPC2 EPC8 EPC14 EPC16 EPC18 
    
  
1 3 4 2 5 
    
  
0.438 0.146 0.109 0.219 0.088 
    
C79 2 EPC2 EPC8 EPC14 EPC16 EPC18 
    
  
2 3 4 1 5 
    
  
0.219 0.146 0.109 0.438 0.088 
    
C80 4 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
2 3 4 5 6 1 
   
  
0.204 0.136 0.102 0.082 0.068 0.408 
   
C82 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 2 8 5 3 6 7 4 9 
  
0.353 0.177 0.044 0.071 0.118 0.059 0.05 0.088 0.039 
C83 1 EPC1 EPC3 EPC10 EPC11 EPC14 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 EPC36 
  
3 1 2 8 6 4 9 7 5 
  
0.118 0.353 0.177 0.044 0.059 0.088 0.039 0.05 0.071 
C85 1 EPC2 EPC7 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C86 2 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C87 1 EPC5 EPC6 EPC9 EPC12 EPC38 
    
  
4 2 3 1 5 
    
  
0.109 0.219 0.146 0.438 0.088 
    
C91 12 EPC27 EPC29 EPC30 EPC31 EPC35 
    
  
4 3 5 2 1 
    
  
0.109 0.146 0.088 0.219 0.438 
    
C92 1 EPC3 EPC13 EPC14 EPC32 EPC33 
    
  
5 2 4 3 1 
    
  
0.088 0.219 0.109 0.146 0.438 
    
C94 1 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C95 5 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 3 4 5 6 2 
   
  
0.408 0.136 0.102 0.082 0.068 0.204 
   
C96 1 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
2 6 4 5 3 1 
   
  
0.204 0.068 0.102 0.082 0.136 0.408 
   
C97 2 EPC3 EPC13 EPC14 EPC32 EPC33 
    
  
5 2 3 4 1 
    
  
0.088 0.219 0.146 0.109 0.438 
    
C98 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 9 4 2 6 5 6 8 
  
0.353 0.118 0.039 0.088 0.177 0.059 0.071 0.059 0.044 
C100 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 2 8 5 3 9 7 4 6 
  
0.353 0.177 0.044 0.071 0.118 0.039 0.05 0.088 0.059 
C102 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
  
2 1 3 5 4 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.146 0.088 0.109 
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Table B.3 (continued) : Ranking and weighting result of each EPC in accident cause. 
Cause Times  EPC, ranking, and weigting 
 
C103 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C104 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
2 3 5 1 4 7 8 6 
 
  
0.184 0.123 0.074 0.368 0.092 0.053 0.046 0.061 
 
C105 2 EPC1 EPC3 EPC10 EPC11 EPC14 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 EPC36 
  
1 3 2 8 5 4 9 6 7 
  
0.353 0.118 0.177 0.044 0.071 0.088 0.039 0.059 0.05 
C107 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
2 3 5 1 4 8 7 6 
 
  
0.184 0.123 0.074 0.368 0.092 0.046 0.053 0.061 
 
C108 1 EPC2 EPC8 EPC14 EPC16 EPC18 
    
  
1 2 4 3 5 
    
  
0.438 0.219 0.109 0.146 0.088 
    
C114 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 3 4 6 5 2 
   
  
0.408 0.136 0.102 0.068 0.082 0.204 
   
C115 1 EPC2 EPC7 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C116 2 EPC5 EPC19 EPC33 EPC36 
     
  
3 4 1 2 
     
  
0.160 0.120 0.480 0.240 
     
C118 1 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C121 3 EPC8 EPC9 EPC34 EPC35 
     
  
1 3 4 2 
     
  
0.480 0.160 0.120 0.240 
     
C122 3 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
2 3 6 1 4 7 8 5 
 
  
0.184 0.123 0.061 0.368 0.092 0.053 0.046 0.074 
 
C123 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 6 2 4 3 5 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.204 0.102 0.136 0.082 
   
C127 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C129 1 EPC1 EPC11 EPC27 EPC35 
     
  
1 3 4 2 
     
  
0.480 0.160 0.120 0.240 
     
C130 3 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
2 1 9 4 3 7 5 6 8 
  
0.177 0.353 0.039 0.088 0.118 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.044 
C131 1 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
3 5 6 4 2 1 
   
  
0.136 0.082 0.068 0.102 0.204 0.408 
   
C133 2 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
3 5 2 6 4 1 
   
  
0.136 0.082 0.204 0.068 0.102 0.408 
   
C136 2 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 2 4 6 5 3 
   
  
0.408 0.204 0.102 0.068 0.082 0.136 
   
C137 1 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
2 3 1 
      
  
0.273 0.182 0.545 
      
C138 3 EPC5 EPC19 EPC33 EPC36 
     
  
3 4 1 2 
     
  
0.16 0.12 0.48 0.24 
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Table B.3 (continued) : Ranking and weighting result of each EPC in accident cause. 
Cause Times  EPC, ranking, and weigting 
 
C139 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
4 6 2 6 3 1 
   
  
0.102 0.068 0.204 0.068 0.136 0.408 
   
C142 1 EPC2 EPC7 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C144 1 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
       
C145 3 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
2 1 8 4 3 6 5 7 9 
  
0.177 0.353 0.044 0.088 0.118 0.059 0.071 0.05 0.039 
C146 2 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
  
2 4 3 5 1 
    
  
0.219 0.109 0.146 0.088 0.438 
    
C147 3 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
4 6 1 5 2 3 
   
  
0.102 0.068 0.408 0.082 0.204 0.136 
   
C149 12 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C150 3 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
3 5 4 6 2 1 
   
  
0.136 0.082 0.102 0.068 0.204 0.408 
   
C154 1 EPC1 EPC3 EPC10 EPC11 EPC14 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 EPC36 
  
1 3 2 5 8 4 9 7 6 
  
0.353 0.118 0.177 0.071 0.044 0.088 0.039 0.05 0.059 
C155 1 EPC2 EPC7 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C156 4 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
  
2 5 3 4 1 
    
  
0.219 0.088 0.146 0.109 0.438 
    
C158 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 6 2 5 3 4 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.204 0.082 0.136 0.102 
   
C160 2 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
4 5 1 6 3 2 
   
  
0.102 0.082 0.408 0.068 0.136 0.204 
   
C161 1 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C163 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 2 3 5 6 4 
   
  
0.408 0.204 0.136 0.082 0.068 0.102 
   
C164 4 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
3 6 5 4 2 1 
   
  
0.136 0.068 0.082 0.102 0.204 0.408 
   
C165 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 2 4 5 6 3 
   
  
0.408 0.204 0.102 0.082 0.068 0.136 
   
C166 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
2 3 9 4 1 7 5 6 8 
  
0.177 0.118 0.039 0.088 0.353 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.044 
C167 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
  
2 1 3 5 4 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.146 0.088 0.109 
    
C168 5 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 2 9 4 3 7 5 6 8 
  
0.353 0.177 0.039 0.088 0.118 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.044 
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 Table B.3 (continued) : Ranking and weighting result of each EPC in accident cause. 
Cause  Times  EPC, ranking, and weigting 
 
C169 2 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
3 4 6 5 2 1 
   
  
0.136 0.102 0.068 0.082 0.204 0.408 
   
C170 3 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C172 2 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C173 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
2 3 5 1 4 8 7 6 
 
  
0.184 0.123 0.074 0.368 0.092 0.046 0.053 0.061 
 
C174 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 2 8 4 3 9 5 6 7 
  
0.353 0.177 0.044 0.088 0.118 0.039 0.071 0.059 0.05 
C176 3 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
3 6 5 4 2 1 
   
  
0.136 0.068 0.082 0.102 0.204 0.408 
   
C177 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
  
2 1 3 4 5 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.146 0.109 0.088 
    
C178 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 2 3 6 5 4 
   
  
0.408 0.204 0.136 0.068 0.082 0.102 
   
C179 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
  
2 1 4 3 5 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.109 0.146 0.088 
    
C180 3 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C182 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
2 3 8 4 1 9 5 6 7 
  
0.177 0.118 0.044 0.088 0.353 0.039 0.071 0.059 0.05 
C186 2 EPC1 EPC11 EPC27 EPC35 
     
  
1 3 4 2 
     
  
0.480 0.160 0.120 0.240 
     
C187 2 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
2 3 4 5 6 1 
   
  
0.204 0.136 0.102 0.082 0.068 0.408 
   
C188 2 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 2 9 4 3 7 5 6 8 
  
0.353 0.177 0.039 0.088 0.118 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.044 
C189 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 6 2 5 4 3 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.204 0.082 0.102 0.136 
   
C191 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 2 4 6 5 3 
   
  
0.408 0.204 0.102 0.068 0.082 0.136 
   
C192 3 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 8 4 2 6 5 7 9 
  
0.353 0.118 0.044 0.088 0.177 0.059 0.071 0.05 0.039 
C194 4 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C195 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C197 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
2 1 9 4 3 7 5 6 8 
  
0.177 0.353 0.039 0.088 0.118 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.044 
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Table B.3 (continued) : Ranking and weighting result of each EPC in accident  
Cause        Times      EPC, ranking and weigting 
C199 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
3 5 1 6 4 2 
   
  
0.136 0.082 0.408 0.068 0.102 0.204 
   
C201 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
  
2 1 3 5 4 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.146 0.088 0.109 
    
C202 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
4 6 1 5 2 3 
   
  
0.102 0.068 0.408 0.082 0.204 0.136 
   
C203 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
3 1 8 4 2 6 5 7 9 
  
0.118 0.353 0.044 0.088 0.177 0.059 0.071 0.05 0.039 
 
C204 5 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
5 6 3 4 1 2 
   
  
0.082 0.068 0.136 0.102 0.408 0.204 
   
C205 2 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
3 1 9 4 2 6 5 7 8 
  
0.118 0.353 0.039 0.088 0.177 0.059 0.071 0.05 0.044 
C207 2 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
1 5 3 4 2 6 
   
  
0.408 0.082 0.136 0.102 0.204 0.068 
   
C208 1 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C209 3 EPC8 EPC9 EPC34 EPC35 
     
  
1 3 4 2 
     
  
0.480 0.16 0.120 0.240 
     
C210 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
2 6 5 1 4 8 7 3 
 
  
0.184 0.061 0.074 0.368 0.092 0.046 0.053 0.123 
 
C214 7 EPC1 EPC3 EPC10 EPC11 EPC14 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 EPC36 
  
5 1 2 3 8 4 9 7 6 
  
0.071 0.353 0.177 0.118 0.044 0.088 0.039 0.05 0.059 
C215 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 2 4 5 6 3 
   
  
0.408 0.204 0.102 0.082 0.068 0.136 
   
C216 1 EPC2 EPC8 EPC14 EPC16 EPC18 
    
  
1 2 4 3 5 
    
  
0.438 0.219 0.109 0.146 0.088 
    
C217 2 EPC5 EPC19 EPC33 EPC36 
     
  
4 3 1 2 
     
  
0.12 0.16 0.48 0.24 
     
C219 7 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
1 6 3 4 2 5 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.136 0.102 0.204 0.082 
   
C220 2 EPC2 EPC7 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C221 1 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
1 6 3 4 2 5 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.136 0.102 0.204 0.082 
   
C226 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
4 6 5 1 3 8 7 2 
 
  
0.092 0.061 0.074 0.368 0.123 0.046 0.053 0.184 
 
C227 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
2 3 1 
      
  
0.273 0.182 0.545 
      
C228 2 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 2 9 4 3 7 5 6 8 
  
0.353 0.177 0.039 0.088 0.118 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.044 
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Table B.3 (continued) : Ranking and weighting result of each EPC in accident cause. 
Cause        Times      EPC, ranking and weigting 
C229 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
3 6 5 2 4 7 8 1 
 
  
0.123 0.061 0.074 0.184 0.092 0.053 0.046 0.368 
 
C231 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 2 8 4 3 7 5 6 9 
  
0.353 0.177 0.044 0.088 0.118 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.039 
C232 1 EPC2 EPC7 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C233 2 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
1 6 3 4 2 5 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.136 0.102 0.204 0.082 
   
C235 2 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
5 3 1 6 3 2 
   
  
0.082 0.136 0.408 0.068 0.136 0.204 
   
C236 1 EPC5 EPC6 EPC9 EPC12 EPC38 
    
  
4 2 5 1 3 
    
  
0.109 0.219 0.088 0.438 0.146 
    
C237 2 EPC5 EPC19 EPC33 EPC36 
     
  
3 4 1 2 
     
  
0.160 0.120 0.480 0.240 
     
C238 2 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 6 2 3 4 5 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.204 0.136 0.102 0.082 
   
C240 5 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 3 4 5 6 2 
   
  
0.408 0.136 0.102 0.082 0.068 0.204 
   
C241 1 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
1 6 4 3 2 5 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.102 0.136 0.204 0.082 
   
C242 1 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C243 5 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 3 4 5 6 2 
   
  
0.408 0.136 0.102 0.082 0.068 0.204 
   
C245 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 2 9 3 4 6 5 7 8 
  
0.353 0.177 0.039 0.118 0.088 0.059 0.071 0.05 0.044 
C246 2 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
2 1 5 4 6 3 
   
  
0.204 0.408 0.082 0.102 0.068 0.136 
   
C247 4 EPC2 EPC7 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C248 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 5 3 4 2 6 
   
  
0.408 0.082 0.136 0.102 0.204 0.068 
   
C251 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
2 6 4 3 5 8 7 1 
 
  
0.184 0.061 0.092 0.123 0.074 0.046 0.053 0.368 
 
C253 1 EPC2 EPC8 EPC14 EPC16 EPC18 
    
  
1 2 5 3 4 
    
  
0.438 0.219 0.088 0.146 0.109 
    
C256 1 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
1 6 3 4 2 5 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.136 0.102 0.204 0.082 
   
C257 3 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 2 9 4 3 7 5 6 8 
  
0.353 0.177 0.039 0.088 0.118 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.044 
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Table B.3 (continued) : Ranking and weighting result of each EPC in accident cause. 
Cause        Times      EPC, ranking and weigting 
C258 9 EPC2 EPC8 EPC14 EPC16 EPC18 
    
  
2 1 4 3 5 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.109 0.146 0.088 
    
C259 1 EPC3 EPC13 EPC14 EPC32 EPC33 
    
  
3 2 4 5 1 
    
  
0.146 0.219 0.109 0.088 0.438 
    
C260 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
2 3 2 
      
  
0.273 0.182 0.273 
       
C261 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
3 1 8 4 2 6 5 7 9 
  
0.118 0.353 0.044 0.088 0.177 0.059 0.071 0.05 0.039 
C264 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 5 2 4 3 6 
   
  
0.408 0.082 0.204 0.102 0.136 0.068 
   
C265 1 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C267 1 EPC5 EPC19 EPC33 EPC36 
     
  
4 3 1 2 
     
  
0.120 0.160 0.480 0.240 
     
C268 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 2 4 5 6 3 
   
  
0.408 0.204 0.102 0.082 0.068 0.136 
   
C269 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 4 3 2 5 6 
   
  
0.408 0.102 0.136 0.204 0.082 0.068 
   
C270 1 EPC2 EPC8 EPC14 EPC16 EPC18 
    
  
1 2 5 3 4 
    
  
0.438 0.219 0.088 0.146 0.109 
    
C272 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
2 5 4 3 6 7 8 1 
 
  
0.184 0.074 0.092 0.123 0.061 0.053 0.046 0.368 
 
C273 3 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 2 9 4 3 7 5 6 8 
  
0.353 0.177 0.039 0.088 0.118 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.044 
C276 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C277 1 EPC2 EPC7 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C278 1 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
3 5 1 4 2 6 
   
  
0.136 0.082 0.408 0.102 0.204 0.068 
   
C279 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 2 5 4 6 3 
   
  
0.408 0.204 0.082 0.102 0.068 0.136 
   
C280 1 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C281 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
  
2 1 3 5 4 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.146 0.088 0.109 
    
C282 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 5 2 6 4 3 
   
  
0.408 0.082 0.204 0.068 0.102 0.136 
   
C283 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
  
2 1 4 5 3 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.109 0.088 0.146 
    
176 
 
Table B.3 (continued) : Ranking and weighting result of each EPC in accident cause. 
Cause        Times      EPC, ranking and weigting 
C284 2 EPC2 EPC8 EPC14 EPC16 EPC18 
    
  
1 2 4 3 5 
    
  
0.438 0.219 0.109 0.146 0.088 
    
C285 2 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 8 4 2 6 5 7 9 
  
0.353 0.118 0.044 0.088 0.177 0.059 0.071 0.05 0.039 
C286 3 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
3 5 1 4 2 6 
   
  
0.136 0.082 0.408 0.102 0.204 0.068 
   
C289 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
  
2 3 1 5 4 
    
  
0.219 0.146 0.438 0.088 0.109 
    
C290 1 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C292 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
5 4 1 6 3 2 
   
  
0.082 0.102 0.408 0.068 0.136 0.204 
   
C293 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
4 5 1 6 3 2 
   
  
0.102 0.082 0.408 0.068 0.136 0.204 
   
C294 1 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
1 5 4 3 2 6 
   
  
0.408 0.082 0.102 0.136 0.204 0.068 
   
C297 1 EPC1 EPC3 EPC10 EPC11 EPC14 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 EPC36 
  
1 4 2 3 8 5 9 6 7 
  
0.353 0.088 0.177 0.118 0.044 0.071 0.039 0.059 0.05 
C298 2 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
3 8 5 1 4 7 1 6 
 
  
0.123 0.046 0.074 0.368 0.092 0.053 0.368 0.061 
 
C299 2 EPC5 EPC6 EPC9 EPC12 EPC38 
    
  
5 2 3 1 4 
    
  
0.088 0.219 0.146 0.438 0.109 
    
C300 1 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
1 2 3 
      
  
0.545 0.273 0.182 
      
C302 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 2 5 4 6 3 
   
  
0.408 0.204 0.082 0.102 0.068 0.136 
   
C305 1 EPC2 EPC7 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C306 3 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C307 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 9 4 2 7 5 6 8 
  
0.353 0.118 0.039 0.088 0.177 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.044 
C308 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 5 3 6 2 4 
   
  
0.408 0.082 0.136 0.068 0.204 0.102 
   
C310 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
2 3 1 
      
  
0.273 0.182 0.545 
      
C311 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 8 4 2 7 5 6 9 
  
0.353 0.118 0.044 0.088 0.177 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.039 
C312 4 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
3 1 9 4 2 7 5 6 8 
  
0.118 0.353 0.039 0.088 0.177 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.044 
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Table B.3 (continued) : Ranking and weighting result of each EPC in accident cause. 
Cause        Times      EPC, ranking and weigting 
C313 1 EPC8 EPC9 EPC34 EPC35 
     
  
1 3 4 2 
     
  
0.480 0.160 0.120 0.240 
     
C314 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C315 5 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 3 4 5 6 2 
   
  
0.408 0.136 0.102 0.082 0.068 0.204 
   
C316 2 EPC1 EPC3 EPC10 EPC11 EPC14 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 EPC36 
  
1 3 2 8 5 4 9 7 6 
  
0.353 0.118 0.177 0.044 0.071 0.088 0.039 0.05 0.059 
 
C317 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C318 1 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
1 2 3 
      
  
0.545 0.273 0.182 
      
C319 1 EPC5 EPC6 EPC9 EPC12 EPC38 
    
  
5 3 4 1 2 
    
  
0.088 0.146 0.109 0.438 0.219 
    
C321 1 EPC1 EPC3 EPC10 EPC11 EPC14 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 EPC36 
  
1 6 2 4 8 3 9 7 5 
  
0.353 0.059 0.177 0.088 0.044 0.118 0.039 0.05 0.071 
C323 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 8 5 2 7 4 6 9 
  
0.353 0.118 0.044 0.071 0.177 0.05 0.088 0.059 0.039 
C324 1 EPC1 EPC3 EPC10 EPC11 EPC14 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 EPC36 
  
1 4 2 9 7 3 8 6 5 
  
0.353 0.088 0.177 0.039 0.05 0.118 0.044 0.059 0.071 
C325 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 9 4 2 7 5 6 8 
  
0.353 0.118 0.039 0.088 0.177 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.044 
C330 1 EPC2 EPC8 EPC14 EPC16 EPC18 
    
  
2 1 4 3 5 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.109 0.146 0.088 
    
C332 2 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 5 2 6 3 4 
   
  
0.408 0.082 0.204 0.068 0.136 0.102 
   
C333 1 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C336 3 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C337 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 3 4 6 5 2 
   
  
0.408 0.136 0.102 0.068 0.082 0.204 
   
C340 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 5 2 6 3 4 
   
  
0.408 0.082 0.204 0.068 0.136 0.102 
   
C343 1 EPC2 EPC7 EPC32 
      
  
2 3 1 
      
  
0.273 0.182 0.545 
      
C344 2 EPC3 EPC13 EPC14 EPC32 EPC33 
    
  
3 1 4 5 2 
    
  
0.146 0.438 0.109 0.088 0.219 
    
C347 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 3 4 5 6 2 
   
  
0.408 0.136 0.102 0.082 0.068 0.204 
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Table B.3 (continued) : Ranking and weighting result of each EPC in accident cause. 
Cause        Times      EPC, ranking and weigting 
C348 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 4 3 6 2 5 
   
  
0.408 0.102 0.136 0.068 0.204 0.082 
   
C359 1 EPC2 EPC7 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C360 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 2 9 3 4 6 5 7 8 
  
0.353 0.177 0.039 0.118 0.088 0.059 0.071 0.05 0.044 
C365 2 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
  
2 1 3 4 5 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.146 0.109 0.088 
    
C367 1 EPC1 EPC11 EPC27 EPC35 
     
  
1 3 4 2 
     
  
0.480 0.160 0.120 0.240 
     
C368 1 EPC3 EPC13 EPC14 EPC32 EPC33 
    
  
3 1 4 5 2 
    
  
0.146 0.438 0.109 0.088 0.219 
    
C371 2 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
2 3 1 
      
  
0.273 0.182 0.545 
      
C373 1 EPC2 EPC7 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C374 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 3 4 5 6 2 
   
  
0.408 0.136 0.102 0.082 0.068 0.204 
   
C376 2 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C377 2 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
3 8 5 1 4 7 2 6 
 
  
0.123 0.046 0.074 0.368 0.092 0.053 0.184 0.061 
 
C384 1 EPC5 EPC6 EPC9 EPC12 EPC38 
    
  
5 2 3 1 4 
    
  
0.088 0.219 0.146 0.438 0.109 
    
C387 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 5 2 6 4 3 
   
  
0.408 0.082 0.204 0.068 0.102 0.136 
   
C388 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
2 3 1 
      
  
0.273 0.182 0.545 
      
C391 1 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C395 1 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
2 3 1 
      
  
0.273 0.182 0.545 
      
C398 1 EPC2 EPC8 EPC14 EPC16 EPC18 
    
  
2 1 4 3 5 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.109 0.146 0.088 
    
C400 2 EPC2 EPC7 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C401 2 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
1 6 3 4 2 5 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.136 0.102 0.204 0.082 
   
C404 1 EPC5 EPC6 EPC9 EPC12 EPC38 
    
  
5 2 3 1 4 
    
  
0.088 0.219 0.146 0.438 0.109 
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Table B.3 (continued) : Ranking and weighting result of each EPC in accident cause. 
Cause        Times      EPC, ranking and weigting 
C405 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
2 3 1 
      
  
0.273 0.182 0.545 
      
C406 2 EPC1 EPC3 EPC10 EPC11 EPC14 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 EPC36 
  
2 5 1 3 8 4 9 7 6 
  
0.353 0.071 0.353 0.118 0.044 0.088 0.039 0.05 0.059 
C409 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 9 4 2 6 5 7 8 
  
0.353 0.118 0.039 0.088 0.177 0.059 0.071 0.05 0.044 
C410 2 EPC5 EPC15 EPC27 EPC34 
     
  
2 1 3 4 
     
  
0.240 0.480 0.160 0.120 
     
C411 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 8 4 2 7 5 6 9 
  
0.353 0.118 0.044 0.088 0.177 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.039 
 
C414 2 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
4 5 2 6 1 3 
   
  
0.102 0.082 0.204 0.068 0.408 0.136 
   
C416 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
2 3 1 
      
  
0.273 0.182 0.545 
      
C421 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 7 3 5 8 4 6 9 
  
0.353 0.118 0.05 0.118 0.071 0.044 0.088 0.059 0.039 
C422 2 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C423 1 EPC2 EPC7 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C427 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 8 5 2 7 4 6 9 
  
0.353 0.118 0.044 0.071 0.177 0.05 0.088 0.059 0.039 
C428 1 EPC2 EPC8 EPC14 EPC16 EPC18 
    
  
2 1 4 3 5 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.109 0.146 0.088 
    
C429 1 EPC1 EPC3 EPC10 EPC11 EPC14 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 EPC36 
  
1 5 2 3 8 4 9 7 6 
  
0.353 0.071 0.177 0.118 0.044 0.088 0.039 0.05 0.059 
C430 2 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
1 6 3 4 2 5 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.136 0.102 0.204 0.082 
   
C431 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 9 5 2 7 4 6 8 
  
0.353 0.118 0.039 0.071 0.177 0.05 0.088 0.059 0.044 
C436 3 EPC1 EPC12 EPC14 
      
  
2 1 3 
      
  
0.273 0.545 0.182 
      
C437 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C438 1 EPC5 EPC6 EPC9 EPC12 EPC38 
    
  
5 3 4 1 2 
    
  
0.088 0.146 0.109 0.438 0.219 
    
C439 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 9 5 2 7 4 6 8 
  
0.353 0.118 0.039 0.071 0.177 0.05 0.088 0.059 0.044 
C442 2 EPC2 EPC8 EPC14 EPC16 EPC18 
    
  
2 1 4 3 5 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.109 0.146 0.088 
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Table B.3 (continued) : Ranking and weighting result of each EPC in accident cause. 
Cause        Times      EPC, ranking and weigting 
C443 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 6 9 3 2 8 4 5 7 
  
0.353 0.059 0.039 0.118 0.177 0.044 0.088 0.071 0.05 
C444 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
  
2 1 3 4 5 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.146 0.109 0.088 
    
C445 2 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
2 3 1 
      
  
0.273 0.182 0.545 
      
C449 1 EPC5 EPC6 EPC9 EPC12 EPC38 
    
  
5 2 3 1 4 
    
  
0.088 0.219 0.146 0.438 0.109 
    
C452 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 6 2 5 4 3 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.204 0.082 0.102 0.136 
   
C453 1 EPC3 EPC13 EPC14 EPC32 EPC33 
    
  
3 1 4 5 2 
    
  
0.146 0.438 0.109 0.088 0.219 
    
C456 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 5 2 6 4 3 
   
  
0.408 0.082 0.204 0.068 0.102 0.136 
   
C457 3 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 3 4 5 6 2 
   
  
0.408 0.136 0.102 0.082 0.068 0.204 
   
C460 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 9 4 2 7 5 6 8 
  
0.353 0.118 0.039 0.088 0.177 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.044 
C461 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
  
2 1 3 5 4 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.146 0.088 0.109 
    
C462 1 EPC2 EPC7 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C463 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 6 2 5 4 3 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.204 0.082 0.102 0.136 
   
C465 1 EPC1 EPC3 EPC10 EPC11 EPC14 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 EPC36 
  
1 4 2 3 8 5 9 6 7 
  
0.353 0.088 0.177 0.118 0.044 0.071 0.039 0.059 0.05 
C467 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
3 2 5 1 4 7 8 6 
 
  
0.123 0.184 0.074 0.368 0.092 0.053 0.046 0.061 
 
C469 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 5 2 6 4 3 
   
  
0.408 0.082 0.204 0.068 0.102 0.136 
   
C471 1 EPC2 EPC7 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C472 2 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 9 4 2 7 5 6 8 
  
0.353 0.118 0.039 0.088 0.177 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.044 
C473 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 6 2 5 4 3 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.204 0.082 0.102 0.136 
   
C474 1 EPC5 EPC19 EPC33 EPC36 
     
  
3 4 1 2 
     
  
0.160 0.120 0.480 0.240 
     
C475 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 4 3 5 6 2 
   
  
0.408 0.102 0.136 0.082 0.068 0.204 
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Table B.3 (continued) : Ranking and weighting result of each EPC in accident cause. 
Cause        Times      EPC, ranking and weigting 
C475 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 4 3 5 6 2 
   
  
0.408 0.102 0.136 0.082 0.068 0.204 
   
C476 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
2 3 5 1 4 8 7 6 
 
  
0.184 0.123 0.074 0.368 0.092 0.046 0.053 0.061 
 
C478 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 3 2 5 6 4 
   
  
0.408 0.136 0.204 0.082 0.068 0.102 
   
C481 1 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
1 5 4 3 2 6 
   
  
0.408 0.082 0.102 0.136 0.204 0.068 
   
C482 1 EPC5 EPC19 EPC33 EPC36 
     
  
4 3 1 2 
     
  
0.120 0.160 0.480 0.240 
     
C483 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 5 2 6 4 3 
   
  
0.408 0.082 0.204 0.068 0.102 0.136 
   
C484 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
  
2 1 3 4 5 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.146 0.109 0.088 
     
C485 2 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
2 3 1 
      
  
0.273 0.182 0.545 
      
C486 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 5 3 6 4 2 
   
  
0.408 0.082 0.136 0.068 0.102 0.204 
   
C487 1 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
1 6 3 4 2 5 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.136 0.102 0.204 0.082 
   
C492 2 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C494 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
2 3 5 1 4 8 7 6 
 
  
0.184 0.123 0.074 0.368 0.092 0.046 0.053 0.061 
 
C495 1 EPC1 EPC3 EPC10 EPC11 EPC14 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 EPC36 
  
1 4 2 8 3 5 9 7 6 
  
0.353 0.088 0.177 0.044 0.118 0.071 0.039 0.05 0.059 
C496 1 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
1 2 3 
      
  
0.545 0.273 0.182 
      
C504 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 9 4 2 7 5 6 8 
  
0.353 0.118 0.039 0.088 0.177 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.044 
C505 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
2 3 5 1 4 7 8 6 
 
  
0.184 0.123 0.074 0.368 0.092 0.053 0.046 0.061 
 
C509 1 EPC5 EPC6 EPC9 EPC12 EPC38 
    
  
3 4 5 1 2 
    
  
0.146 0.109 0.088 0.438 0.219 
    
C510 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 8 4 2 7 5 6 9 
  
0.353 0.118 0.044 0.088 0.177 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.039 
C511 1 EPC2 EPC7 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C513 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
2 3 5 1 4 8 7 6 
 
  
0.184 0.123 0.074 0.368 0.092 0.046 0.053 0.061 
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Table B.3 (continued) : Ranking and weighting result of each EPC in accident cause. 
Cause        Times      EPC, ranking and weigting 
C514 1 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
1 6 2 4 3 5 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.204 0.102 0.136 0.082 
   
C520 1 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C523 2 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
  
2 1 3 5 4 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.146 0.088 0.109 
    
C529 1 EPC5 EPC19 EPC33 EPC36 
     
  
3 4 1 2 
     
  
0.160 0.120 0.480 0.240 
     
C530 1 EPC1 EPC3 EPC10 EPC11 EPC14 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 EPC36 
  
1 5 2 3 8 4 9 7 6 
  
0.353 0.071 0.177 0.118 0.044 0.088 0.039 0.05 0.059 
C533 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 5 2 6 4 3 
   
  
0.408 0.082 0.204 0.068 0.102 0.136 
   
C535 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
2 3 5 1 4 8 7 6 
 
  
0.184 0.123 0.074 0.368 0.092 0.046 0.053 0.061 
 
C538 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 9 4 2 7 5 6 8 
  
0.353 0.118 0.039 0.088 0.177 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.044 
C543 1 EPC5 EPC6 EPC9 EPC12 EPC38 
    
  
5 2 3 4 1 
    
  
0.088 0.219 0.146 0.109 0.438 
    
C544 2 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 3 4 5 6 2 
   
  
0.408 0.136 0.102 0.082 0.068 0.204 
   
C551 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
  
2 1 4 5 3 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.109 0.088 0.146 
    
C552 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
2 3 1 
      
  
0.273 0.182 0.545 
      
C554 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 8 4 2 6 5 7 9 
  
0.353 0.118 0.044 0.088 0.177 0.059 0.071 0.05 0.039 
C555 1 EPC1 EPC3 EPC10 EPC11 EPC14 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 EPC36 
  
1 5 2 3 9 4 8 7 6 
  
0.353 0.071 0.177 0.118 0.039 0.088 0.044 0.05 0.059 
C556 1 EPC2 EPC7 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C557 1 EPC1 EPC3 EPC10 EPC11 EPC14 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 EPC36 
  
1 5 2 3 8 4 9 7 6 
  
0.353 0.071 0.177 0.118 0.044 0.088 0.039 0.05 0.059 
C558 1 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
1 6 3 4 2 5 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.136 0.102 0.204 0.082 
   
C561 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 3 4 6 5 2 
   
  
0.408 0.136 0.102 0.068 0.082 0.204 
   
C562 2 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 5 2 3 4 6 
   
  
0.408 0.082 0.204 0.136 0.102 0.068 
   
C565 1 EPC3 EPC13 EPC14 EPC32 EPC33 
    
  
2 1 4 5 3 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.109 0.088 0.146 
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Table B.3 (continued) : Ranking and weighting result of each EPC in accident cause. 
Cause        Times      EPC, ranking and weigting 
C566 1 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
1 3 4 6 2 5 
   
  
0.408 0.136 0.102 0.068 0.204 0.082 
   
C567 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
2 3 1 
      
  
0.273 0.182 0.545 
      
C569 2 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
2 3 5 1 4 7 8 6 
 
  
0.184 0.123 0.074 0.368 0.092 0.053 0.046 0.061 
 
C570 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 3 5 6 4 2 
   
  
0.408 0.136 0.082 0.068 0.102 0.204 
   
C573 1 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
1 4 3 6 2 5 
   
  
0.408 0.102 0.136 0.068 0.204 0.082 
   
C574 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 8 4 2 5 6 7 9 
  
0.353 0.118 0.044 0.088 0.177 0.071 0.059 0.05 0.039 
C577 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 6 2 5 4 3 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.204 0.082 0.102 0.136 
   
C578 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 3 4 5 6 2 
   
  
0.408 0.136 0.102 0.082 0.068 0.204 
    
C582 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
  
2 1 3 5 4 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.146 0.088 0.109 
    
C584 2 EPC1 EPC12 EPC14 
      
  
1 2 3 
      
  
0.545 0.273 0.182 
      
C585 2 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C586 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
2 3 5 1 4 7 8 6 
 
  
0.184 0.123 0.074 0.368 0.092 0.053 0.046 0.061 
 
C587 1 EPC1 EPC3 EPC10 EPC11 EPC14 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 EPC36 
  
1 5 2 3 8 4 9 7 6 
  
0.353 0.071 0.177 0.118 0.044 0.088 0.039 0.05 0.059 
C588 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
2 3 1 
      
  
0.273 0.182 0.545 
      
C589 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 5 2 6 4 3 
   
  
0.408 0.082 0.204 0.068 0.102 0.136 
   
C590 1 EPC8 EPC9 EPC34 EPC35 
     
  
1 3 4 2 
     
  
0.480 0.160 0.120 0.240 
     
C593 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 9 4 2 7 5 6 8 
  
0.353 0.118 0.039 0.088 0.177 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.044 
C594 1 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
1 6 3 4 2 5 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.136 0.102 0.204 0.082 
   
C596 1 EPC1 EPC3 EPC10 EPC11 EPC14 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 EPC36 
  
1 4 2 3 8 5 9 6 7 
  
0.353 0.088 0.177 0.118 0.044 0.071 0.039 0.059 0.05 
C599 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 2 5 4 6 3 
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Table B.3 (continued) : Ranking and weighting result of each EPC in accident cause. 
Cause        Times      EPC, ranking and weigting 
C609 1 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
1 6 4 3 2 5 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.102 0.136 0.204 0.082 
   
C610 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 2 4 6 5 3 
   
  
0.408 0.204 0.102 0.068 0.082 0.136 
   
C611 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 8 5 2 7 4 6 9 
  
0.353 0.118 0.044 0.071 0.177 0.05 0.088 0.059 0.039 
C613 1 EPC2 EPC7 EPC32 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C619 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 6 3 4 5 2 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.136 0.102 0.082 0.204 
   
C620 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 9 5 2 7 4 6 8 
  
0.353 0.118 0.039 0.071 0.177 0.05 0.088 0.059 0.044 
C623 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 6 2 3 4 5 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.204 0.136 0.102 0.082 
   
C625 1 EPC5 EPC15 EPC27 EPC34 
     
  
2 1 3 4 
     
  
0.240 0.480 0.160 0.120 
     
C626 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
2 3 1 
      
  
0.273 0.182 0.545 
      
C627 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
  
1 2 3 4 5 
    
  
0.438 0.219 0.146 0.109 0.088 
    
C631 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
2 3 6 1 4 7 8 5 
 
  
0.184 0.123 0.061 0.368 0.092 0.053 0.046 0.074 
 
C634 1 EPC8 EPC18 EPC37 
      
  
1 3 2 
      
  
0.545 0.182 0.273 
      
C635 1 EPC1 EPC3 EPC10 EPC11 EPC14 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 EPC36 
  
1 5 2 3 8 4 9 7 6 
  
0.353 0.071 0.177 0.118 0.044 0.088 0.039 0.05 0.059 
C636 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 6 2 5 4 3 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.204 0.082 0.102 0.136 
   
C637 2 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
  
2 1 3 5 4 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.146 0.088 0.109 
    
C640 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 3 4 5 6 2 
   
  
0.408 0.136 0.102 0.082 0.068 0.204 
   
C641 1 EPC2 EPC8 EPC14 EPC16 EPC18 
    
  
2 1 4 3 5 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.109 0.146 0.088 
    
C642 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 2 3 5 6 4 
   
  
0.408 0.204 0.136 0.082 0.068 0.102 
   
C644 1 EPC5 EPC19 EPC33 EPC36 
     
  
3 4 1 2 
     
  
0.160 0.120 0.480 0.240 
     
C645 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 9 5 2 7 4 6 8 
  
0.353 0.118 0.039 0.071 0.177 0.05 0.088 0.059 0.044 
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Table B.3 (continued) : Ranking and weighting result of each EPC in accident cause. 
Cause        Times      EPC, ranking and weigting 
C647 1 EPC13 EPC17 EPC20 EPC22 EPC26 EPC28 
   
  
1 6 3 4 2 5 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.136 0.102 0.204 0.082 
   
C649 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 2 3 6 5 4 
   
  
0.408 0.204 0.136 0.068 0.082 0.102 
   
C650 2 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 6 2 5 4 3 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.204 0.082 0.102 0.136 
   
C655 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC16 EPC17 EPC21 
    
  
2 1 4 5 3 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.109 0.088 0.146 
    
C659 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
2 3 1 
      
  
0.273 0.182 0.545 
      
C660 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 6 2 5 4 3 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.204 0.082 0.102 0.136 
   
C663 1 EPC8 EPC9 EPC34 EPC35 
     
  
1 3 4 2 
     
  
0.480 0.160 0.120 0.240 
     
C670 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 9 4 2 7 5 6 8 
  
0.353 0.118 0.039 0.088 0.177 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.044 
 
C671 1 EPC1 EPC9 EPC10 EPC14 EPC23 EPC38 
   
  
1 6 2 5 4 3 
   
  
0.408 0.068 0.204 0.082 0.102 0.136 
   
C674 1 EPC5 EPC6 EPC9 EPC12 EPC38 
    
  
2 2 3 1 4 
    
  
0.219 0.219 0.146 0.438 0.109 
    
C675 1 EPC2 EPC4 EPC7 EPC11 EPC12 EPC17 EPC21 EPC26 EPC28 
  
1 3 9 4 2 7 5 6 8 
  
0.353 0.118 0.039 0.088 0.177 0.05 0.071 0.059 0.044 
C683 1 EPC10 EPC13 EPC14 EPC15 EPC16 EPC20 EPC25 EPC37 
 
  
2 3 5 1 4 7 8 6 
 
  
0.184 0.123 0.074 0.368 0.092 0.053 0.046 0.061 
 
C689 1 EPC8 EPC9 EPC34 EPC35 
     
  
1 4 3 2 
     
  
0.480 0.120 0.160 0.240 
     
C690 1 EPC2 EPC8 EPC14 EPC16 EPC18 
    
  
2 1 4 3 5 
    
  
0.219 0.438 0.109 0.146 0.088 
    
C691 1 EPC11 EPC16 EPC19 EPC20 EPC22 EPC23 
   
  
1 2 4 6 5 3 
   
  
0.408 0.204 0.102 0.068 0.082 0.136 
   
C692 1 EPC4 EPC24 EPC32 
      
  
2 3 1 
      
  
0.273 0.182 0.545 
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Table B.4 : Comprehensive results for discharging process of propylene oxide cargo. 
Step Sub-step Gep value EPC EPC max.    
    affect 
EPC APOA HEP value 
1. 1.1 4.00E-04 EPC2 14.01 0.648 7.24E-03 
   
EPC38 3.61 0.352 
 
 
1.2 2.00E-05 EPC8 14.15 0.142 3.18E-04 
   
EPC14 6.72 0.525 
 
   
EPC18 2.15 0.334 
 
 
1.3 4.00E-04 EPC2 14.01 0.320 2.32E-02 
   
EPC11 8.60 0.557 
 
   
EPC35 10.30 0.123 
 
 
1.4 4.00E-04 EPC5 5.76 0.311 7.12E-03 
   
EPC13 12.55 0.100 
 
   
EPC15 10.03 0.182 
 
   
EPC22 1.64 0.406 
 
 
1.5 3.00E-03 EPC2 14.01 0.286 7.77E-02 
   
EPC11 8.60 0.271 
 
   
EPC17 2.79 0.443 
 
 
1.6 2.00E-05 EPC12 12.51 0.211 1.72E-03 
   
EPC13 12.55 0.387 
 
   
EPC33 9.90 0.402 
 
 
1.7 2.00E-05 EPC2 14.01 0.309 2.88E-04 
   
EPC17 2.79 0.189 
 
   
EPC26 3.28 0.502 
 
 
1.8 4.00E-04 EPC1 17.00 0.320 1.96E-02 
   
EPC10 11.00 0.557 
 
   
EPC17 2.79 0.123 
 
 
1.9 4.00E-04 EPC2 14.01 0.258 1.15E-02 
   
EPC11 8.60 0.419 
 
   
EPC17 2.79 0.323 
 
 
1.10 2.00E-05 EPC17 2.79 0.602 1.89E-04 
   
EPC33 9.90 0.398 
 
 
1.11 3.00E-03 EPC2 14.01 0.198 1.64E-01 
   
EPC14 6.72 0.348 
 
   
EPC15 10.03 0.454 
 
 
1.12 2.00E-05 EPC17 2.79 0.750 1.51E-04 
   
EPC33 9.90 0.250 
 
 
1.13 4.00E-04 EPC2 14.01 0.503 1.04E-02 
   
EPC14 6.72 0.233 
 
   
EPC17 2.79 0.264 
 
 
1.14 2.00E-05 EPC2 14.01 0.289 1.24E-03 
   
EPC12 12.51 0.303 
 
   
EPC23 5.69 0.405 
 
 
1.15 2.00E-02 EPC17 2.79 1.000 
 
5.58E-02 
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Table B.4 (continued) : Comprehensive results for discharging process of propylene                   
oxide cargo. 
Step Sub-step Gep value EPC EPC max.    
    affect 
EPC APOA HEP value 
2 2.1 2.00E-05 EPC1 17.00 0.334 1.84E-03 
   
EPC13 12.55 0.525 
 
   
EPC16 8.42 0.142 
 
 
2.2 3.00E-03 EPC15 10.03 0.557 2.21E-02 
   
EPC17 2.79 0.123 
 
 
2.3 2.00E-05 EPC2 14.01 0.458 5.71E-04 
   
EPC14 6.72 0.542 
 
 
2.4 4.00E-04 EPC12 12.51 0.310 1.32E-02 
   
EPC15 10.03 0.690 
 
 
2.5 4.00E-04 EPC11 8.60 0.489 8.89E-03 
   
EPC15 10.03 0.411 
 3 3.1 2.00E-05 EPC2 14.01 0.236 4.90E-04 
   
EPC18 2.15 0.389 
 
   
EPC32 9.43 0.375 
 
 
3.2 3.00E-03 EPC2 14.01 0.355 3.63E-02 
   
EPC17 2.79 0.645 
 
 
3.3 2.00E-02 EPC17 2.79 1.000 5.58E-02 
 
3.4 4.00E-04 EPC17 2.79 0.406 4.56E-03 
   
EPC27 4.35 0.100 
 
   
EPC33 9.90 0.182 
 
   
EPC36 3.85 0.311 
 
 
3.5 2.00E-05 EPC17 2.79 0.315 6.62E-05 
   
EPC34 2.63 0.685 
 4 4.1 3.00E-03 EPC13 12.55 0.290 4.41E-02 
   
EPC27 4.35 0.710 
 
 
4.2 2.00E-02 EPC17 2.79 1.000 5.58E-02 
 
4.3 4.00E-04 EPC1 17.00 0.125 6.88E-03 
   
EPC15 10.03 0.369 
 
   
EPC22 1.64 0.506 
 
 
4.4 3.00E-03 EPC17 2.79 0.348 6.90E-03 
   
EPC22 1.64 0.652 
 
 
4.5 4.00E-04 EPC27 4.35 0.383 2.38E-03 
   
EPC38 3.61 0.617 
 
 
4.6 3.00E-03 EPC2 14.01 1.000 4.20E-02 
 
4.7 4.00E-04 EPC8 14.45 0.320 9.35E-03 
   
EPC14 6.72 0.123 
 
   
EPC36 3.85 0.557 
 
 
4.8 3.00E-03 EPC15 10.03 0.250 2.29E-02 
   
EPC17 2.79 0.750 
 
 
4.9 4.00E-04 EPC2 14.01 1.000 5.60E-03 
5 5.1 4.00E-04 EPC2 14.01 0.817 8.64E-03 
 
  
EPC23 5.69 0.183 
 
 
5.2 2.00E-02 EPC17 2.79 0.334 7.11E-02 
   
EPC22 1.64 0.525 
 
   
EPC23 5.69 0.142 
 
 
5.3 2.00E-05 EPC8 14.45 0.311 1.88E-03 
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Table B.4 (continued) : Comprehensive results for discharging process of propylene 
oxide cargo. 
Step Sub-step Gep value EPC EPC max.    
    affect 
EPC APOA HEP value 
   EPC11 8.60 0.100  
   EPC13 12.55 0.182  
 
  
EPC14 6.72 0.406 
 
 
5.4 2.00E-02 EPC22 1.64 1.000 3.28E-02 
 
5.5 4.00E-04 EPC2 14.01 0.320 8.64E-03 
 
  
EPC17 2.79 0.557 
 
 
  
EPC33 9.90 0.123 
 
 
5.6 4.00E-04 EPC2 14.01 0.750 1.40E-02 
   
EPC15 10.03 0.250 
 6 6.1 9.00E-02 EPC22 1.64 0.366 1.53E-01 
   
EPC29 1.59 0.634 
 
 
6.2 4.00E-04 EPC12 12.51 0.204 7.67E-03 
   
EPC22 1.64 0.363 
 
   
EPC32 9.43 0.433 
 
 
6.3 2.00E-05 EPC17 2.79 0.310 8.71E-05 
   
EPC38 3.61 0.690 
 7 7.1 4.00E-04 EPC2 14.01 0.311 1.37E-02 
   
EPC32 9.43 0.689 
 
 
7.2 2.00E-05 EPC14 6.72 0.406 2.33E-04 
   
EPC27 4.35 0.182 
 
   
EPC36 3.85 0.412 
 
 
7.3 2.00E-05 EPC2 14.01 0.625 8.67E-04 
   
EPC10 11.00 0.375 
 
 
7.4 4.00E-04 EPC23 5.69 0.701 6.28E-03 
   
EPC33 9.90 0.299 
 
 
7.5 2.00E-05 EPC15 10.03 0.199 1.39E-04 
   
EPC25 1.22 0.287 
 
   
EPC38 3.61 0.514 
 8 8.1 4.00E-04 EPC10 11.00 0.308 1.45E-02 
   
EPC13 12.55 0.453 
 
   
EPC17 2.79 0.239 
 
 
8.2 2.00E-05 EPC8 14.15 0.389 5.50E-04 
   
EPC14 6.72 0.611 
 
 
8.3 4.00E-04 EPC2 14.01 0.504 3.59E-03 
   
EPC15 1.03 0.216 
 
   
EPC22 1.64 0.280 
 
 
8.4 4.00E-04 EPC17 2.79 1.000 1.12E-03 
 
8.5 2.00E-05 EPC11 8.60 0.478 6.64E-04 
   
EPC14 6.72 0.366 
 
   
EPC32 9.43 0.156 
 
 
8.6 2.00E-02 EPC17 2.79 1.000 5.58E-02 
 
8.7 2.00E-05 EPC1 17.00 0.203 1.69E-03 
   
EPC2 14.01 0.412 
 
   
EPC27 4.35 0.398 
 
   
EPC38 3.61 0.130 
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